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PREFACE 
 
 
This study examines the effect of stock market liberalization in four main areas 
that are the revaluation effect of the firm stock return, firm investment rate and firm cost 
of capital, and firm performance.  The study uses annual firm-level data in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand from 1976 to 2003.  The total number of firms in this study is 469 
firms in 31 sectors.  The revaluation effect of firm stock return is composed of the effect 
on the Main board and on the Alien board.  The years 1985, 1987, and 1991 are the stock 
market liberalization years, based on significant liberalization events that occurred in 
those years.  I analyze the pre, during, post, and after effects of stock market 
liberalization on firm stock return, firm investment rate, firm cost of capital, and firm 
performance.  I compare the effect of the stock market liberalization to two years before 
liberalization level.  The main focus is on the during and post-liberalization effects of 
liberalization and the effect of the 1987 stock market liberalization on the firm stock 
return revaluation, firm investment and cost of capital, and firm performance. 
             In analyzing the effects, I first controlled for firm differences and later for sector 
differences.  The firm Main board stock return declines from the pre-liberalization level 
during the 1985 stock market liberalization, increases in the post-liberalization, and falls 
again in the after-period of the liberalization.  A change in firm size in during, post and 
after period of 1985 liberalization does not affect the firm Main board stock return.  The 
1987 stock market liberalization positively affects the firm Main board stock return
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during the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place but negatively affects the firm 
Main board stock return later on.  A change in firm size in during, post, and after-periods 
of the 1987 stock market liberalization does not affect the revaluation of the firm Main 
board stock return. 
The firm investment rate significantly declines from the pre-liberalization level 
following the 1985 liberalization during the liberalization takes place but significantly 
increases from the pre-liberalization following the 1987 liberalization during the 
liberalization takes place when no controlled variables are included.  The effect of the 
1987 stock market liberalization on firm investment is quite large since the firm 
investment rate increases from the pre-liberalization level in during, post, and after-
periods of the 1987 stock market liberalization.  When control variables are included in 
the estimation, the firm investment rate still significantly increases from the pre-
liberalization level in the post and after liberalization periods.  The firm cost of capital 
significantly declines following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization. The 1987 
stock market liberalization causes a reduction in firm cost of capital in during, post, and 
after-liberalization periods while the 1985 stock market liberalization causes a reduction 
in firm cost of capital in the post and after-liberalization periods. 
Firm performance significantly improves from the pre-liberalization level in the 
post and after liberalization periods following the 1985 and 1987 liberalization regardless 
of which firm performance proxy is used.  The improvement in firm performance is 
strongest when the liberalization year is 1987 since both firm performance proxies show 
a significant improvement in firm performance in the during, post, and after periods of 
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the 1987 liberalization.  The improvement in firm performance is much stronger when 
Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy of firm performance instead of ROA. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A.  Motivation 
 
 
The economic and financial crises in emerging countries prompted many 
academics and researchers to question the merit of financial and capital liberalization.  
Joseph Stiglitz of the World Bank and Paul Krugman of MIT have favored capital 
controls (Kim and Singal, 2000).  In contrast, economists such as Merton Miller reason 
that the financial crisis has occurred because markets are not open enough and that some 
existing controls needed to be removed (Kim and Singal, 2000).  Although some 
economists have favored capital controls, global markets have moved toward capital 
liberalization.  Stock market liberalization is one form of financial liberalization.  By 
liberalizing the stock market, countries allow foreign investors to participate in their 
stock markets through buying and selling domestic shares.  Stock market liberalization is 
also a specific element of capital account liberalization since it removes restrictions on 
capital inflows and capital outflows.  Stock market liberalization affects both the 
financial and the macroeconomic development of countries.  It is thus a particular type of 
policy that may help to promote financial and economic development (Fuchs-Schundein 
and Norbert Funk, 2001).   
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For emerging countries, there are several potential advantages of opening their 
stock markets to foreign investors.  Liberalization stock markets represent an important 
opportunity to attract foreign capital to finance economic growth (Kim and Singal, 2000).  
It is argued that stock market liberalization is related to long-run economic growth 
(Levine and Zervos, 1998).  Because stock market liberalization, besides allowing 
foreigners to own domestic securities allows domestic investors to obtain external 
financing from abroad, it is argued that firms that need external financing in economies 
that are liberalizing their financial sectors will grow disproportionately faster than those 
in economies that are not liberalizing their financial sector (Das, 2003).  Furthermore, by 
comparing countries with differences in the development of financial markets, Rajan and 
Zingales found that development of financial markets facilitates economic growth by 
reducing the cost of external financing (Kim and Singal, 2000).  It is also argued that the 
international risk-sharing through global diversification results in improved resource 
allocation (Obstfeld, 1994).   
However, we must compare the benefits of stock market liberalization with the 
uncertainty associated with it.  One major concern is the movement of hot money, which 
is an international flow of funds allegedly highly sensitive to differences in interest rates, 
expectations of future economic growth, and expected returns from holding securities 
(Kim and Singal, 2000).  Therefore, given this investment sensitivity, even a small shock 
to the economy might lead to a volatile change in fund flows, which exacerbates the 
shock or can destabilize the domestic economy (Kim and Singal, 2000).  In addition, it is 
argued that stock market liberalization might lead to an increase in volatility in stock 
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prices.  This might make investors demand higher risk premiums, which implies higher 
costs of capital and less investment (Kim and Singal, 2000). 
 
B.  Objective 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to capture the effect of stock market liberalization.  The 
primary focus of this dissertation is on the revaluation effect of stock market 
liberalization.  In addition, this dissertation also tries to identify the effect of stock market 
liberalization on firm investment rate and firm cost of capital.  Lastly, this dissertation 
also tries to identify the effect of the stock market liberalization on firm performance.  In 
evaluating the effect of stock market liberalization, I look at pre, during post, and after 
effects, with the main concentration on the effect in during and post stock market 
liberalization.  The estimation will be controlled for firm differences and then later for 
sector differences.  This dissertation focuses on Thailand since Thailand has employed a 
series of financial liberalization policies over decades.  Two alternative liberalization 
years are studied since stock market liberalization is a gradual process and the events that 
occurred in those years are considered major liberalization events.  The liberalization 
years are 1985 and 1987, respectively since those years have the significant liberalization 
events.  In analyzing the revaluation effect of the firm stock return on both firm Main 
board and Alien board, 1991 is used as the additional liberalization year since the firm 
Alien board share price started to appear on the Alien board in 1988 and 1991 is another 
year that had significant liberalization event.  Annual firm-level data from 1976 to 2003 
are used for this study.  The sample firms are those listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET).  The firms that are used in this study are 469 firms in 31 sectors.  In 
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addition to the whole sample dataset, sub-sample datasets that contain only firms with 
observations before and after each liberalization year are also used in the estimation to 
identify whether the effect of the stock market liberalization is different when estimation 
is applied to the smaller datasets.   
 
C.  Contribution 
 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the effect of stock market 
liberalization on three main areas: the revaluation of firm Main board and Alien board 
stock return, the effect on firm investment rate and firm cost of capital, and the effect on 
firm performance using two different liberalization years.  This study provides a better 
understanding of the true effect of stock market liberalization on three main related areas; 
because stock market liberalization induced capital inflows into the economy, it will 
certainly affect those three related main areas.  Rather than focusing on a single 
liberalization year, this dissertation uses two different liberalization years, thereby 
showing the different effects of stock market liberalization in different liberalization 
years. 
D.  Main Finding 
 
 
The effects of the stock market liberalization on firm stock return, firm 
investment rate/firm cost of capital, and firm performance vary depending on the year of 
liberalization.  The magnitude of the increase also varies depending on the year of 
liberalization as well.  The immediate impact of the 1985 stock market liberalization on 
firm Main board stock return is negative.  In addition, since there was only one trading 
board during the period of the 1985 liberalization along with the foreign ownership limit 
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that constrained foreigners to trade shares within specified limit, these factors might have 
caused the revaluation effect of the 1985 stock market liberalization to be lower than 
expected.  A change in firm size in during, post, and after period of the 1985 stock market 
liberalization does not affect the firm Main board stock return.  The inauguration of the 
Alien board in 1987 to facilitate foreign investment causes an immediate positive impact 
on the firm Main board stock return.  The firm Main board stock return increases from 
the pre-liberalization level during the 1987 stock market liberalization.  The firm Main 
board stock return then declines in the post and after-liberalization period.  Firm size in 
the during, post, and after-period of the 1987 stock market liberalization does not affects 
the revaluation effect of the firm Main board stock return. 
For the Alien board stock return, the 1991 stock market liberalization negatively 
affects the firm Alien board stock return during the year that liberalization takes place.  A 
change in firm size in during, post, and after period of the 1991 stock market 
liberalization does not affect the firm Alien board stock return.  A different ability in 
utilizing information among foreign and local investors might be one factor that drives up 
the difference in the revaluation effect of the firm Main board and firm Alien board.   
In the firm investment rate/ firm cost of capital and firm performance sections.  
The firm investment rate immediate declines from the pre-liberalization level following 
the 1985 stock market liberalization while immediately increases from the pre-
liberalization level following the 1987 stock market liberalization.  The estimation with 
no control variables shows that the firm investment rate significantly increases from the 
pre-liberalization level in during, post, and after-period of the 1987 stock market 
liberalization.  When control variables are included, the firm investment rate is still 
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significantly higher than the pre-liberalization level in the post and after liberalization 
periods.  An increase in firm investment rate following the liberalization is consistent 
with the International Asset Pricing Model since it predicts that the cost of capital should 
decline following the liberalization.   When the cost of capital declines the expected 
return increases thereby the firm share price should rise.  As the firm share price 
increases, this will increase the Tobin’s Q.  The change in Tobin’s Q value as a result of 
the stock market liberalization will drive the subsequent adjustment in the firm’s capital 
stock (Chari and Henry 2005).  Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 
has the strongest immediate positive impact on firm investment rate.   
For the effect of liberalization on firm cost of capital, the firm cost of capital 
immediately declines from its pre-liberalization value following the 1985 and 1987 stock 
market liberalizations. In addition to a reduction in firm cost of capital following the 
1985 and 1987 liberalizations in the post and after liberalization periods, the cost of 
capital also falls in the during liberalization period.  Thus, the inauguration of the Alien 
board in 1987 is considered a major liberalization event since the firm cost of capital falls 
and investment increases following the 1987 liberalization.   
For the effect of stock market liberalization on firm performance, firm 
performance significantly improves following the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
liberalization.  In addition to a significant improvement in firm performance following 
the 1985 and 1987 liberalizations in the post (POSTLIB) and after liberalization periods 
(LIBAF), firm performance also significantly improves in the during liberalization period 
(LIB0) following the 1987 liberalization. Therefore, an inauguration of the Alien board in 
1987 has a large positive impact on firm performance.  Therefore, during the year of the 
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liberalization, the 1987 stock market liberalization positively affects the firm Main board 
stock return, firm investment rate, and firm performance and causes a reduction in firm 
cost of capital following the liberalization. 
 
E.  Organization 
 
 
 This dissertation is organized into six chapters.  The second chapter contains the 
literature review, which discusses previous studies of the effects of the stock market 
liberalization.  The third section, the history of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, includes 
the liberalization process, the liberalization policies, and the policies to promote foreign 
investments.  The fourth section is the methodology issues and data.  This section 
discusses the datasets used to conduct this study and the methodology used to evaluate 
the effects of stock market liberalization in the three main areas of study.  The fifth 
section is the findings section.  This section discusses the findings related to the effect of 
stock market liberalization in the three main areas of study in the three different 
liberalization years.  The sixth section is the summary.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Levine (2001) argued that international capital flow liberalization is a useful 
policy tool for a country seeking to boost stock market development.  He also argued that 
international financial integration can boost the operation of domestic financial systems 
and thereby stimulate improvement in resource allocation and faster economic growth 
(Levine, 2001).  Many studies look at the effect of stock market liberalization.  Most 
studies address the effect of stock market liberalization at the aggregate or country level.  
Most of the literature on stock market liberalization focuses mainly on the revaluation 
effect of stock market liberalization.  The effects of stock market liberalization are also 
studied in the area of cost of capital, investment, economic growth, market efficiency, 
and market liquidity.  In addition to country-level studies of the effect of stock market 
liberalization, studies of the firm-level effect have been also done.  Chari and Henry 
(2004) argued that firm level data provide a sufficient degree of freedom to disentangle 
the contribution of changes in the risk free rate from changes in risk sharing following the 
stock market liberalization.  According to Chari and Henry (2005), the stock market 
liberalization affects the cost of capital through two channels: the risk free rate and the 
firm-specific beta effect.  The stock market liberalization results in a fall in risk free rate 
as the country moves from financial autarky to integration with the world market.  The 
common shock to the cost of capital as shown by a reduction in the risk free rate will
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increase the average investment rate of the firms (Chari and Henry 2005).  Through the 
beta effect, the stock market liberalization change the relevant benchmark for pricing the 
risk of individual stocks from local stock market index to a world market index (Chari 
and Henry 2005).  Consequently, the equity-risk premium falls, the expected return falls 
and the stock price increases.  This is the prediction of the International Asset Pricing 
Model.  In addition, as the equity premium falls following the liberalization for firms 
whose returns are less correlated with the world market than they are with the local 
market, this implies the firms whose equity-risk premiums fall should invest more than 
those whose risk premium rises (Chari and Henry 2005).  Therefore, the stock market 
liberalization should result in an increase in firm share price and investment rate. 
The studies of the effects of stock market liberalization are organized into four areas: the 
revaluation effect of stock market liberalization; the effect of stock market liberalization 
on cost of capital, investment and Tobin’s Q; the effect of stock market liberalization on 
stock market liquidity and efficiency; and the effect of stock market liberalization at firm 
level. 
 
A.  Studies on the Revaluation Effect of Stock Market Liberalization 
 
 
  It is argued that liberalizing a country’s stock market changes the relevant sources 
of systematic risk for pricing stocks from the local stock market index to the world 
market index (Chari and Henry, 2005).  Consequently, the expected return should change 
when a country liberalizes.  Much of the literature shows that the stock market 
liberalization leads to an increase in return or stock prices during the liberalization period 
(Henry, 2000b and Bakaert and Harvey, 2000).  Henry (2000b) used the International 
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Asset Pricing model (IAPMs) to predict the behavior of stock price following the stock 
market liberalization.  He argued that the IAPM predicts that the stock market 
liberalization will reduce the liberalizing country’s cost of capital by allowing risk 
sharing between foreign and domestic agents.  He argued that following the stock market 
liberalization, the emerging country’s stock market becomes fully integrated, the equity 
premium will be proportional to the covariance of the country’s aggregate cash flows and 
the world market portfolio (Henry, 2000b).  He argued that in mild segmentation case in 
which the country is constrained by the foreign ownership limit restriction, the equity 
premium will lie somewhere between the autarky and a fully integrated premium (Henry, 
2000b).  In addition, he argued that once the market is integrated following the stock 
market liberalization, in both complete and mild segmentation cases, the equity premium 
is expected to fall because risk is diversified (Henry, 2000b).  When the equity premium 
falls, the cost of capital will also fall.  Therefore, he further argued that if stock market 
liberalization reduces the aggregate cost of capital, holding the expected cash flows 
constant, the country’s equity price index should increase when the stock market 
liberalization occurs.  Henry’s (2000b) sample consisted of data from 12 emerging 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela.  He models stock return as a function of 
stock market liberalization.  In addition, he used the world stock return variable, a 
concurrent economic reform variable, and macroeconomic fundamental variables in 
separate equations as the explanatory variables.  He also tested whether revaluation 
occurs in anticipation of subsequent stock market liberalization. He used an event study 
approach to assess whether the stock market liberalization is associated with the 
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evaluation of the stock price.  Using an event study, he found that the stock market return 
increases after liberalization has taken place in all five of his models.  His liberalization 
dummy variable represents the event window of the first stock market liberalization that 
begins seven months prior to the implementation month and ends in the implementation 
month.  In his sample of 12 emerging countries, he finds that the stock market 
experiences average abnormal returns of 4.7 percent per month in real dollar terms during 
the eight-month window leading to the stock market liberalization.  After he controlled 
for the co-movements in the world stock markets, economic policy reforms, and the 
average abnormal returns, he found that the abnormal return is around 3.3 percent per 
month.  In addition, he found that the largest abnormal return that he could estimate is 6.5 
percent for the month in which the liberalization takes place when he changed the 
liberalization dummy variable to cover four months prior to the implementation month 
and ends in the implementation month.  His findings were consistent with the 
International Asset Pricing model. 
Kim and Singal (2000) found the effect of stock market liberalization by 
computing and comparing stock returns before market opening with the stock returns 
following the market opening. Their database contained a monthly total return index for 
19 countries, based on a representative set of stocks followed by the IFC and adjusts for 
all distributions and stock splits.  The 10-year period of study included 5 years before 
market opening and 5 years after market opening.  Their unit of measurement was in 
dollar terms. They computed the mean and standard deviation of returns prior to market 
opening, and after market opening and the change in return rate.  They used parametric 
tests to give the estimate of the size of the average effect of market openings on changes 
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in stock returns.  They also used nonparametric tests to determine whether the percentage 
of post-opening returns is significantly greater than the pre-opening returns by 50 
percent.  In their study, they found that the stock return increases soon after the opening 
of markets and is followed by a subsequent reduction in returns that is sometimes 
significant.  They argued that an increase in returns probably reflects an increase in stock 
prices due to additional demand by foreign investors.  They argued that once the stock 
price adjusts to the new information, stock returns fall.  The study of Kwan and Reyes 
(1997) on the price effect of stock market liberalization in Taiwan also showed that 
Taiwan’s stock market liberalization had induced some change in returns distribution and 
the volatility of stock returns was lower in the post liberalization period. 
 
B.  Studies of the Stock Market Liberalization Effect on  
Cost of Capital, Investment, and Tobin’s Q 
 
Besides a revaluation effect, it has been shown that stock market liberalization 
leads to a decrease in cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 1998; Henry, 
2000b; and Henry, 2003).  Henry (2000b) uses dividend yield to proxy for the cost of 
capital.  In his paper, he models dividend yield as a function of stock market 
liberalization.  He also controls for world stock return, concurrent economic reforms, and 
macroeconomic fundamental variables in separate equations.  In all of his models, the 
dividend yield falls after the stock market liberalization.  As dividend yield falls after the 
stock market liberalization, this implies that the cost of capital is reduced.  Since the cost 
of capital is reduced, it is argued that investment will increase (Henry, 2003).  Moreover, 
since the level of investment increases after liberalization, economic growth is expected 
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to be higher (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2001).  Bekaert and Harvey (1998) also 
found that increases in equity flows after liberalization are associated with the lower cost 
of capital, higher correlation with world market returns, lower asset concentration, lower 
inflation, larger market size relative to GDP, more trade, and slightly higher per capita 
economic growth.  
In another study, Henry (2000a) found that stock market liberalization leads to 
boom in private investment.  From a sample of 11 developing countries that liberalized 
their stock markets, 9 experienced growth rates in private investment above their non-
liberalization median in the first year after liberalizing.  In the second and third years 
after liberalization, this number is 10 of 11 and 8 of 11, respectively.  The mean growth 
rate of private investment in the three years immediately following stock market 
liberalizations exceeded the sample mean by 22 percentage points.  Henry also argued 
that if stock market liberalization reduces a country’s aggregate cost of equity capital, it 
would also cause a temporary increase in the growth rate of investment, via the following 
mechanism: stock market liberalization will increase stock prices and thereby will 
increase investment.   
Chari and Henry (2005) argued that the stock market liberalization results in a 
reduction in risk free rate and a change in firm equity-risk premiums.   A change in risk 
premiums is due to liberalization change a relevant benchmark for pricing the risk of 
individual stocks from the local stock market index to a world market index.  
Consequently, the equity-risk premium falls for firms whose returns are less correlated 
with the world market than they are with the local market index.  They argued that given 
the common shock, the firms whose equity risk premium fall should invest more than 
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those whose equity-risk premium rises.  They also argued that the reform induces change 
in expected future earnings that might also drive a change in post liberalization 
investment.  They use open-economy model of Tobin’s Q to decompose change in post-
liberalization investment into changes in future earning, the change in risk free rate, and 
changes in equity-risk premium.  They use International Finance Corporate Finance 
database to construct a firm level dataset of 369 firms in India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
and Thailand from 1980 to 1994.  They use firms that listed in the stock exchange 
market.  They found that average firm experiences a 46.1% jump in Tobin’s Q during 
liberalization.  They found that in the three year period following the stock market 
liberalization, the growth rate of the typical firm’s capital stock exceed its pre-
liberalization mean by an average of 5.4% point.  In addition, their panel data estimation 
results show that a 1% point increase in the firm’s expected future earning results in a 2.9 
to 4.1% point increase in growth rate of firm capital stock.  The common shock to the 
firm’s cost of capital generates a 2.3% point per year increase in investment.  The 
changes in firm equity-risk premiums, however, are statistically insignificant in every 
specification.  In other words, the firm-specific changes in risk premium do not affect the 
investment rate.   
 
C.  Studies on the Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on  
Stock Market Liquidity and Efficiency 
 
In addition to increases in stock prices, lower cost of capital and higher levels of 
investment, many studies have shown that stock market liberalization increases stock 
market liquidity (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Chandra, 2002; and Patro and Wald, 2002).  
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Levine and Zervos (1998) found that the stock markets tend to become larger, more 
liquid, more volatile, and more integrated following the liberalization.  Levine (1997) 
argued that stock market liquidity is a robust predictor of long-run real per capital GDP 
growth.  He also argued that lowering international investment barriers significantly 
enhances the liquidity of stock markets, with positive effects on economic growth; 
therefore, there is a strong connection between liquidity and economic growth.  In 
another paper, Levine (2001) argued that liquid equity markets make long-term 
investment more attractive because they allow investors to buy and sell quickly.  He 
argued that by facilitating long-term investment, liquid markets improve the allocation of 
capital and thereby boost productivity growth (Levine, 2001).  He used the value traded 
ratio, which equals the value of shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by 
GDP to measure the stock market liquidity.  Then he used an event study method to 
examine the behavior of stock market liquidity before and after a change in liberalization 
policy in 15 countries.  His results indicated that liquidity tends to rise following 
liberalization.  He found that 14 out of 15 countries exhibited strong evidence of greater 
stock market liquidity after liberalization.  He concluded that his results are consistent 
with the view that international capital flow liberalization may be a useful policy tool for 
countries seeking to boost stock market development.   
It has been shown that the stock market becomes more efficient after 
liberalization (Chandra, 2002).  Chandra (2002) linked the liquidity level to the efficiency 
of the market.  It was argued in that study that stock market liberalization leads to 
enhance liquidity, after controlling for size and other relevant factors, and that an increase 
in liquidity will lead to a decrease in market inefficiency (Chandra, 2002).  In addition to 
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using the liquidity level to measure market efficiency, Kim and Singal (2000) also used 
the random walk hypothesis to capture market efficiency.  In their paper, they used 
variance ratio tests to test the random walk hypothesis.  They examined whether the stock 
returns become more random when there was stock market liberalization and argued that 
randomness is related to market efficiency.  They found that the tests of the random walk 
hypothesis show that stock returns are less predictable over the longer horizon.  To the 
extent that less predictability in stock prices reflects greater stock market efficiency, open 
markets should result in a more efficient allocation of capital (Kim and Singal, 2000). 
In order to assess whether liberalization induces inefficient investment, Chari and 
Henry (2005) examine post-liberalization rate of return on capital and find that the rate of 
return on capital increases from an average of 16% per year in the pre-liberalization 
period to 24.3% in the post liberalization period.  This implies that investment following 
liberalization is not wasteful. 
 
D.  Other Studies of Stock Market Liberalization at Firm Level 
 
 
Although most studies have been done at the aggregate or country level, some 
studies have been done at the firm level as well.  It has been shown that stock market 
liberalization increases risk sharing and thereby reduces the systematic risk associated 
with holding investible securities (Chari and Henry, 2004).  In addition, it is argued that 
liberalization will affect the revaluation of stock price through the size of individual 
firms.  Larger firms tend to exhibit large revaluation effects, insignificant changes in 
performance, large declines in volatility, and insignificant changes in correlation from 
liberalization.  Small firms show small revaluation effects, improved performance, 
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smaller declines in volatility, and decreases in correlation after liberalization 
(Christoffersen, Chung, and Erunza, 2002).   
 Patro and Wald (2002) used firm level analysis on the impact of capital market 
liberalization in 18 emerging markets.  They found an increase in return in during 
liberalization and post liberalization compared to the pre-liberalization period.  In after 
liberalization period, the return was positive but significantly lower than in the pre- 
liberalization period.  They also found that liberalization lowers firm cost of equity as 
predicted by the International Asset Pricing model.  The International Asset Pricing 
model under capital market segmentation predicts that as capital markets become 
integrated, the cost of capital will decline as risk is internationally diversified.  Using 
dividend yield to proxy for cost of capital, they found that dividend yield fell by 44 basis 
points on average from the pre-liberalization to the during liberalization period, by 204 
points from the pre-liberalization period to the post period, and by 143 basis points form 
the pre liberalization period to the after liberalization period.  In addition, they also found 
that during liberalization, smaller firms, high book to market value firms, low local beta 
firms, low foreign exchange beta firms, and non-manufacturing firms had increased 
returns.  Also, they found that after liberalization, firms with higher local market betas, 
and firms with lower foreign exchange betas had decreased returns.     
 
E.  Summary 
 
 
In conclusion, stock market liberalization induces an increase in the stock price 
and stock return around the liberalization period.  Previous studies show that the stock 
return increases following liberalization and declines over time.  Previous studies also 
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show that the cost of capital declines following stock market liberalization thereby 
inducing an increase in investment.  Chari and Henry (2005) also finds that Tobin’s Q 
and firm investment also increase following stock market liberalization.  Besides 
increases in stock prices, lower cost of capital, higher level of investment and higher 
Tobin’s Q, many studies have shown that the stock market liberalization increases stock 
market liquidity.  In addition, previous studies also show that the stock market becomes 
more efficient following liberalization.  The study of the effect of stock market 
liberalization using firm level data also shows the same result; that is, stock market 
liberalization induces an increase in a firm’s stock return, reduces the cost of capital, and 
increases investment following the liberalization.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HISTORY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF THAILAND, LIBERALIZATION, 
AND THE POLICIES TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
A.  The Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
The capitalization and level of trading activity in the Thai market exceeds some 
smaller developed countries and all but the largest emerging markets (Bailey and 
Jagtiani, 1994).  Legislation establishing the Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET) was 
formally enacted in 1974.  The Securities Exchange of Thailand officially started trading 
on April 30, 1975.  On January 1, 1991, the Securities Exchange of Thailand officially 
changed its name to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).  The SET’s primary roles 
are: 
1)  To serve as a center for the trading of listed securities and to provide the 
essential system needed to facilitate securities trading. 
2)  To undertake any business relating to the securities exchange, such as a 
clearing house, securities depository center, securities registrar, or similar activities. 
3)  To undertake any other business approved by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
In 1992, there were several developments in the Thai capital markets.  The new 
Securities and Exchange Act was enacted, while a governing body, the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC)1 was established.  Under the SEC Act, an issuer of shares 
and equity-related securities is restricted to a public limited company, while an issuer of 
debt instruments can be either public limited company or a limited company.  The 
difference between the public limited company and limited company is that the public 
limited company is the company listed on the SET, while a limited company is not listed 
on the SET.  In order for a company to issue shares in the SET, the company has to be a 
public limited company.  Issuers have to disclose reliable and adequate information to 
provide greater investor protection.  Different types of securities businesses require 
different licenses.  These include securities brokerage, securities dealing, investment 
advisory services, securities underwriting, mutual fund management, and private fund 
management. 
The SEC Act encourages further development of both primary and secondary 
markets for debt and stock instruments, e.g., warrants, mutual funds, and convertible 
debentures.  These changes represent a major innovation, since the previous rules and 
regulations were either too stringent or too intricate.  In addition, various regulators or 
supervisors were unified into a single unit, or SEC, which not only screens and approves 
stock and debt issuance but also oversees the SET’s pattern of trading. 
 
                                               
1
 The SEC Act also provides for setting up an over-the counter (OTC) center to facilitate the 
trading of unlisted securities.  Ordinarily, public offering of securities must be processed through SEC.  If 
the securities cannot be listed in SET, they can be traded OTC. SEC retains the power to investigate all 
unfair securities trading practices and to impose appropriate penalties (Data source: TDRI Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 March 1995, pp. 8-11). 
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B.  The Liberalization of the Stock Market 
 
  
During the early 1980s, financial liberalization received little attention from Thai 
authorities, who until that time, gave top priority to resolving fundamental 
macroeconomic and microeconomic problems.  When the time was right, Thailand began 
to experience rapid economic expansion and to have surpluses in the fiscal balance and 
the balance of payments.  Therefore, increasing the competitiveness of domestic financial 
institutions and restructuring financial systems became a priority.   
 To cope with high market fluctuations and rapid economic expansion, Thailand 
began to implement financial liberalization policies.  In 1985, a number of policies were 
implemented.  These included the easing of exchange controls, the liberalization of 
interest rates, various policies to promote foreign investment, and a larger scope for the 
operation of financial institutions.  Various policies were also implemented to promote 
foreign investment in the stock market. For example; the appearance of the Bangkok 
Fund Ltd at the London Stock Exchange in 1985, allowing foreign investors to repatriate 
their invested funds at any time after being confirmed by member firms of the SET, a 
decrease in the income tax rate for foreign investors in the on-shore foreign investment 
fund in 1986, a launching of a special board for trading securities by foreigners called the 
“Alien Board” in 1987, allowing outward remittances of dividends foreign investors 
received from Thai companies if they had already submitted relevant documents in 1989, 
and relaxing foreign exchange controls in 1990, and introduction of the first ADRs in 
1991.  Moreover, the basic financial infrastructure was renovated in several aspects.  The 
Bank of International Settlements’ guidelines on capital adequacy were adopted, and the 
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Bangkok International Banking Facilities2 (BIBF) was initiated.  The following agencies 
were also established: The Securities Exchange Commission, more mutual fund 
companies, a credit rating agency, and the Export-Import Bank. 
 
C.  Policies to Promote and Facilitate Foreign Investment and Liberalization Dates 
 
 
The capital account liberalization was normally characterized: first, reforming the 
banking sector with the deregulation of domestic interest rates; secondly, by the opening 
of the capital account in varying degrees; and thirdly, by beginning the dismantling of 
restrictive measures on domestic equity markets, as well as those on foreign ownership of 
financial assets, (Das, 2003).  As this dissertation studies the effect of stock market 
liberalization on stock return, investment/cost of capital, and performance of the firms 
listed in the SET, its main focus is on the liberalization policies that promote and 
facilitate foreign investment in the stock market.  The liberalization policies were 
obtained from the SET Fact book and the SET Annual Report.  In addition, I use Henry’s 
(1999) chronological listing of major policy events in developing countries to identify 
liberalization policies that helped promote foreign investment in certain years.  In 
addition, Henry’s (2000b) paper identified the official stock market liberalization date of 
                                               
2
 The BIBF was established in March 1993 to facilitate the growth of international banking business in 
Thailand.  The main operation of BIBF banks on the liability side is deposits or borrowing in foreign 
exchange from abroad, mainly through foreign inter-bank transaction and inter-office borrowings.  On the 
asset side, their main activities are lending in foreign currency to Thai residents (out-in) and non-residents 
(out-out).  To the extend that the BIBF out-in lending to Thai firms is replacing other sources of short and 
long term foreign capital, the maturity structure of Thailand external debt will shorten since most BIBF 
funding is short-term.  And by reducing borrowing costs and indirectly easing access to foreign capital 
market for smaller and less well-known Thai firms, the establishment of the BIBF may have increased the 
magnitude of short-term capital flows. In addition, the BIBF also benefited from several important tax 
advantages. BIBF banks are treated as residents by the Bank of Thailand for purposes of the BOP.  
Therefore, BIBF funding activities are counted as capital inflows under the BOP. (Data Source: Alba, 
Hernandez, and Klingebile, Financial Liberalization and the Capital Account: Thailand 1988-1997, World 
Bank and Central Bank of Chile). 
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Thailand.  Table 1 shows Thailand’s official liberalization dates and various policies to 
promote and facilitate foreign investment.  From Table 1, the years 1985 and 1987 are 
chosen to be the stock market liberalization years in this study since significant 
liberalization events occur in those years.  In 1985, the Bangkok Fund Ltd. was launched 
for the first time on the London Stock Exchange with net asset value of $163.5 million.  
According to Bakaert and Harvey (2000), a closed-end country fund is the investment 
company that invests in a portfolio of assets in a foreign country and issues a fixed 
number of shares domestically, and each fund provides two different market prices: the 
country fund share price quoted on the market where it trades, while its net asset value is 
determined by the price of the underlying shares traded on the foreign market.  They 
argued that the close-end mutual funds were the original channel for foreign investment 
in emerging financial markets (Bakaert and Harvey,  2000).  Errunza, Senbet, and Hogan 
(1998) showed that the introduction of country funds increased the local companies’ price 
and reduced the cost of capital.  They argued that the introduction of the country fund 
integrated the local market to the global market (Errunza, Senbet, and Hogan, 1998).  In 
1987, the Alien board was inaugurated in addition to the Main board in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand to facilitate foreign investment.  The inauguration of the Alien 
board was to promote foreign investment in the Thailand.  Therefore, the introduction of 
the first Thailand fund and the establishment of the Alien board are considered the major 
liberalization events.  Since the Alien board share prices started to appear on the Alien 
board in 1988, 1991 is the additional liberalization year that is considered when 
evaluating the revaluation effects.  In 1991, there were various policies to promote 
foreign investment such as partially removing controls and reporting requirements for the 
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repatriation of dividends capital gains, foreign currencies, and share certificates.  In 
addition, the first ADR was announced and became effective on that year.  The first ADR 
is considered another liberalization policy according to Stulz (1999), who argues that if 
none of the firms in a country has access to international capital markets, the 
announcement of the ADR program by a firm in the country is evidence of the 
liberalization of the capital market of that country.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATA 
 
 
This study examines the effect of stock market liberalization on stock return, 
investment, and the performance of Thai firms.  It tries to find the effects in the pre, 
during, post, and after stock market liberalization periods on firm stock return, 
investment/ cost of capital, and performance.  The effect of liberalization on a firm stock 
return is separated into two effects: Main board effect and Alien board effect.  In 1987, 
the SET promoted greater foreign investment by launching the Alien board in addition to 
the Main board to facilitate foreign investment.  Prior to the establishment of the Alien 
board, foreign investors had to wait indefinitely for the foreign ownership limits set by 
the Thai authority to be loosened when other foreigners sold shares in order for them to 
submit buying orders.  Since the establishment of the Alien board, for companies that 
reach the foreign ownership limit, Thais continue to trade shares on the Main board while 
foreigners submit orders to the Alien board. Alien board shares and Main board shares 
are identical in all respects such as dividends and voting rights.  However, the share 
prices on the Alien board are generally higher than on the Main board due to higher 
demand and the foreign ownership limit constraint.  Therefore, the revaluation effects are 
separated into the Main board effect and the Alien board effect.   
Annual firm level data is used in this study.  According to Patro and Wald (2002), 
using firm level data allows researchers to examine the breadth of liberalization.  The 
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study is divided into three main sections.  The first section looks at the effect of the stock 
market liberalization on firm stock return.  The second section studies the effect of stock 
market liberalization on firm investment rate and firm cost of capital.  The third section 
studies the effect of stock market liberalization on firm performance.   
 In order to determine the stock market liberalization process, I employ the SET’s 
policy to promote and facilitate foreign investment.  I treat the SET policies to promote 
foreign investment as the indicator of stock market liberalization.  Allowing foreign 
investment in a domestic stock market can be viewed as a removal of or reduction in 
constraints (Kim and Singal, 2000).  Opening the market represents an important 
opportunity to attract foreign capital to finance economic growth (Kim and Singal, 2000).   
As indicated in Table 1, stock market liberalization is a gradual process.  Any 
policy changes that occur during the liberalization may affect the market.  Dummy 
variables are used to capture the effect of stock market liberalization in years that had 
significant policy changes that facilitated foreign investment.  The first liberalization year 
is 1985, when the Bangkok Fund was first officially launched on the London Stock 
Exchange with a net asset value of $163 million.  The second liberalization year is 1987, 
when the Alien board, the special board for trading securities held by foreigners, was 
launched.  After 1989, various significant policies were announced to promote and 
facilitate foreign investment.  Since January 1990, the SET Board of Directors has 
allowed quoted and pre-quoted companies offering their shares to the public to adopt a 
dual price policy through which their share price might be fixed at two levels for sales to 
foreign and to local investors.  This regulation enables companies to earn more premiums 
by selling their shares in foreign markets.  Normally, foreigners would buy shares 
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through the Alien board.  Second, in May 1990, the BOT and the Ministry of Finance 
announced new measures to liberalize the financial system.  These measures dismantled 
restrictions on current international payments to avoid discrimination in currency 
practices to other members of the IMF and to apply only one exchange rate for 
international business, and facilitated foreign exchange settlements by relaxing foreign 
exchange controls.  The controls and reporting requirements for the repatriation of 
dividends, capital gains, foreign currencies, and share certificates were partially removed 
in 1991.  In addition, the first ADR was introduced in 1991; therefore, 1991 is my 
additional liberalization year when evaluating the revaluation effect of the firm Alien 
board stock return.  Stulz (1999) argued that the ADR initiation in a country can be 
viewed as a liberalization event and that as a country undertakes the ADR program, the 
cost of capital in the country can be affected, since the ADR program is evidence of 
liberalization.  Since the introduction of the ADR affects the cost of capital, it will 
certainly affect the revaluation effect on firm stock return.  
 Before estimating the model, I conducted a test to identify whether a 
heteroskedastic problem exists.  Then I estimated the model by the ordinary least squares, 
fixed effect estimation method, and panel-generalized least squares.  In estimating the 
model, I first control for firm differences and then for sector differences.  I used the 
Hausman Specification test to pick the best estimation method to interpret the results.   
 
 
A.  Data to Conduct the Study 
  
 
 Panel annual firm level data are used in this study.  The data are collected 
annually from 1976 to 2003.  Since Thailand experienced a financial crisis in 1997, a 
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dummy variable for 1997 is included in the estimation model to account for the structural 
break.  Some early year data are collected manually because most of the data before 1992 
are available only in print.  Firm level data from 1976 to 1996 are collected from the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand Company Profiles.  Annual firm level data from 1997 to 
2003 are collected from the Global Vantage database.  In addition to using the 
chronological listing of major policy events in developing countries of Henry (1999), I 
also used the Securities Exchange of Thailand annual reports from 1976 to 2003 and the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Fact Book from 1976 to 2003 to identify financial and 
economic developments that significantly affected liberalization.  The Main board share 
prices are obtained from the Stock Exchange Company Profiles and the Global Vantage 
database.  The Alien board share prices are obtained from the Securities Exchange of 
Thailand Fact Book. The Main board share prices and Alien board share prices are year-
end prices. Although the Alien board was inaugurated in 1987, share prices were shown 
in the Securities Exchange of Thailand Fact Book after 1987.  The unit of measurement 
for a firm Main board share price (P), firm Alien board share price (P_AB), and earning 
per share (EPS) variables is the baht.  The measurements for sales (SALES), net income 
(NI), property plant and equipment (PPE), market capitalization (MKTCAP), total 
liabilities (TOTAL_LIA), total equity (TOTAL_EQ), and total asset (TA) are in thousand 
baht.  The unit of measurement for the Alien board number of shares (AB_NS) and Main 
board number of shares (NS) is in thousand units.  Table 2 summarizes the statistics for 
the complete dataset from 1976 to 2003 used in this study.  The total number of 
observations is 10,778 with large gap due to missing data.  The total number of 
observations is different between variables.  The total number of firms used in this study 
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is 469, in 31 sectors, listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand.  Four main datasets are 
used to conduct the estimation.  The first dataset is the whole sample dataset, which is the 
original dataset.  The second dataset contains only the firms that have observations before 
and after 1985.    The total number of firms and sectors in the second dataset is 104 firms, 
in 19 sectors respectively.  The third dataset contains only the firms that have observation 
before and after 1987.  The total numbers of firms and sectors are 116 firms, in 22 sectors 
respectively.  The fourth dataset contains only the firms that have observation before and 
after 1991.  The numbers of firms and sectors in the forth dataset is 276 firms, in 30 
sectors respectively.  Table 3, 5, and 6 summarize data in the second, third, and fourth 
dataset.  In estimating the model, the whole sample dataset is used and the sub sample 
datasets are used to estimate the same model to determine whether the estimation results 
are different when the sample size is smaller.  The criteria for choosing the sub sample 
dataset depend on the chosen liberalization year. 
 
 
B.  Methodology 
 
B.1.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on the Firm Stock Return 
 
 
 Many studies of stock market liberalization have shown that liberalization leads to 
increases in stock return during the liberalization period.  Henry (2000b) found that the 
stock market return increases after liberalization has taken place.  Henry (2000b) used the 
Standard International Asset Pricing Models (IAPMs) to predict the behavior of stock 
prices after liberalization.  According to IAPMs, the country’s aggregate cost of equity 
capital falls when it opens its stock market to foreign investors.  Equivalently stated, 
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holding expected future cash flows constant, we should see an increase in an emerging 
country’s equity price index when the market learns of impending stock market 
liberalization (Henry, 2000b).   
Therefore, in order to test the effect of stock market liberalization on stock return, 
I developed a model to find the effect of stock market liberalization in periods before, 
during, post, and after the liberalization.  The main focus is on the during and post-
liberalization effects.  In the previous studies by Chari and Henry (2004), Patro and Wald 
(2002), and Fuchs-Schundeln and Funk (2001), stock return is modeled as a function of 
liquidity and firm size, firm size and market to book ratio, firm size, and liberalization 
variables respectively.  I use the number of shares outstanding to proxy for liquidity, the 
log of sales to capture the firm’s size (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999), and the 
market to book ratio to capture the growth rate of the firm (Varaiya, Kerin, and Weeks, 
1987).  I expect the stock return to increase during the liberalization period and fall after 
the liberalization period.   
According to investment theories, in a segmented market, the market portfolio of 
securities is priced according to the home market index (Chan and Yu, 2003).  However, 
when the market is liberalized, the market portfolio of securities is priced according to 
the world index, and the securities will be revalued according to the world market price 
of risk (Chan and Yu, 2003).  According to Stulz (1999), stock market liberalization 
results in risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors.  Chari and Henry (2004), 
started with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  They first assumed a small 
country whose equity market is completely segmented from world equity markets.  They 
also assume that all investors in the world are risk averse and care only about the 
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expected return and variance of their investment.  They argue that since domestic 
investors care only about the expected return and volatility of their portfolio, it follows 
that CAPM will hold.  Therefore, before stock market liberalization, the expected return 
will be in the following form: 
E[Ri] = rf + βim( E[Rm] –rf)                                                                         (1) 
Where  E[Ri] = required rate of return on firm i’s stock 
 rf = risk free rate in domestic market 
βim = beta coefficients of firm i with the domestic market portfolio before liberalization 
 E[Rm] = the expected return on domestic market. 
(E[Rm] – rf) = aggregate risk premium on small country’s equity market before stock 
market liberalization.  
 
Following Chari and Henry (2004), it can be rewritten as γ(W)σ2 m  where γ(W) is 
the coefficient of risk aversion and σ2 m  is the variance of return on the small country’s 
market portfolio.  Chari and Henry (2004) assume that all investors have constant relative 
risk aversion so that γ(W) =  γ.  Therefore, the equation will be rewritten as:
 
E[Ri] = rf + βimγσ2 m                                                                                                                          (2) 
Where βimγσ2 m = risk premium before liberalization and βim = COV (Ri, Rm) 
                             σ2 m                                                                                                                          
  
 
After the country liberalizes its stock market, the expected return on domestic stock 
will change.  I assumed a mild segmentation case.  Under mild segmentation, foreign 
investors can invest domestically but can hold only a subset of domestic securities.  I 
assume a mild segmentation case because Thailand still imposes restrictions on 
foreign ownership limit.  Foreigners are generally limited to a maximum of 49 
percent ownership in a Thai firm.  Chari and Henry (2004) assume that the expected 
value and variance of the profits from domestic production activities are unaltered by 
liberalization. When the country liberalizes, the relevant source of systematic risk 
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becomes the world market.  According to Chari and Henry (2004), the required rate 
of return after liberalization will be as follows: 
 
E[Ri *] = rf *+ βiw (E[Rw] –rf *)                                                                (3) 
Where E[Ri *] = the required rate of return on firm i in the integrated capital market equilibrium 
βiw = firm i’s beta with the world market 
E[Rw] = the required rate of return on the world equity market portfolio 
rf * = world risk free rate 
 
 
(E[Rw] –rf *) = the aggregate risk premium on the world market portfolio.  It can 
be rewritten as γσ2w where σ2w = variance of the return on the world portfolio.  According 
to Chari and Henry (2004), the required rate of return on firm i’s after liberalization
 
is as 
follows: 
E[Ri *] = rf *+ βiwγσ2w                                                                                                                   (4) 
Where βiwγσ2w   = risk premium after liberalization and βiw = COV(Ri, Rw) 
                       σ2w                                                                                                                  
 
Therefore, stock market liberalization affects a firm’s required rate of return.  
Chari and Henry (2004) specify another variable, DIFCOV, which is the historical 
covariance of a firm stock return with the local market index, minus the historical 
covariance of the firm stock return with the world market index:   
 
DIFCOV
  
= βimγσ2 m - βiwγσ2w                                                                                               (5)     
 
  = COV (Ri, Rm) γσ2 m -  COV(Ri, Rw) γσ2w                                                                                                               
   σ2m                                         σ2w                                                                                                                   
 
  = γ COV (Ri, Rm) - γ COV(Ri, Rw)    (6) 
Assume that all investors in the world are risk averse and care only about the 
expected return and variance of their investment.   
DIFCOV = γ [COV (R i, R m)-COV (R i, R w)]                        (7)                                                           
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According to Chari and Henry (2004), the historical covariance of the average 
investible firm stock return with the local market index is roughly 200 times larger than 
its historical covariance with the world market index; therefore, liberalization reduces the 
systematic risk associated with holding investible securities.  In other words, they found 
that systematic risk declines after liberalization.  That is βimγσ2 m is greater than βiwγσ2w.  
Because international diversification reduces risk, investors are willing to accept lower 
returns on their investments after market liberalization (Chan and Yu, 2003).  Patro and 
Wald (2002) argued that a reduction in expected return would cause a securities price to 
rise.  Thus, I expect a short-term surge in stock return around a market liberalization 
announcement, but a long-term reduction in market returns because risk sharing occurs 
after liberalization (Chan and Yu, 2003).  As stated above, Chari and Henry (2004) 
specify the variable DIFCOV as the difference between the covariance of a firm stock 
return with the local market index and the covariance of the firm stock return with the 
world market index.  They found a positive statistic relationship between firm stock price 
and DIFCOV variable.  Therefore, a long term reduction in market returns may be a 
result of a reduction in the DIFCOV variable over time.  Patro and Wald (2002) found of 
a short-term surge in stock return around market liberalization and a long-term reduction 
in returns after the stock market liberalization.  They found an increase in returns during 
the liberalization period; that is, the return is higher than in the pre-liberalization period.  
They also found a higher return in the post-liberalization period than in the pre-
liberalization period and a positive return in the after period although the return is 
significantly lower than in the pre-liberalization period.   
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Chan and Yu (2003) also mentioned the International Asset Pricing Model under 
market segmentation. The International Asset Pricing Model theory predicts that a 
country’s aggregate cost of equity capital will fall upon the opening of its stock market to 
foreign investors.  The model implies that market returns will be higher during the 
liberalization event shortly before and after the announcement and lower in the long- run.  
I expect to see a surge in stock return in the pre-liberalization period since according to 
the International Asset Pricing model, the cost of capital fall upon the opening of the 
stock market due to a reduction in the risk premium.  As the cost of the capital fall, the 
expected return falls and the stock price is expected to rise.  Therefore, I expect a short- 
term surge in stock price due to the cost of capital is expected to falls following the stock 
market liberalization.  I calculated the covariance of firm stock return with the local 
market index and the covariance of the firm stock return with the world market index for 
all years before and all years after the stock market liberalization.  If the covariance of 
firm stock return with the local market index is higher than the covariance of firm stock 
return with the world market index, this implies that the risk premium falls.  When the 
risk premium falls, the expected return falls, thereby causing the security price to 
increase.  Therefore, if the International Asset Pricing Model prediction is true, I expect 
firm stock price to increase when the covariance of the firm stock return with the local 
market index is higher than covariance of the firm stock return with world market index 
following the liberalization. 
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B.1.1.  The Pre, During, Post and After Effects of Stock Market Liberalization on 
Firm Main Board Stock Return 
 
To determine the liberalization effect on firm Main board stock return, I first 
conducted a t-test to identify whether there is a significant change in the firm Main board 
stock return under four main scenarios: all years before and all years after liberalization, 
five years before and five years after liberalization, three years before and three years 
after liberalization, and one year before and one year after liberalization.  To identify the 
effect of stock market liberalization on firm Main board stock return, I estimated how the 
liberalization would affect the firm Main board stock return in the during, post, and after 
the year that had significant changes in SET’s policies to promote foreign investment.  In 
other words, I tried to find any revaluation effects in 1985 and 1987 liberalization for the 
firm Main board stock return and find any revaluation effects in the 1991 liberalization 
for the firm Alien board stock return.  I started with the Main board stock return.  The 
model is as follows: 
RETURNit=θ 1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+5LIBAF +6D97+Firmi+em it                                          
(8a) 
   
RETURNit=θ 1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+5LIBAF +6D97+Sectori+em it                                          
(8b) 
 
where 
 
Firm =firm specific fixed effect dummies 
Sector =sector specific fixed effect dummies 
RETURN it = firm Main board stock return. It is the log of firm Main board share price for 
period t (lnp mit) minus log of firm Main board share price for the period of t-1 
(lnp mit-1). 
 PRELIB = 1 one and two years before liberalization and 0 otherwise. This dummy 
variable is used to capture right before liberalization effect. 
LIB0         = 1 in the year of liberalization and zero otherwise.  
POSTLIB = 1 one and two years after liberalization and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable 
is used to capture post-liberalization effect 
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  LIBAF = 1 in three, four, and five years after liberalization years and 0 otherwise. This 
dummy variable is used to capture after liberalization effect 
D97 = Dummy variable for year 1997 to account for the Asian financial crisis  
 
Returnit is the firm Main board stock return calculated as the log of firm Main 
board share price in period t minus the log of share price in period t-1.  The subscript “m” 
refers to the Main board stock return.  The subscript “i” refers to the firm and subscript 
“t” denotes the time period. Using panel data allows me to include cross sectional fixed 
effects (Firm i and Sectori) and thus to mitigate any potential omitted variable bias 
(Fuchs-Schundeln and Funke, 2001).  In order to find out the pre, during, post, and after 
effects of stock market liberalization on stock return, I followed Fuchs-Schundeln and 
Funke (2001) by using the liberalization dummy variables, PRELIB, LIB0, POSTLIB, 
and LIBAF.  PRELIB takes value of 1 in one and two years before the liberalization 
years and 0 otherwise.  LIB0 takes value of 1 in the year that liberalization takes place 
and 0 otherwise to capture the during-liberalization effect.  POSTLIB takes value of 1 in 
one and two years after liberalization and 0 otherwise to capture the post-liberalization 
effect.  LIBAF takes value of 1 in three, four, and five years after liberalization year and 
0 otherwise to capture the after-liberalization effect.  This model is estimated using years 
1985 and 1987 respectively one at a time as the LIB0 variable, which is the year of stock 
market liberalization.   
Then I add the control variables to equation (8) to see whether the revaluation 
effects are different when control variables are included.   
 
RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it + θ1 PRELIB 
+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                   (9a)                                                                           
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RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it                
+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it     (9b)                                                                     
 
 
Where LNSL       = log of firm sales (to capture size of the firms) 
               MB = Firm market to book ratio from Alien board (to capture growth of firms) 
 LNNS   = log of number of shares traded from Alien board (to capture liquidity) 
 WRETURN   = log of world market return 
 
  
The control variables are firm size, firm growth rate, firm liquidity, and world 
market return.  The log of firm sales (LNSL) is used as a proxy for firm size.  Market to 
book ratio (MB) is used as a proxy for firm growth rate.  Log of number of shares 
available to be traded (LNNS) is used as a proxy for firm stock liquidity.  Lag value of 
firm market to book ratio (MBmit-1) and firm number of share traded (LNNSmit-1) are used 
as controlled variable instead of the current value. Christoffersen, Chung, and Erruza 
(2002) also include the log of world market return in their revaluation effect model as 
another control variable to see whether the world stock return is significantly related to 
the firm stock return.  World stock return is calculated as the log of world stock index in 
the current period minus the log of world stock index in the last period.  In addition, 
following the work of Christoffersen, Chung, and Erruza (2002), I include the interaction 
of the liberalization dummy variables with the firm size variable (LNSL) to see the effect 
of firm size on firm stock return in the during, post, and after-liberalization periods in 
addition to the overall effect of firm size on the firm Main board stock return.  If the 
coefficients of the interaction variables are statistically significant, this implies that the 
revaluation effect depends on firm size. 
Formulating the model in this way allows me to see how the firm Main board 
stock return reacts to significant changes in policies in that period.  Kim and Singal 
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(2000) found that stock return increases soon after the opening of the market and is 
followed by subsequent reductions in returns that are sometime significant.  Patro and 
Wald (2002) also found a larger increase in returns during liberalization and a large 
decrease in returns after liberalization.  Therefore, using the pre-liberalization period as 
the base year, I expect the coefficients of the during-liberalization variable (LIB0) and the 
post-liberalization variable (POSTLIB) to be positive and higher than the PRELIB 
variable.  Patro and Wald (2002) also found positive but significantly lower returns in the 
after-liberalization period than in the pre-liberalization period.  Therefore, I expect the 
positive stock returns following the stock market liberalization to be less than the pre-
liberalization level in the after-liberalization period.  The main concentration is on the 
LIB0 and POSTLIB liberalization dummy variables.   Since cross sectional data 
sometimes is heteroskedastic, I tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity before 
estimating the model. 
 
B.1.2.  The Pre, During, Post, and After Effects of Stock Market Liberalization on 
Firm Alien Board Stock Return 
 
 As mentioned in Table 1, the Alien board was inaugurated in 1987 in addition to 
the Main Board to facilitate and promote foreign investment.  The need for the Alien 
board arose in the mid 1980s as foreign direct and portfolio investment poured into 
Thailand.  Foreign ownership limits for many Thai firms became binding at that time.  In 
order to submit buy orders, foreign buyers had to wait indefinitely for the ownership 
limits to loosen when other foreigners sold shares. Foreigners are generally limited to a 
maximum of 49% ownership in Thai firms, though limits vary across industries and 
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across firms within an industry.  Generally, the maximum foreign share ownership limit 
is 49% for general companies and 25 % for financial institutions.  However, the level can 
vary with the approval of the Bank of Thailand.3 
 In response, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) inaugurated the Alien board 
in September 1987.  For companies that have reached foreign ownership limits, Thais 
continue to trade shares on the Main board while foreigners submit orders to the Alien 
board.  Main and Alien board shares are identical in all other respects, such as dividends, 
voting rights, and procedures for settlement and registration.  Foreigners and Thais 
normally trade the same company’s securities on distinct boards at different prices (Baily 
and Jagtiani, 1994).  The Alien board price is generally higher than the Main board price 
due to higher demand.  Baily and Jagtiani (1994) also mentioned that tighter foreign 
ownership limits a firm and information-rich firms caused the Alien board price to be 
higher than the Main board price.  In other words, they argued that firms with a relatively 
high weight in foreign investor portfolios but with a tight foreign ownership limit will be 
in high demand and will exhibit large differences between the Alien and the Main board 
share prices.  Their study found that firms that have a tighter foreign ownership limit are 
associated with a higher Alien board price premium.  They argued that the relative 
liquidity of the Main board and Alien board shares affects the prices in the Alien board 
and the Main board.  They argued that in the foreigners’ view, the Alien board has higher 
liquidity than the Main board.  Their study found that foreign investors offer a relatively 
high price for relatively liquid Alien board listings, thereby causing the Alien board share 
price to be higher than the Main board share price.  Lastly their study found that the firms 
                                               
3
 See Baily and Jagtiani (1994) “Foreign ownership restrictions and stock prices in the Thai capital 
market”, Journal of Financial Economics 36 (1994) 57-87. 
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that are information rich from foreign investors’ point of view tend to exhibit large Alien 
board share price premium.  Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2004) found that foreign 
investors have superior information processing ability compared to local investors, a fact 
which causes a difference in the share price between the Main board and the Alien board.  
Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2004) argued that the gap between price and volume traded 
between the two boards could increase as cross-market information flows and 
information processing declines.  Since Thai investors normally trade shares through the 
Main board and foreigners normally trade shares through the Alien board, the price 
difference between the two boards might be due to the Main board’s being populated by 
poorly informed investors with inferior information processing ability while the 
unrestricted market is populated by foreign investors who have superior information 
processing ability (Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom, 2004). 
Although normally Thais trade shares on the Main board and foreigners trade 
shares on the Alien board, Thais can trade shares on both Main and Alien boards, and 
foreigners can also trade shares on both Main and Alien board.  However, if Thais trade 
shares on the Alien board, they lose all dividends and voting rights. There is no 
restriction on how long Thais can hold Alien board shares.  The only drawback is that 
during the period that Thais hold Alien board shares, they do not receive any dividends 
and voting rights.  The same consequences hold for foreigners; they are allowed to hold 
Main board shares but do not receive any voting rights and dividends during the period 
that they hold Main board shares.  There is no restriction on how long foreigners can hold 
Main board shares.  Therefore, if Thais and foreigners want to receive dividends and 
voting rights, Thais have to hold Main board shares and foreigners have to hold Alien 
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board shares.  Since the Alien board price is generally higher than the Main board price, 
the shares in the Main board can not be traded for shares in the Alien board.  In other 
words, trading between Alien and Main boards is strictly restricted.  Since 1987 when the 
Alien board was inaugurated, the Alien board price is shown in the SET Fact Book in 
1988.  
 In order to find the stock market liberalization effect on Alien board stock return, 
I changed the dependent variable to the Alien board stock return instead of the Main 
board stock return. 
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF +5D97+Firmi+eab it  
          (11a)                              
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF 5D97+Sectori+eab it      
                                                                                                                        (11b)                          
 
Where    Firm  = firm specific fixed effect dummies 
Sector  = sector specific fixed effect dummies 
RETURNPABit = firm Alien board stock return.  It is log of firm Alien board share 
price for the period t (lnp abit) minus log of firm Alien board share price 
for the period of t-1 (lnp abit-1).   
D97 = Dummy variable for year 1997 to account for the event of financial 
crisis on 1997 
 
 
 Equation (11) is used to capture the direct effect of the stock market liberalization 
on firm Alien board stock return.  RETURNPABit  is the firm Alien board stock return.  It 
is the log of firm Alien board share price for the period t minus the log of firm Alien 
board share price for the period t-1. The subscript “ab” refers to the Alien board share 
price.  Since the Alien board share price started to appear on the board in 1988, 1991 is 
the only liberalization year that is used in estimating the effect of the stock market 
liberalization on the firm Alien board stock return.  As in the case of the firm Main board 
stock return, I expect the firm Alien board stock return to be higher than the pre-
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liberalization level in the during and post-liberalization periods but lower than the pre-
liberalization level in the after-liberalization period.  In order to identify whether the 
revaluation effects are different when control variables are included, I estimate the 
following equations. 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it +γ 2 abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Firmi+eab it             (12a)                                                                   
                  
 RETURNPAB it =γ 1 abLNSLab it +γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Sectori+eab it                  (12b) 
 
 Where MB abit-1 is the firm Alien board market to book ratio last period and 
LNNSabit-1 is log of firm Alien board number of share traded last period.  In order to 
identify whether a change in firm size affects the firm Alien board stock return in the 
during, post, and after liberalization periods compared to the pre-liberalization level, I 
used the following equations. 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIB
AF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Firmi+eab it                   (13a) 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIB
AF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Sectori+eab it                     
             (13b) 
 
If the coefficients of the interaction variables are statistically significant, a change 
in firm size affects the firm Alien board stock return in pre, during, post, and after 
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liberalization period.  I tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity when I estimated the 
model.  I expect the revaluation effect of the firm Alien board stock return to be similar to 
the firm Main board stock return. 
 
B.1.3.  Estimating the Model 
 
 
I estimated the Main board share price equations and firm Alien board share price 
equations separately using three estimation methods: 1) the ordinary least squares 
method, 2) the fixed effect method, and 3) the generalized least squares method.  I first 
controlled for firm differences and then controlled for sector differences.  Consistent 
standard errors are used if there is a heteroskedasticity problem.  Then I used the 
Hausman Specification test to select the best model to interpret the results.  The whole 
sample dataset was used first in estimating the model.  Then I estimated the model using 
a smaller data that includes firms with observation before and after the liberalization.  
The choice of data for the smaller dataset depended on the chosen liberalization year. 
 
B.2.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Investment rate and Firm 
Cost of Capital 
 
 
B.2.1.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Investment rate 
 
 In order to find whether stock market liberalization affects firm investment rate, I 
use the real growth rate of firm property plant and equipment to proxy for the real growth 
rate of firm investment.  The real growth rate of firm property plant and equipment is 
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calculated as the growth rate of nominal firm property plant and equipment minus a 
change in the price index of domestic gross capital formation.  It is argued in many 
finance papers that investment is related to the cost of capital.  In most finance papers, the 
dividend yield is used as a proxy for cost of capital.  According to Bakaert and Harvey 
(2000), a change in the cost of capital may be reflected in a change in dividend yields.  
Patro and Wald (2002) argued that dividend yield is a superior measure of the cost of 
capital.  Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) argue that the advantage of using 
dividend yields to measure the cost of capital is that dividend yields are observable and 
stationary.  The International Asset Pricing Model (IAPMs), under capital market 
segmentation, predicts that as a capital market is integrated, the cost of capital will 
decline as risk is internationally diversified.  In order to see whether the dividend yield 
declines after the stock market liberalization, I plotted the average dividend yield against 
time.  If the dividend yield falls following the liberalization comparing to the pre-
liberalization level, this implies that the cost of capital declines.  If the cost of capital 
declines, investment is expected to rise.  In other words, if stock market liberalization 
reduces the cost of capital, investment is expected to rise.  Chari and Henry (2004) 
mentioned the effect of stock market liberalization on firm investment.  They related 
firm-specific risk sharing to a firm’s physical investment.  They used the variable 
DIFCOV, that is, the difference between the covariance of firm i’s stock return with the 
local market index with the covariance of firm i’s stock return with the world market 
index.  The variable DIFCOV represented the risk sharing that occurs after stock market 
liberalization.  Chari and Henry (2004) argued that they should observe relatively more 
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investment by firms whose systematic risk falls and relatively less by those whose 
systematic risk rises after stock market liberalization.  As a result, a firm that has high 
DIFCOV should experience faster capital stock growth than a firm that has low DIFCOV 
following the stock market liberalization. 
 Chari and Henry (2005) assume a standard neoclassical production framework, 
that is all firms are price-takers, the production function is linear homogenous in capital 
and labor, and the cost of installing capital is linear homogenous in investment (I) and K 
(stock of capital). They assume all investors have an identical coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.  They assume the marginal Tobin’s Q and average Tobin’s Q are equal.  
Therefore, the investment equation before the liberalization can be written as: 
i
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Where Q= Tobin’s Q = 
i
i
K
V
 where iV  is the stock market value of firm and iK  is the 
replacement cost of firm capital stock.  iV  is the present discounted value of the firm’s 
expected future cash flow.  Let’s ipi  = firm’s stochastic cash flow, which is expected to 
grow at a rate ig .  It follows 
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i
grKK
V
−+
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θ
pi
       (15) 
Where r is the economy’s risk free rate, ipi  is the expected value of ipi ,  
iθ is the risk premium, ig  is the expected growth rate of firm’s future cash flow.  
Equation (15) is derived from the Constant Growth Model.  The firm’s stochastic cash 
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flow grows at rate g.  The firm’s stochastic cash flow is discounted by the risk free rate 
and risk premium.  iθ  and ig  have to be constant for each firm.   
 When the country liberalizes the stock market, the firm cost of capital as shown 
by the risk free rate, the risk premium, and the expected future growth rates change.  Let 
r*, iθ *, and ig * denote the post-liberalization value of risk free rate, risk premium and 
the expected future growth.  Changes in Q will drive a subsequent adjustment in the firm 
capital stock to reestablish equilibrium.  Q* denotes the Tobin’s Q after the liberalization.  
Therefore, change in investment after liberalization can be written as follow: 
**
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Where iλ  = [ ][ ]*** iiiii grgrK
b
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 *)( rr − , *)( ii θθ − , and *)( ii gg − are change in risk free rate, change in risk 
premiums, and change in expected future growth rate of firm cash flow as the result of 
the stock market liberalization.  Refer to equation (2) and (4), risk premium before 
liberalization is βimγσ2 m and risk premium after liberalization is βiwγσ2w.  Refer to 
equation (5) and (6) and assume all investors have constant coefficient of risk aversion, I 
can rewrite *)( ii θθ −  as follow. 
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*)( ii θθ −  =  βimγσ2 m - βiwγσ2w                                                                                                
 
      = COV (Ri, Rm) γσ2 m -  COV(Ri, Rw) γσ2w                                                                                                               
   σ2m                                         σ2w                                                                                                                   
 
      = γ COV (Ri, Rm) - γ COV(Ri, Rw)     
       = γ DIFCOVi       (18) 
Where DIFCOVi = [COV (R i, R m)-COV (R i, R w)].  Therefore, *
iK
I 

∆  can be 
rewritten as follow: 
*
iK
I 

∆  = [ ])*(*)( iii ggDIFCOVrr −++− γλ      (19) 
Where *)( rr −  + γ DIFCOVi is change in the firm cost of capital and *)( ii gg − is 
change in firm growth rate of earning.  Therefore, post-liberalization investment is 
affected by the change in firm cost of capital and change in firm growth rate of earning.  
*)( rr −  is change in risk free rate after liberalization and is the common shock to all 
firms in the economy.  According to the International Asset Pricing model, the relevant 
benchmark for pricing the individual stocks changes from the local stock market index to 
a world market index after liberalization (Chari and Henry 2005).  Therefore, if the COV 
(R i, R m) is before liberalization is larger than COV (R i, R w) after liberalization, the cost 
of capital should fall following the liberalization.  As the cost of capital falls, the 
investment is expected to increase following the liberalization.  In other words, the firms 
that experience a fall in their cost of capital should invest more (Chari and Henry 2005).  
For change in firm growth rate of future cash flow *)( ii gg − , the larger the growth rate 
of the firm’s future cash flow, the greater the change in firm investment rate following 
the liberalization (Chari and Henry 2005).  I use dividend yields as proxy of the firm cost 
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of capital and follow Chari and Henry 2005 by using the growth rate of firm sales to 
proxy for the firm’s future cash flow.   
In order to estimate the liberalization effect on firm investment rate, I first 
conducted a t-test to identify whether there is a significant change in firm investment 
rates following each stock market liberalization year under four scenarios: 1) all years 
before and after liberalization, 2) 5 years before and 5 years after liberalization, 3) 3 years 
before and 3 years after liberalization, and 4) 1 year before and 1 year after liberalization.  
According to the International Asset Pricing model prediction, the cost of capital should 
decline from the pre-liberalization level following the stock market liberalization due to 
risk is diversified. Therefore, if the International Asset Pricing Model is correct, I should 
observe an increase in firm investment following the liberalization.  In addition to a t-test 
for a significant change in firm investment rate, I also conduct a t-test to identify whether 
there is a significant change in firm cost of capital following the stock market 
liberalization.   
 In order to find whether stock market liberalization affects firm investment rate, I 
use the same methodology for the stock market return. 
 
REALG_PPE it = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF +4D97 + 
e it            (20a) 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i + φ 1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 
+ e it            (20b) 
 
 
 
 Equation (20) is used to capture the direct effect of stock market liberalization on 
firm investment rate.    REALG-PPE is real growth rate in firm property plant and 
equipment used to proxy for firm investment rate.  REALG_PPE is calculated as a 
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change in log of firm property plant and equipment this period from the last period minus 
a change in log of gross capital formation index (GCFI) this period from the last period.  
That is, REALG_PPE = [ln(PPEt)-ln(PPE t-1)] – [ln(GCFIt)-ln(GCFI t-1)].  The domestic 
gross capital formation index is generated from the domestic gross fixed capital 
formation at current price divided by the domestic gross fixed capital formation at 
constant price. The domestic gross capital formation data is obtained from the World 
Development Indicators.   
 Then I add the control variables to see whether the liberalization effects are 
different when controlled variables are included. 
 
REALG_PPE it  = FIRM i + λ1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1+ δPRELIB + 
θ 1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB + θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it   (21a)  
 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i  + λ 1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1 +δPRELIB + 
θ 1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB1 + θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it         (21b) 
 
 The firm investment rate (REALG_PPE) is a function of firm cost of capital 
(DIV), growth rate of firm’s expected future cash flow (G_SALES), and firm size 
(LNTA).  DIVit-1 is cost of capital last period and LNTAit-1 is firm size last period.   I 
expect λ1  to be negative as investment is negatively related to cost of capital.  I expect λ2 
to be positive according to equation (19), the larger increase in the growth rate of the 
firm’s future cash flow, the greater the change in firm investment rate following the 
liberalization (Chari and Henry 2005).  Chari and Henry (2005) find that 1% increase in 
firm’s expected future cash flow predicts a 4.1% increase in firm investment rate.  If λ 3  is 
positive, this implies that a firm size is positively related to firm investment.  If stock 
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market liberalization has a positive effect on a firm investment rate, the θ-coefficients 
will be positive and significant.  If Henry (2000a) is correct, the θ-coefficients will be 
positive since he found that the stock market liberalization leads to private investment 
booms.  According to Henry (2000a), from a sample of 11 developing countries that 
liberalized their stock markets, 9 experienced growth rates in private investment above 
their non-liberalization median in the first year after liberalization.  In the second and 
third years after liberalization, this number is 10 of 11, and 8 of 11, respectively (Henry, 
2000a).  I concentrate on the during and post-liberalization effects of stock market 
liberalization on firm investment rate ( 1θ  and 2θ ). 
 
B.2.2.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Cost of Capital 
 
 
According to the International Asset Pricing Model under capital market 
segmentation, the firm cost of capital should decline following the stock market 
liberalization.  I first conduct a t-test to identify whether there is a significant change in 
firm cost of capital following the stock market liberalization under the same four main 
scenarios.  The following models are used to identify the pre, during, post, and after 
effects of stock market liberalization on firm cost of capital. 
 
DIV it  = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it      (22a)   
 
DIV it  = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97+ e it            
  
              (22b) 
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 Equation (22) is used to capture the direct effect of stock market liberalization on 
cost of capital.  DIV is firm dividend yield used as a proxy for firm cost of capital.  I 
expect the cost of capital to declines following the liberalization.  Then I add the control 
variables to see whether the liberalization effects are different when controlled variables 
are included.   
DIV it  = FIRM i  + 1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB 
+φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it                            (23a)                                                                       
DIV it  =SECTOR i  +1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it +  φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB 
+φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it                             (23b)                                                                      
 
LNTA is the log of firm total asset as a proxy for firm size.  G_EPS is growth rate 
of firm earning per shares.  In corporate finance theory, the cost of capital composed of 
dividend yield plus the growth rate of firm earning per share.  The growth rate of firm 
earning per share for the case of Thailand is large and unstable.  Therefore, I use only the 
dividend yield to measure the cost of capital.  If the cost of capital is fixed, I should 
observe an inverse relationship between dividend yield and the firm growth rate of 
earning per share.   Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between firm dividend 
yield and firm growth rate of earning per share.  Higher dividend payment implies lower 
retained earning.  When retained earning is lower, this implies lower investment.  This 
will further reduce the firm growth rate of net income and lower firm growth rate of 
earning per share.  I follow the same estimation method in estimating equations (22) and 
(23).  If the International Asset Pricing Model, is true, the firm cost of capital should fall 
following the stock market liberalization. 
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B.3.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Performance 
 
 
In order to find the effect of stock market liberalization on firm performance, 
Tobin’s Q ratio is used to measure firm performance.  Tobin’s Q ratio is a ratio of a 
firm’s financial market value divided by the replacement cost of its assets.  James Tobin 
first introduced the ratio in 1969 as a predictor of a firm’s future investment (Bharadwaj, 
Bharadwaj, and Konsynski, 1999).  According to Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 
(1999), Tobin’s Q can be used as a) an alternative measure of business performance, b) a 
predictor of profitable investment opportunity, c) a measure of the capitalized value of 
monopoly rents, d) a measure of returns from diversification, e) an indicator of a firm’s 
intangible value, f) a measure of brand equity, and g) a measure of the value of 
technological assets.  In addition, industrial organization economists and strategy 
researchers have used Tobin’ s Q ratio to study the effects of market power on 
performance, especially where accounting measures have failed to detect any 
performance effects (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski, 1999).  Tobin’s Q ratio 
measures market power from both existing assets and future growth potential of the firm 
(Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski, 1999). 
In this study, I first use Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance.  Bharadwaj, 
Bharadwaj, and Konsynski (1999) argue that Tobin’s Q is a better measure of firm 
performance in terms of future profitability than standard accounting-based measures.  
The standard accounting measures to measure firm performance are return on asset, 
return on equity, and return on sales.  They argue that one drawback of standard 
accounting measures is that they typically reflect only past information and are not 
forward looking.  Other drawbacks are that the standard accounting measures are not 
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adjusted for risk, and they are distorted by temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, and 
accounting convention (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski, 1999).  In addition, they 
argue that accounting measures of firm performance are insensitive to the time lags 
necessary for realizing the potential of capital investment.  Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and 
Konsynski (1999) mention that Tobin’s Q has been shown to reflect ex ante financial 
market valuation of the level and risk of future profitability.  Therefore, it provides a 
market estimate of the firm’s long-run performance (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and 
Konsynski, 1999).  Therefore, I use both Tobin’s Q and ROA, the standard accounting 
measure of firm performance, in measuring the firm performance to see whether the 
liberalization effects are different between the two measures of firm performance.   
I follow Chari and Henry (2005) and calculate Tobin’s Q as: 
 
Tobin’s Q =  Market Value of equity + Book value of debt (24) 
  Book value of total asset 
 
 
That is, Tobin’s Q equal the sum of market value of equity and the book value of 
debt all divided by book value of total assets.  Then book value of debt is used instead of 
market value of debt due to market value of debt is not available.  The market value of 
equity is the firm stock price multiplied by firm number of shares outstanding, which is 
the firm market capitalization.  The book value of debt is the book value of total liability.  
According to equation (17), change in Tobin’s Q following the liberalization equals 
to [ ])*(*)(*)( iiiii ggrr −+−+− θθλ , which is sum of firm cost of capital and change in 
growth rate of firm future cash flow.  According to the International Asset Pricing model, 
the cost of capital falls following the liberalization.  If the liberalization reduces firm cost 
of capital and increase growth rate of firm future cash flow, Tobin’s Q value should rise 
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following the liberalization.  Chari and Henry (2005) find the average firm experiences a 
46.1% increase in Tobin’s Q during liberalization.  Therefore, I expect Tobin’s Q value 
to increase following the stock market liberalization.   
To identify whether there is significant change in firm Tobin’s Q value following 
the stock market liberalization, I conduct a t-test under four main scenarios.   In order to 
estimate the effect of stock market liberalization on firm Tobin’s Q, I use the following 
equation. 
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (25a)   
                                                                              
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (25b)            
 
 
 
Equation (25) captures the direct effect of the stock market liberalization.  The 
dummy variable LIB0 will take years 1985 and 1987 one at a time in separated model.   
I expect to see an improvement in firm performance following the liberalization.  Then I 
add the control variables to see whether the liberalization effects are different when 
controlled variables are included. 
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE 1−it +τ 2 DEBTEQ 1−it +τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0
+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                     (26a)  
                                                     
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE 1−it +τ 2 DEBTEQ 1−it +τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LI
B0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                  (26b) 
 
 Firm performance is a function of firm market share (MKTSHARE), firm debt to 
equity ratio (DEBTEQ), firm size (LNSL), and liberalization dummy variables.  Firm 
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debt to equity ratio is calculated as firm total liability divided by firm total equity, used to 
measure firm leverage.  Haksar and Kongsamut (2003) find a larger market share is 
associated with stronger firm performance while a high debt to equity ratio is associated 
with poor performance.  Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between firm market 
share and firm Tobin’s Q and a negative relationship between firm debt to equity ratio 
and firm Tobin’s Q.  Bharadwaj, Bharawaj, and Konsynski (1999) also find a positive 
relationship between firm performance and market share. Therefore, I expect τ1  to be 
positive.  If the coefficients of the dummy variables are significant and positive, this 
implies that the stock market liberalization has positively affected firm performance in 
the pre, during, post, and after the stock market liberalization periods.   
Besides using Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance, I also use firm Return on 
Asset (ROA) since it is a standard accounting measure to evaluate firm performance.  I 
try to identify whether the effect of stock market liberalization is different between those 
two measures of firm performance.  The firm performance as measured by ROA is as 
follows. 
 
ROA it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (27a)      
                                                                           
ROA it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (27b)   
          
ROA it =FIRM i +τ 1 MKTSHAREit-1+τ 2 DEBTEQit-1+τ 3 LNSL it  +ηPRELIB 
+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                               (28a)  
                                                                              
ROA it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHAREit-1+τ 2 DEBTEQit-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB 
+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                               (28b)  
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ROA is firm return on asset calculated as firm net income divided by firm total 
asset.  MKTSHAREit-1 is firm market share last period and DEBTEQit-1 is firm debt to 
equity ratio last period.  Lag value of DEBTEQ is used to avoid the problem of 
simultaneity.  I follow the same estimation method for the effect of stock market 
liberalization on firm Main board share price, firm investment, and firm cost of capital.  I 
expect the estimation results using ROA as a proxy for firm performance to be similar to 
the estimation results using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
A.  The Revaluation Effect of Stock Market Liberalization 
 
  
 
Many studies of stock market liberalization have shown that stock market 
liberalization will lead to an increase in the stock return during liberalization period 
(Henry, 2000b; Bakeart and Harvey, 2000).  Kim and Singal (2000) found increases in 
stock market return soon after the opening of markets, is followed by a subsequent 
reduction in returns that was sometime significant.  According to the International Asset 
Pricing Model (IAPMs), holding expected future cash flow constant, we should see an 
increase in an emerging country’s equity price index when the market learns of 
impending stock market liberalization.  According to investment theory, in a segmented 
market, the market portfolio of securities is priced according to the home market index 
(Chan and Yu, 2003).  When the market is liberalized, the market portfolio of securities is 
priced according to the world index, and the securities are revalued according to the 
world market price of risk (Chan and Yu, 2003).  Stulz (1999) argued that stock market 
liberalization results in risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors.  Chari and 
Henry (2004) found that the historical covariance of the average investible firm stock 
return with the local market index is roughly 200 times larger than its historical 
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covariance with the world market index.  That is, the risk declines following stock market 
liberalization.  As international diversification reduces risk, investors are willing to 
accept lower returns on their investments (Chan and Yu, 2003).  However, the risk is 
diversified in the long-run.  Therefore, I would expect a short term surge in stock prices 
level around stock market liberalization and a long-run reduction in the stock price.   
According to Henry (2000b), the International Asset Pricing Model (IAPMs) predicts that 
stock market liberalization will reduce the country’s cost of equity capital by allowing for 
risk sharing among domestic and foreign investors and holding expected future cash 
flows constant, and the reduction in the country’s cost of capital is likely to increase the 
country’s equity price index following liberalization.  Therefore, I tried to identify 
whether the International Asset Pricing Model holds using firm-level data from the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand.   
According to Stulz (1999), liberalization transforms the relationship between the 
firms and the providers of capital.  Before liberalization, the only source for a firm capital 
is from domestic saving.   After stock market liberalization, firms are able to access 
external sources of capital beyond domestic saving thereby enabling them to raise funds 
using new securities and to invest in new projects.  According to Stulz (1999), saving and 
investment can differ when liberalization takes place.  Liberalization affects the cost of 
capital through its effect on domestic interest rate and risk premium.  Stock market 
liberalization induces the capital to flow into a country thereby reducing the cost of 
capital by reducing the risk free rate.  Stock market liberalization also allows risk sharing, 
thereby reducing risk premium, which is another cost of capital.   
Since the reduction in the risk free rate from stock market liberalization is 
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likely to affect all the firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand equally, I focus on the 
changes in risk premium following stock market liberalization.  Following Stulz (1999), I 
assume that investors in Thailand are risk averse and care only about their investment’s 
expected return and the variance of the stock return.  According to Stulz (1999), risk is 
measured by the variance of the stock return.  Stulz (1999) also argued that if the 
investors have the same coefficient of risk aversion, the risk premium is the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion times the variance of the return on the market portfolio.  Therefore, 
a decline in the variance of the return declines or in other words, the return volatility 
implies a decline in risk premium.  Stulz (1999) argued that as a country liberalizes, the 
domestic investors no longer have to bear all the risk.  The foreign investors who invest 
in liberalizing country have to bear some of the risk.  The diversification in risk because 
of liberalization will cause a reduction in return volatility thereby causing a reduction in 
the risk premium. Therefore, liberalization induces risk sharing and thereby reduces the 
firm cost of capital.   To see the impact of stock market liberalization on firm stock return 
and firm cost of capital, I follow Stulz (1999) using the small country case because 
Thailand is a small country.  I assume that investors in Thailand have constant risk 
aversion and that the price per unit of risk is constant.  Following stock market 
liberalization, the Thailand Stock market is part of the world equity market, and I assume 
that the capital asset pricing model holds for both Thailand and for the world equity 
market.  Therefore, following stock market liberalization, the gap in the risk premium is 
the difference between the risk premium before and after stock market liberalization.  The 
differences in firm risk premium following stock market liberalization is the differences 
between the covariance of Thai firm stock return with the return of local market index 
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before the stock market liberalization and the covariance of the Thai firm stock return and 
the world market portfolio return.  If the covariance of the Thai firm stock return with the 
return on local market index is higher than the covariance of the Thai firm stock return 
and the return of the world market portfolio, this implies that the risk premium declines 
following stock market liberalization.  As risk premium declines, the firm cost of capital 
falls since the risk is diversified.  That is, before liberalization, the volatility of the return 
depends only on the covariance of the Thai firm stock return with the return of the local 
market index.  After liberalization, the risk is diversified since the risk of holding the 
Thai securities now depends on the covariance of the Thai firm stock return and the 
return of the world market portfolio, and the firm cost of capital declines.  A reduction in 
firm cost of capital through a reduction in firm risk premium will cause a reduction in 
firm expected stock return.  As the firm expected stock return falls, the securities price is 
likely to rise.  If the securities price rises enough, the stock return will also rise.   
In order to prove whether the firm cost of capital falls following Thailand stock 
market liberalization, I calculated the covariance of Thai firm stock return with the return 
of the local market index.  In the period of study, the covariance of the Thai firm stock 
return with the local market index is 0.1611 and the covariance of the Thai firm stock 
return with the world market index is -0.0078.  Therefore, the covariance of the Thai firm 
stock return with local market index is higher than the covariance of the Thai firm stock 
return with the world market index.  Since the covariance of the Thai firm stock return 
with the return on local market index is higher than the covariance of the Thai firm stock 
return and the return of the world market portfolio, this implies that the risk premium 
declines following stock market liberalization.  As risk premium declines, the firm cost of 
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capital falls and the expected return falls.  Therefore, according to the prediction of the 
International Asset Pricing model, the firm stock price should rise following the 
liberalization.   
In order to identify whether the firm stock price and firm stock return rises 
following the 1985, 1987, and 1991 stock market liberalization, I first plot the mean 
value of the firm Main board share price from 1976 to 2003 to see the movement of the 
firm stock prices.  Figure 1 shows the behavior of the mean value of the firm Main board 
share price from 1976 to 2003.  Since the Stock Exchange of Thailand was established on 
1975, Figure 1 also shows the movement of the mean value of the firm Main board share 
price since the establishment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand.  As shown in Figure 1, 
the firm Main board share price tends to move upward and reached the highest value in 
1978.  After 1978, it goes down and bounces back again after 1985, which is the first 
liberalization year in my sample.  In 1985 the Bangkok fund limited was first launched on 
the London Stock Exchange according to Bakeart and Harvey’s chronology of 
economics, political, and financial events in emerging markets.  The firm Main board 
share price reaches the second highest value in 1987, which is the second liberalization 
year in my sample.  In September 1987, the Alien board was inaugurated in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand in addition to the Main board to facilitate foreign trading.  The 
firm Main board share price falls after reaching the third highest point in 1989 and 
bounced back a little bit again after 1991, the additional liberalization year in my sample 
and the year that the first ADR was announced.  As shown in Figure 1, the firm Main 
board share price increases slightly when the 1985 stock market liberalization takes place 
but increases sharply when the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place.   
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Figure 2 illustrates the mean value of the firm Main board stock return from 1976 
to 2003.  Firm Main board stock return reduces when 1985 stock market liberalization 
takes place.  Firm Main board stock return reaches the highest point in 1987, the year that 
the Alien board was inaugurated.  Firm Main board stock return then falls and rises again 
after 1988.  The firm Main board stock return then falls and rises again after 1990.  The 
firm Main board stock return also rises after 1991 and then falls after 1993.  Slightly 
different from the effect of stock market liberalization on firm Main board share price, 
the firm Main board stock return declines slightly when the 1985 stock market 
liberalization takes place.  However, the firm Main board stock return rises sharply when 
the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place.  An increase in the firm Main board 
stock return when the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place shows that the 
establishment of the Alien board has a large positive effect on both firm Main board 
share price and firm Main board stock return. 
To see more closely the impact of stock market liberalization on firm Main board 
share price using 1985, 1987, and 1991 as during liberalization years, I calculate the 
mean value of firm Main board share price in pre, during, post, and after period of each 
liberalization year.  Figure 3 plots the movement of the mean value of firm Main board 
share prices following each stock market liberalization year.  The firm Main board share 
price does not change much from pre- liberalization level following the 1985 
liberalization.  The firm Main board share price then increases in one and two years after 
1985 liberalization and falls after that.  The post-liberalization value of the firm Main 
board share price following the 1985 liberalization is higher than the pre-liberalization 
level.  However, the firm Main board share price increases sharply from the pre- 
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liberalization levels when the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place. The firm Main 
board share price following the 1987 stock market liberalization, however, declines both 
one and two years after the 1987 liberalization and the period after that.  The post-
liberalization value of the firm Main board share price following the 1987 stock market 
liberalization is still higher than the pre- liberalization but the after-liberalization value is 
lower.  A larger increase in the firm Main board share price from pre-liberalization levels 
during the 1987 stock market liberalization is consistent with the study of Patro and Wald 
(2002).  The long run reduction in the firm Main board share price following 
liberalization in all liberalization years is consistent with the results found by Kim and 
Singal (2000).  Figure 4 shows the movement of the mean value of the firm Main board 
stock return. The results in Figure 4 are similar to the results in Figure 3.  The firm Main 
board stock return declines slightly during the 1985 liberalization.  The firm Main board 
stock return increases in the post period and declines afterward.  As in the case of the 
firm Main board share price, the firm Main board stock return increases sharply during 
the 1987 stock market liberalization.  This shows that the establishment of the Alien 
board has a short-run positive impact on firm Main board stock return and stock price.  
The firm Main board stock return then falls sharply in the post and after period of the 
1987 liberalization.  The post and after liberalization values of the firm Main board stock 
return are lower than pre-liberalization levels following the 1987 liberalization.  
I compute a t-test to identify significant changes in the mean value of firm Main 
board share price and firm Main board stock return before and after each liberalization 
year under four main scenarios: all years before and after liberalization, 5 years before 
and 5 years after liberalization, 3 years before and 3 years after liberalization, and 1 year 
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before and 1 year after liberalization.  The 1985 and 1987 are used as the liberalization 
years to study the revaluation effect of the firm Main board and 1991 is used as the 
liberalization year to study the revaluation effect of the firm Alien board.  The results in 
Table 6 show that, under all years before and all years after liberalization, the firm Main 
board share price (P) and the firm Alien board share price (PAB) are significantly lower 
than pre-liberalization level in all three liberalization years.  For the results of the firm 
Main board stock return, the absolute value of firm Main board stock return also falls in 
all liberalization years.  However, the only year that had significant change in the firm 
Main board stock return is 1987.  The firm Alien board stock return also falls following 
the 1991 liberalization but a decline is not statistically significant.  
 In the 5 years before and 5 years after liberalization case, the firm Main board 
share price was significantly higher than pre-liberalization levels following the 1985 
liberalization.  The change in firm Main board share price following the 1987 
liberalization was positive but not statistically significant.  The firm Alien board share 
price significantly declines following the 1991 liberalization. The firm Main board stock 
return significantly declines following the 1987 liberalization.   
When the period is 3 years before and 3 years after liberalization, the firm Main 
board share price significantly increases from pre-liberalization levels following the 1985 
liberalization.  The firm Main board share price also significantly increases from pre-
liberalization levels following the 1987 liberalization despite a significant reduction in 
firm Main board stock return following 1987.  However, the firm Alien board share price 
is significantly lower than pre-liberalization level following the 1991 liberalization.  A 
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change in firm Alien board stock return following the 1991 liberalization is not 
statistically significant. 
 When the time period is 1 year before and 1 year after liberalization, the firm 
Main board stock return significantly increases from pre-liberalization levels following 
the 1985 liberalization.  The firm Main board share price also increases from pre-
liberalization levels following 1985 liberalization but the increase is not statistically 
significant.  The firm Main board share price also significantly increases from pre-
liberalization level following 1987 stock liberalization.  However, despite this, the firm 
Main board stock return is significantly less than pre-liberalization levels.  Both firm 
Alien board stock price and stock return are significantly lower than pre-liberalization 
level following the 1991 liberalization.  Therefore, the 1991 stock market liberalization 
seems to have negative impact on both firm Alien board stock price and stock return 
regardless of which time interval is. 
In the next section, I develop the model to evaluate the effect of 1985, 1987, and 
1991 stock market liberalization. The main concentration is on the revaluation effect of 
the firm Main board stock return following the 1987 liberalization and the revaluation 
effect of the firm Alien board stock return following the 1991 liberalization.   
 
 
A.1  The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 and 1987 Stock Market 
Liberalization on Firm Main Board Stock Return 
 
Kim and Singal (2000) found that stock return increases soon after the opening of 
the market and is followed by subsequent reductions in return that are sometimes 
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significant.  Patro and Wald (2002) also found a larger increase in return during 
liberalization and a large decrease in return after liberalization. The International Asset 
Pricing model also predicts that the stock market liberalization should induce an increase 
in firm share price because of lower cost of capital following the liberalization. 
Therefore, to get a better understanding of how firm Main board stock return is affected 
by stock market liberalization, I evaluated the pre, during, post, and after effect of stock 
market liberalization using the following model.   
 
RETURNit=θ 1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Firmi+em it                 
            (8a)                                                
RETURNit=θ 1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Sectori+em it         
                        (8b) 
 
 I focus on the effect of the 1987 stock market liberalization. LIB0 represents 
during 1987 liberalization.  In estimating model (8), I compare the effect of 1987 stock 
market liberalization to two years before liberalization level (PRELIB).    
The heteroskedasticity test shows that heteroskedasticity exists, therefore the 
consistent standard error is used.  I estimate model (8) using the Ordinary least squares 
estimation, the fixed effect estimation, and the panel-generalized least squares estimation.  
I use the Hausman Specification test to pick the best estimation method.   The Hausman 
Specification test is an asymptotic test based on the distribution of the quadratic form that 
results form the differences between a consistent estimator under null and alternative 
hypothesis and an inconsistent estimator under the alternative hypothesis but efficient 
under the null hypothesis.  The null hypothesis is that the difference in coefficients 
between the two estimation methods is not systematic.  If the Hausman Specification test 
does not reject the null hypothesis, there is no systematic difference between the two 
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estimators.  Using the whole sample dataset, regardless of whether firm or sector 
differences are controlled, the Hausman Specification test picks the fixed effect 
estimation over others estimation methods.  Therefore, the results of the fixed effect 
estimation are in Table 8.   
The whole sample dataset, which is the total dataset, and sub sample dataset, 
which includes only the firms that have observations before and after 1987, are used in 
estimating the models to identify whether the revaluation effects are different when 
dataset is smaller.  The estimation results with only dummy variables using the whole and 
sub-sample dataset both show that the firm Main board stock return increases from the 
pre-liberalization level in the liberalization period regardless of whether firm or sector 
differences are controlled.  The difference between the pre and the post liberalization 
return is negative and in most cases significant.  The estimation results using whole and 
sub-sample dataset both shows that the firm Main board stock return declines from the 
pre-liberalization level in the after liberalization period.  When the whole sample dataset 
is used, the firm Main board stock return increases from the pre-liberalization level by 
71.50% when firm differences are controlled and by 71.54% when sector differences are 
controlled in the liberalization year.  When the sub sample dataset is used, the firm Main 
board stock return increases from the pre-liberalization level by 71.48% when firm 
differences are controlled and by 71.37% when sector differences are controlled in the 
liberalization year.  When sub-sample dataset is used, the firm Main board stock return 
declines from the pre-liberalization period by 19.47% when firm differences are 
controlled and by 18.52% when sector differences are controlled in POSTLIB period.  
The firm Main board stock return also significantly declines from the pre-liberalization 
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level in the LIBAF period of the 1987 liberalization regardless of which dataset is used 
and which firm or sector differences are controlled.  Next, I add the control variables to 
identify whether the liberalization results are different using the following models. 
 
RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it + θ1 PRELIB 
+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it             (9a) 
                                                                                                     
RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it  
+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it        (9b)                                                                             
 
 The firm specific fixed effect estimation and sector specific fixed effect 
estimation using either dataset shows that the firm Main board stock return falls when 
firm size is larger.  This might due to the fact that larger firms have lower growth 
opportunity thereby causing the revaluation effects to be smaller.  The negative relation 
between firm stock return and firm size and firm market to book ratio are consistent with 
the study of Fama and French (1995).  In addition, the high level of firm liquidity 
positively affects the firm stock return.  The positive correlation between firm stock 
return and world stock return is consistent with the study of Christoffersen, Chung, and 
Erruza (2002).  However, the world stock return variable is positive but not statistically 
significant when sub-sample dataset is used.  When the control variables are included, the 
revaluation effects on the firm Main board stock return are similar to the results without 
controll variables. Using either dataset, the firm Main board stock return increases from 
the pre-liberalization level in the liberalization period and falls from the pre-liberalization 
level in the post and after periods.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation shows that 
the firm Main board stock return increase from the pre-liberalization level by 73.83% 
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when whole sample dataset is used an by 71.61% when sub-sample dataset is used in the 
LIB0 period.  The sector specific fixed effect estimation shows a slightly smaller positive 
effect in the LIB0 period.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation shows that the firm 
Main board stock return declines from the pre-liberalization level by 14.95% when whole 
sample dataset is used and by 17.49% when sub sample dataset is used in the POSTLIB 
period.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation shows that the firm Main board stock 
return declines by 41.21% when whole sample dataset is used and by 41.04% when sub-
sample dataset is used in the LIBAF period of 1987 liberalization.  Therefore, regardless 
of whether control variables are included, the firm Main board stock return significantly 
increases from the pre-liberalization level in the during period and declines from the pre-
liberalization level in the post and after periods.   
 To identify whether a change in firm size in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF period 
affects the revaluation of the firm Main board share price following the 1987 
liberalization, I use the following models. 
 
RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it  
+γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB 
+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                                                              (10a) 
 
RETURNit=γ 1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it  
+γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF 
+ θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it           (10b)                                         
 
The effects of firm size on firm Main board stock return in the LIB0, POSTLIB, 
and LIBAF periods are not statistically significant.  That is, an increase in firm size in the 
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LIB0 and POSTLIB period of 1987 liberalization does not affect the firm Main board 
stock return.  The F-test of whether the coefficients of the interaction variables are equal 
to zero does not reject the null hypothesis whether the whole or the sub-sample dataset is 
used when firm differences are controlled.  The null hypothesis is rejected when the 
whole sample dataset is used but not when the sub-sample dataset is used when the sector 
differences are controlled.  When the interaction variables are included, the LIB0 and 
POSTLIB effects of the 1987 liberalization are not statistically significant when firm 
differences are controlled using either dataset.   
Since the F-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
interaction variables are jointly equal to zero, a change in firm size in the LIB0, 
POSTLIB and LIBAF periods of the 1987 liberalization does not affect the revaluation 
effect of the firm Main board stock return.  Therefore, I use the results without the 
interaction variable and conclude that the 1987 stock market liberalization increases the 
firm Main board stock return in the LIB0 period and reduces the firm Main board stock 
return in the POSTLIB and LIBAF period.  An increase in firm Main board stock return 
in the LIB0 period following the 1987 liberalization is consistent with the predictions of 
the International Asset Pricing model that the firm stock price and stock return should be 
higher following the liberalization due to risk sharing occurs following the liberalization.  
Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 positively affects the firm Main 
board stock return during the liberalization takes place. 
The estimation results of the effect of 1985 stock market liberalization on the firm 
Main board stock return are in Table 7.  When liberalization year is 1985, the firm Main 
board stock return declines from the pre-liberalization level in the LIB0 period, increases 
 71 
in the POSTLIB period, and declines again in the LIBAF period regardless of which 
dataset is used and whether firm or sector differences are controlled.  When control 
variables are included, both firm and sector specific fixed effect estimations using either 
dataset also shows a reduction of the firm Main board stock return in the LIB0 and 
LIBAF period and an increase in firm Main board stock return in the POSTLIB period.  
Thus, the positive effect of the 1985 liberalization on firm Main board stock return seems 
to occur in one and two years after liberalization.  When the interaction variables are 
included, the coefficient of the POSTLIB variable is no longer statistic significant.  The 
F-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction variables 
are jointly equal to zero when firm differences are controlled.  Since, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, I conclude that a change in firm size in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF 
periods of 1985 stock market liberalization does not affect the firm Main board stock 
return.   
 Therefore, the 1985 stock market liberalization causes an immediate negative 
impact on the firm Main board stock return during the liberalization period while the 
1987 stock market liberalization causes an immediate positive impact. The 1985 stock 
market liberalization then causes a positive impact on the firm Main board stock return in 
the POSTLIB period while the 1987 stock market liberalization causes a negative impact.  
The firm Main board stock return declines in the LIBAF period following both 1985 and 
1987 liberalization.   
In the next section, I evaluate the effect of stock market liberalization on firm 
Alien board Stock Return to see whether the revaluation effects are different from the 
Main board.  The Alien board is established in order to facilitate foreign investment, 
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therefore, the movement of Alien board share price following the liberalization is 
important to understand the complete revaluation effect.   
 
 
A.2.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Alien Board Stock Return 
 
 Figure 5 shows that movement of the firm Alien board share price closely 
resembles the movement of the firm Main board share price.  In Figure 2, the mean value 
of the firm Alien board stock return also closely resembles the mean value of the firm 
Main board stock return.  Khanthavit and Pattarathammas (2004) studied the common 
factors in stock returns between Main board and Alien board and found that the stock 
returns in both Main board and Alien board were driven by a common factor and by a 
specific factor of their own.  They found that the common factor such as same common 
sources of news and fundamental factors that existed for each pair of same stocks drove 
stock return in the Main and Alien boards to move together.  As shown in Figure 5, the 
mean value of the firm Alien board share price is higher than the mean value of the firm 
Main board share price.  Baily and Jagtiani (1994) mentioned various reasons why the 
Alien board share price is higher than the Main board share price.  They first argued that 
cross- sectional differences in the supply of shares available to the foreigners in the Alien 
board could generate cross-sectional differences in Alien board share price and Main 
board share price.  In other words, they argued that the firms with a relatively high weight 
in foreign investor portfolios but with a tight foreign ownership limits would be in high 
demand and would exhibit large differences between Alien and Main board share price.  
Their study found that firms that have tighter foreign ownership limit were associated 
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with a higher Alien board premium.  They further argued that the relative liquidity of 
Main board and Alien board shares affected the price in the Alien board and Main board.  
They argued that in terms of foreigners’ view, the Alien board had higher liquidity than 
Main board.  Their study found that foreign investors offered a relatively high price for 
relatively liquid Alien board listings, thereby causing the Alien board share price to be 
higher than the Main board share price.  Lastly their study found that the firms that are 
information rich from the foreign investors point of view would tend to exhibit a large 
Alien board share price premium.  Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom (2004) found that foreign 
investors have superior information-processing ability compared to local investors.  The 
fact that foreign investors have superior information-processing skill caused a difference 
in the share price between the Main board and the Alien board.  Bailey, Mao, and 
Sirodom (2004) argued that the gap between price and volume traded between the two 
boards could increase as cross-market information flows and information processing 
declined.  Since Thai investors normally traded shares through the Main board and 
foreigners normally traded shares through the Alien board, the price difference between 
two boards might be due to the Main board being populated by poorly informed investors 
with inferior information-processing ability while the unrestricted market was populated 
by foreign investors with superior information-processing ability (Bailey, Mao, and 
Sirodom, 2004).  In order to evaluate the effect of stock market liberalization on firm 
Alien board share price and to see whether the revaluation effect of the Alien board share 
price is different, I followed the same methodology.  However, the only liberalization 
year that I included in the model is 1991 since the Alien board share price starts to appear 
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on the Alien board in 1988.  To evaluate the direct effect of the stock market 
liberalization on the firm Alien board stock return, I use the following models. 
 
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF +5D97+Firmi+eab it                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                             (11a)                            
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF 5D97+Sectori+eab it   
                                                                                                                            (11b)      
                                                                                                                       
RETURNPAB is firm Alien board stock return.  I followed the same estimation 
methods and first tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity, which exists.  Therefore, I 
use consistent standard error in my estimations.  The estimation is done using both whole 
sample dataset and sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have observation 
before and after 1991.  I first control for firm differences then later for sector differences.    
 The fixed effect estimation results are in Table 9.  The Hausman specification 
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients between the fixed 
effect estimation and panel generalized least square are not systematic. Since the results 
of the fixed effect estimation and panel generalized least square are similar, I use the 
result of the fixed effect estimation.  The firm specific fixed effect estimations using 
either dataset show that the firm Alien board stock return significantly increases from the 
pre-liberalization level in the POSTLIB period of the 1991 liberalization   The effects of 
the 1991 liberalization in the LIB0 and LIBAF period of the 1991 liberalization are 
negative but not statistically significant.  When sector differences are controlled, the 
sector specific fixed effect estimations using either whole or sub-sample dataset show 
that the firm Alien board stock return significantly declines in the LIB0 period and 
significantly increases in the POSTLIB period.  A reduction in the firm Alien board stock 
return from the pre-liberalization level in the LIB0 period contrasts to the prediction of 
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the International Asset Pricing model.  Nevertheless, the introduction of the ADRs in 
1991 positively affects the firm Alien board stock return in one and two years after the 
1991 liberalization. 
Next, I included the control variables to see whether the revaluation effects are 
different when control variables are included. 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it +γ 2 abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Firmi+eab it                 (12a)  
                                                                                           
 RETURNPAB it =γ 1 abLNSLab it +γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Sectori+eab it               (12b) 
 
The estimation results are in Table 9.  The control variables are log of world stock 
return, log of firm sales to proxy for firm size, firm Alien board market to book ratio to 
capture firm growth rate, and firm Alien board number of share traded to capture the firm 
stock liquidity.  As in the case of firm Main board stock return, all estimation methods 
show that the firm Alien board stock return rises when firm size is smaller and when firm 
growth rate declines.  This result contrasts with the result found by Bailey and Jagtiani 
(1994) that larger firm size positively correlates to firm Alien board stock return.  The 
firm Alien board stock return is positive related to the world stock return.  The positive 
correlation between firm stock return and world stock return is consistent with the study 
of Christoffersen, Chung, and Erruza (2002).  The effect of the firm Alien board stock 
liquidity is not statistically significant implies the Alien board stock liquidity does not 
affect the Alien board stock return. The firm specific fixed effect estimation method 
shows that the firm Alien board stock return significantly declines from the pre-
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liberalization level in the LIB0 period and significantly increases in the POSTLIB period.  
The sector specific fixed effect estimations using either whole or sub-sample dataset 
show a reduction in the firm Alien board stock return in both LIB0 and LIBAF period of 
the 1991 stock market liberalization.  Therefore, the immediate impact of the introduction 
of the first ADRs on 1991 causes a negative impact on the firm Alien board stock return 
during the 1991 liberalization takes place. The positive revaluation effect of the firm 
Alien board stock return in the POSTLIB following the 1991 liberalization occurs only 
when firm differences are controlled and when sector specific fixed effect estimation 
using the whole sample dataset. 
 To identify whether a change in firm size in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF period 
affects the firm Alien board stock return, I add the interaction variables and estimate the 
following equation. 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIB
AF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF 
+5D97+Firmi+eab it                           (13a)                                
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it  
+γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIB
AF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF 
+5D97+Sectori+eab it                           (13b)    
 
 The fixed effect estimation results are in Table 9.  When the firm differences are 
controlled, the coefficients of the interaction variables are not statistically significant.  
The F-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the interaction 
variables are jointly different from zero whether firm or sector differences are controlled 
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and whether the whole or sub-sample dataset is used.  Therefore, a change in firm size 
does not affect the firm Alien board stock return.   
 In conclusion, the introduction of the first ADRs in 1991 negatively affects the 
firm Alien board stock return during the liberalization period.  The positive effect of the 
introduction of the ADRs on the firm Alien board stock return occurs only in the 
POSTLIB period.  A reduction of the firm Alien board stock return following the 1991 
liberalization in the LIB0 period contrasts with the prediction of the International Asset 
Pricing model.  Since local investors normally trade shares through the Main board and 
foreign investors normally trade shares through the Alien board, the ability to utilize the 
information available during those periods might be different.  Bailey, Mao, and Sirodom 
(2004) argued that foreign investors had superior information-processing ability 
compared to local investors, one factor that drove up the difference between firm Main 
board and Alien board share prices.  Therefore, the difference in information-processing 
ability between two groups of investors might explain the different effect of the 1991 
stock market liberalization between the two boards. 
 
B.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Investment  
Level and the Effect on Firm Cost of Capital 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the mean value of the real growth rate of firm property plant 
and equipment, which is used to proxy for firm investment rate from 1976 to 2003.  The 
real growth rate of firm property plant and equipment is calculated as the growth rate of 
firm property plant and equipment minus the growth rate of the gross capital formation 
index.  From Figure 8, the growth rate of firm investment declines during the 1985 stock 
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market liberalization.  The firm investment rate starts to rise after 1985 and continues to 
rise and reaches the second highest value in 1990.  After 1990, the firm investment rate 
drops sharply and starts to rise again after 1991.  The firm investment rate reaches the 
highest value in 1992 and falls sharply after that.   
Firm investment is significantly related to the cost of capital.  I use the dividend 
yield as a proxy for the cost of capital.  Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) argue 
that the advantage of using dividend yields to measure cost of capital is that dividend 
yields are stationary, observable, and stable.  Patro and Wald (2002) argue that dividend 
yields are a superior measure of the cost of capital.  According to the International Asset 
Pricing model (IAMPs) under capital market segmentation, the cost of capital will 
decline as risk is diversified internationally.  Therefore, the cost of capital should decline 
following stock market liberalization.  Stulz (1999), Patro and Wald (2002), Bakaert and 
Harvey (1998), and Henry (2003) find that the cost of capital falls following stock market 
liberalization.  Since investment is expected to be negatively related to the cost of capital, 
the cost of capital is expected to fall following the stock market liberalization.  Figure 9 
shows the dividend yield from 1976 to 2003.  The mean value of the firm cost of capital 
starts to decline after 1976, picks up after 1978, starts to fall again after 1984, picks up 
after 1987, and reaches its highest value in 1997, which is the year that Thailand 
experienced the financial crisis.  In order to see the movement of the mean value of firm 
investment and the firm cost of capital, I plot them together in Figure 10.  Figure 10 
shows that when firm investment rate rises, firm cost of capital falls especially over the 
period of 1983 to 1988.  The movement of firm investment rate and the cost of capital has 
a huge gap over the period of 1986 to 1996. 
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Table 10 shows t-test for whether there are significant changes in firm investment 
rate following 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization year.  I determine significant 
changes in four different periods: all years before and all years after the stock market 
liberalization, 5 years before and 5 years after the liberalization, 3 years before and 3 
years after the liberalization, and 1 year before and 1 year after the liberalization.  The 
real growth rate of firm property plant and equipment is used to represent firm investment 
rate.  When the period of study is all years before and all years after the liberalization, 
there is no significant change in firm investment following each stock market 
liberalization year, despite the fact that the mean value of firm investment rate in the after 
liberalization period seems to be higher than the pre-liberalization level.  When the period 
of study is five years before and five years after the liberalization, the investment rate 
increases significantly following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalizations.  The 
firm investment rate significantly increases following the 1985 liberalization when time 
interval is 5 years before and 5 years after and 3 years before and 3 years after but 
significantly declines when time period is 1 year before and 1 year after.   
I also follow Chari and Henry (2005) by calculating the investment deviation 
variable following each stock market liberalization year.  The investment deviation 
variable is calculated as the real growth rate of the firm property plant and equipment 
after the liberalization year minus the mean value of the real growth rate of the firm 
property plant and equipment calculated over years -3 to -1 where year 0 is the 
liberalization year.  Thus, the investment deviation represents the post-liberalization 
investment rate compared to the mean value of the pre-liberalization level calculated over 
three years before liberalization.  Therefore, a positive investment deviation implies that 
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the investment rate in post-liberalization is higher than in pre-liberalization.  Following 
the 1985 liberalization, the investment deviation is less than the mean value of the real 
growth rate of firm property plant and equipment calculated over years -3 to -1 slightly 
during the 1985 liberalization.  However, the investment deviation is higher than the 
mean value by 1.48% in the first year following the liberalization.  The investment rate is 
higher by 8.79% and by 16.76% respectively in the second and third year following the 
liberalization.  Following the 1987 liberalization, the investment deviation is higher than 
the mean value by 8.63% during the 1987 liberalization.  The investment rate is higher 
than the mean value by 11.60%, 28.62%, and by 35.23% respectively in the first year, 
second year, and third year following the liberalization. Therefore, introduction of the 
first Thailand fund seems to cause the firm investment rate to be higher than the pre-
liberalization level after one year of liberalization.  Unlike the 1985 stock market 
liberalization, an increase in firm investment rate occurs immediately in the year that 
1987 stock market liberalization takes place.  The increase in firm investment rate 
continues to be higher than the pre-liberalization level especially over the six-year 
horizon.  Thus, the inauguration of the Alien board causes an immediate positive effect 
on firm investment rate.  
The result on Table 11 shows the t-test for whether there is a significant change in 
firm cost of capital following each stock market liberalization year in four main periods 
as for the firm investment rate.  When the period of study is all years before and all years 
after the stock market liberalization, the firm cost of capital significantly declines 
following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalizations.  The reductions in firm cost of 
capital are 44.35% and 43.54% respectively after the 1985 and 1987 liberalizations. The 
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firm cost of capital also significantly declines following the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
liberalization when time interval is 5 years before and 5 years after, 3 years before and 3 
years after, and 1 year before and 1 year after liberalization. Therefore, the significant 
reduction in firm cost of capital following the 1987 liberalization is consistent with the 
International Asset Pricing model.  Since the cost of capital reduces, the investment is 
expected to rise following the liberalization. 
 
 
B.1.  The During, Post, and After Effects of 1985 and 1987 Stock Market 
Liberalization on Firm Investment 
 
From a sample of 11 countries that liberalized their stock markets, Henry (2000a) 
finds 9 countries experience a growth rate in private investment above their non 
liberalization median in the first year after liberalizing.  In the second and third years, this 
number is 10 of 11 and 8 of 11, respectively.  Henry argues that the stock market 
liberalization increases private investment.  In addition, Chari and Henry (2005) find that 
the growth rate of the firm investment exceeds its pre-liberalization mean by an average 
of 5.4% in the three-year period following stock market liberalization.  Therefore, 
according to the International Asset Pricing model, the firm cost of capital should decline 
and I expect the firm investment to rise following the liberalization.  
In order to find the movement of the firm investment in the pre, during, post, and 
after periods of the stock market liberalization, I plot the mean value of the firm 
investment rate when the liberalization year changes.  The results are in Figure 11.  Real 
growth rate of firm property plant and equipment as a proxy for firm investment rate falls 
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from the pre-liberalization level during the 1985 stock market liberalization.  Firm 
investment rate increases from the pre-liberalization level during the 1987 stock market 
liberalization.  Firm investment rate then increases steeply from the pre-liberalization 
level in the post 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization.  The firm investment rate, 
despite falling sharply from the post 1987 stock market liberalization level, is still higher 
than pre-1987 stock market liberalization level in the after-1987 stock market 
liberalization period.  The firm investment rate is slightly higher than the pre-
liberalization level in the after period of the 1985 stock market liberalization.  
In order to find the pre, during, post, and after effect of the 1985 and 1987 stock 
market liberalization on firm investment rate, I use the following the models.  The main 
concentration is on the effect of the 1987 stock market liberalization on firm investment 
rate.   
 
REALG_PPE it = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF +4D97 + 
e it           (20a) 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i + φ 1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 
+ e it                                 (20b) 
 
REALG_PPE is the real growth rate of firm property plant and equipment used to 
measure the firm investment rate.  The consistent standard error is used since the 
heteroskedastic problem exists.  The fixed effect estimation results are in Table 13.  Two 
datasets are used in the estimation.  The first dataset is the whole dataset and the second 
dataset includes only the firms that have observation before and after 1987.  In estimating 
the model, I control for firm differences and sector differences since those factors might 
affect the differences in firm investment rate.  When the firm differences are controlled, 
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the Hausman specification test picks the fixed effect estimation over the panel-
generalized least squares.  When the sector differences are controlled, the Hausman 
specification test shows that either estimation method can be used.  Therefore, I present 
the results of the fixed effect estimation in Table 13.  When the firm specific fixed effect 
estimation is used as the estimation method, the firm investment rate significantly 
increases from the pre-liberalization level in the LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF periods of 
the 1987 liberalization regardless of which dataset is used.  The largest increase in firm 
investment rate is in the LIBAF period.  The result of the sector specific fixed effect 
estimation also shows that the firm investment rate significantly increases from the pre-
liberalization level in the LIB0, POSTLIB and LIBAF periods of the 1987 liberalization.  
Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board positively affects the firm investment rate 
in all three periods of the 1987 liberalization. 
Next, I include the control variables to see whether the liberalization effects are 
different when control variables are included. 
 
REALG_PPE it  = FIRM i + λ1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1+ δPRELIB + 
θ 1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB + θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it    (21a)  
 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i  + λ 1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1 +δPRELIB + 
θ 1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB1 + θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it   (21b) 
 
G_SALES is the growth rate of firm sales used to capture the growth rate of the 
firm future cash flow.  LNTA is log of firm total asset used to capture the firm size.  DIV 
is the firm dividend yield to capture for the cost of capital.  Two main datasets are used in 
estimating equation (21) to determine whether the liberalization effect is different when 
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the model is estimated with a smaller dataset.  The fixed effect estimation with consistent 
standard error results are in Table 13.  The International Asset Pricing model also 
predicts that the cost of capital should decline following the liberalization because risk is 
diversified.  Therefore, if the International Asset Pricing is true, I should observe an 
increase in firm investment rate compared to the pre-liberalization level following the 
stock market liberalization.   
The fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error shows that the firm 
investment rate negatively relates to the cost of capital and positive relates to growth rate 
of firm future cash flow.   However, the effect of firm cost of capital and growth rate of 
firm future cash flow are not statistically significant when whole sample dataset is used.  
When the sub-sample dataset is used, the firm investment rate positively relates to growth 
rate of firm future cash flow.  The positive relation between firm investment and growth 
rate of firm future cash flow is consistent with the study of Chari and Henry (2005).  The 
firm specific fixed effect estimations using either whole sample or sub-sample dataset 
show that the firm investment rate negatively relates to firm size.  That is, larger firm size 
negatively affects the firm investment rate.  The negative relationship between firm size 
and firm investment rate due to larger firms normally have lower growth opportunity 
while smaller firms normally have higher growth opportunity.  Therefore, firm that has 
larger size might have lower investment rate.  When sector differences are controlled, the 
positive effect of the growth rate of firm future cash flow on firm investment rate is only 
statistically significant when sub-sample dataset is used.   When sector differences are 
controlled and whole sample dataset is used, the larger firm size positively affects the 
firm investment rate.  However, the statistically significant level is not highly significant 
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compared to when firm differences are controlled.  The firm size does not affect the firm 
investment rate when sub sample dataset is used in sector fixed effect estimation.  
 When the control variables are included, the LIB0 effect of the 1987 liberalization 
is no longer statistically significant whether the firm or sector differences are controlled 
or which dataset is used.  Both firm and sector specific fixed effect estimation shows that 
the firm investment rate significantly increases from the pre-liberalization level in the 
POSTLIB and LIBAF periods of the 1987 stock market liberalization.  Therefore, the 
firm investment rate significantly increases especially in one and two years following the 
1987 liberalization. 
 The fixed effect estimation results using the 1985 as the stock market 
liberalization year is on Table 12.  The sub-sample dataset is changed to the one that 
includes only the firms that have observation before and after 1985.  When estimating 
equation (20), both firm and sector specific fixed effect estimation using either whole or 
sub-sample dataset shows that the firm investment rate declines from the pre-
liberalization level in the LIB0 period of the 1985 stock market liberalization.  However, 
when control variables are included, the LIB0 effect is no longer statistically significant 
regardless of whether firm or sector differences are controlled.  The fixed effect 
estimation results using either dataset shows that the firm investment rate significantly 
higher than the pre-liberalization level in the LIBAF period of the 1985 stock market 
liberalization.  The 1985 stock market liberalization does not have immediate effect on 
firm investment rate when control variables are included. 
 Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 positively affects the firm 
investment rate especially in the POSTLIB period of the 1987 liberalization.  The higher 
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investment rate following the 1987 stock market liberalization is consistent with the 
International Asset Pricing model, which predicts that the cost of capita should decline 
following the liberalization.  As the cost of capital declines, the firm investment rate 
should rise following the liberalization.  On the contrary, the introduction of the first 
Thailand funds in 1985 negatively affects the firm investment rate during the 1985 
liberalization takes place. 
 
B.2.  The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 and 1987 Stock Market 
Liberalization on Firm Cost of Capital 
 
 According to the International Asset Pricing model under capital market 
segmentation, the firm cost of capital should decline following stock market 
liberalization.  Table 11 shows a significant reduction in the mean value of the cost of 
capital following the 1985 and 1987 liberalization regardless of which time interval is  
Figure 12 shows that the cost of capital both declines from the pre-liberalization level 
during the period of the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization.  The cost of capital 
continues to decrease from the pre-liberalization level in the POSTLIB period of the 1985 
stock market liberalization.  The cost of capital increases slightly from the LIB0 level in 
the POSTLIB period of the 1987 liberalization.  However, the POSTLIB value of the cost 
of capital following the 1987 liberalization is still lower than the pre-liberalization level.  
The LIBAF value of the cost of capital following both 1985 and 1987 liberalization 
seems to be lower than the pre-liberalization level.  The reduction in the cost of capital 
following the 1985 and 1987 liberalization is consistent with the the International Asset 
Pricing model prediction. 
 87 
 To evaluate the effect of the 1987 stock market liberalization on the cost of 
capital, I use the following model. 
DIV it  = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it       
          (22a)   
DIV it  = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97+ e it      
                     (22b)         
  
DIV is firm dividend yield to proxy for firm cost of capital.  The Hausman 
Specification test picks the fixed effect estimation over the panel generalized least 
squares regardless of which dataset is used and whether firm or sector differences are 
controlled.  The fixed effect estimation results are in Table 15.  Both firm and sector 
specific fixed effect estimation shows that the firm cost of capital significantly declines 
from the pre-liberalization level in the LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF period following the 
1987 stock market liberalization.  The magnitude of a reduction in the cost of capital is 
largest in the LIB0 period.  The reduction in firm cost of capital is consistent with the 
International Asset Pricing model prediction.   In addition, the reduction in cost of capital 
in the LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF period is also consistent with the results in Table 13, 
which shows a significant increase in the firm investment rate in the same periods. 
 Next, I add the control variables to see whether the liberalization effects on the 
firm cost of capital are different. 
DIV it  = FIRM i  + 1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB 
+φ4LIBAF+ 4D97  
+ e it                                                                          (23a) 
DIV it  =SECTOR i  +1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it +  φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB 
+φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it                                                 (23b)                                                             
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 The cost of capital is a function of firm size and growth rate of firm earning per 
share.  When firm differences are controlled, the Hausman specification test picks the 
fixed effect estimation over the panel-generalized least squares.  The fixed effect 
estimation results are in Table 15.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation using either 
dataset show that the cost of capital increases when firm size is smaller.  However, when 
sector differences are controlled, the firm cost of capital positively relates to firm size.  
The positive effect of firm size and firm cost of capital might be due to larger firm paying 
higher dividend because larger firm has lower growth opportunity.  The effect of the firm 
growth rate of earning per share is only statistically significant when sub-sample dataset 
is used.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation and the sector specific fixed effect 
estimation using sub-sample dataset both shows that the cost of capital declines when 
firm growth rate of earning per share rises.  Since the cost of capital is composed of 
dividend yield plus growth rate of earning per share.  If the cost of capital is fixed, an 
increase in growth rate of earning per share should reduce dividend yield.  Since net 
income is used to pay dividends or keep as retained earning for the investment, when the 
retained earning rises, this implies more investment and higher growth rate of net income. 
When retained earning rises, firm dividend yield should decline.  The inclusion of the 
control variables in the equation does not affect the 1987 liberalization effects of the cost 
of capital.  The 1987 liberalization reduces the cost of capital from the liberalization level 
in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF period of the 1987 liberalization. 
 When 1985 is used as the stock market liberalization year, the LIB0 effect of the 
1985 liberalization on firm cost of capital is still negative but no longer statistically 
significant.  The fixed effect estimation results using either whole dataset or sub-sample 
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dataset that contains only the firms that have observation before and after 1985 shows 
that the cost of capital significantly declines from the pre-liberalization level in both 
POSTLIB and LIBAF period.  Therefore, the effects of the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
liberalization on the cost of capital is consistent with the prediction of the International 
Asset Pricing model that the cost of capital should declines following the liberalization.  
The inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 seems to have stronger effect on cost of 
capital since the cost of capital significantly declines in all three periods of the 1987 
liberalization.   
 
C.  The Effect of Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Performance 
 
 
The effect of stock market liberalization on firm performance is measured using 
Tobin’s Q.  According to Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski (1999), Tobin’s Q is a 
better measure of firm performance in terms of future profitability than standard 
accounting measures.  Tobin’s Q is a ratio of the asset market value of capital goods 
divided by replacement cost.  Following Chari and Henry (2005), I calculate Tobin’s Q as 
the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt all divided by the book 
value of total assets.  The market value of equity is firm stock price multiplied by the firm 
number of shares traded, which is the firm market capitalization.  The book value of debt 
is book value of the total liability.  According to the International Asset Pricing model, 
stock market liberalization will cause a reduction in the cost of capital and thereby cause 
the stock price to increase.  Therefore, the Tobin’s Q value should rise following the 
stock market liberalization.   Figure 13 shows the movement of the mean value of 
Tobin’s Q from 1976 to 2003.  As shown in Figure 13, the mean value of Tobin’s Q 
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reaches the highest level in 1989, which is two years after the 1987 stock market 
liberalization.  After 1989, the firm performance declines sharply and picks up again after 
1992.  The firm performance declines sharply after 1993 and reaches the lowest level 
around 1997, the year of Thailand’s financial crisis, to 2000.  The firm performance picks 
up after 2000.   
In order to see the behavior of firm performance before and after the liberalization 
year, I conduct a t-test to identify whether there are significant changes in firm 
performance following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalizations.  I identify the 
significant changes in firm performance under four main scenarios: all years before and 
all years after liberalization, five years before and five years after liberalization, three 
years before and three years after liberalization, and one year before and one year after 
the liberalization.  The results are in Table 16.   
The t-test of significant changes in the mean value of firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q shows that there are significant improvements in firm 
performance following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalizations.  The results show 
that firm performance significantly improves following the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
liberalizations over all years before and all years after, 5 years before and 5 years after, 
and 3 years before and 3 years after liberalization.  When time interval is one year before 
and one year after the liberalization, the firm performance significantly improves 
following the 1987 liberalization.  An improvement in firm performance in one year 
before and one year after 1985 liberalization is not statistically significant. 
A significant improvement in firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q 
following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalizations is consistent with Chari and 
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Henry’s (2005) findings since they find Tobin’s Q increases during the liberalization. A 
significant improvement in firm performance following the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
liberalization over the 5 years before and 5 years after liberalization and the 3 years 
before and 3 years after liberalization also occurs when the ROA is used as the measure 
of firm performance.  The significant change in firm performance as measured by the 
ROA is illustrated in Table 17. 
 In order to identify whether firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand generate 
wasteful investments following each stock market liberalization year that might cause a 
reduction in firm performance, I divide firm net income by firm property plant and 
equipment to generate the firm’s rate of return on investment (NIPPE).  Then I take the 
average NIPPE for all firms to generate the mean value of firm rate of return on 
investment.  According to Chari and Henry (2005), if the rate of return on investment is 
higher in the post liberalization period, we cannot conclude that liberalization stimulates 
wasteful investment.  Figure 16 shows the mean value of firm rate of return on 
investment from 1976 to 2003.  Figure 16 shows that the mean value of firm rate of 
return on investment significantly increases during the 1985 and slightly increase during 
1987.  To see the movement of the mean value of firm rate of return on investment in 
various scenarios, I calculate the mean value of firm rate of return on investment 
following each stock market liberalization year in Table 18.  The first scenario is all years 
before and after each stock market liberalization year.  The results show that the firm rate 
of return on investment significantly falls following the 1985 and 1987 liberalization 
under the first scenario.  The changes in firm rate of return on investment are not 
statistically significant under other scenarios.  However, though the changes in firm rate 
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of return are not statistically significant, the firm rate of return increases following the 
1985 liberalization under 3 years before and 3 years after liberalization and increases 
following the 1987 liberalization under 1 year before and 1 year after liberalization.    
 Haksar and Kongsamut (2003) found that a high level of debt, in other words, 
high leverage is correlated with poor performance.  I use the debt to equity ratio to 
measure company financial leverage.  Firm debt to equity ratio is calculated as firm total 
liabilities divided by firm total equity.  A debt to equity ratio reveals the extent to which 
firm management is willing to fund its operations with debt rather than its equity.  A high 
debt to equity ratio generally implies that a firm has been aggressive in financing its 
growth with debt.  A firm that has a high debt to equity ratio is at risk for bankruptcy and 
has a high chance of becoming insolvent.  According to Haksar and Kongsamut (2003), 
high leverage could reflect poor corporate governance and expose firms to risk in the 
event of economic volatility.  Figure 18 shows that the mean value of debt to equity ratio 
declines after the 1985 and reaches the second lowest value in 1987.  Table 19 shows the 
significant change in firm debt to equity ratio under four main scenarios.  It shows that 
significant changes in firm debt to equity ratio occurs only when the time horizon is all 
years before and all years after and five years before and five years after liberalization.  
Under the all years before and all years after liberalization, the firm debt to equity ratio 
significant declines from the pre-liberalization level in both liberalization years.  
Liberalization year 1987 has the largest significant reduction in firm debt to equity ratio.  
Figures 19 and 20 show the average post 1985 and 1987 debt to equity ratio compared to 
pre-liberalization ratios calculated over year -3 to -1 where year 0 is liberalization.  
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Figures 19 and 20 show that the firm debt to equity ratio is much lower than the pre-
liberalization level for 1985 and 1987.   
 
C.1.  The During, Post, and After Effects of 1985 and 1987 Stock Market 
Liberalization on Firm Performance 
 
 International Asset Pricing Model predicts a reduction in firm cost of capital 
and increase in firm share price following the liberalization, therefore, Tobin’s Q value 
should rise following the liberalization.  In order to find the pre, during, post, and after 
effects of the 1985, and 1987 stock market liberalizations, I plot the movement of mean 
value of firm performance in Figure 21.  Figure 21 shows that the mean value of firm 
performance does not change much when the 1985 stock market liberalization takes 
place.  The mean value of firm performance is higher than the pre-liberalization level in 
both post and after periods of 1985 stock market liberalization.  When the year of 
liberalization is 1987, the mean value of firm performance improves sharply when the 
liberalization takes place.  Then the mean value of firm performance declines from the 
during liberalization level in both post and after liberalization periods.  However, the 
mean value of firm performance in both post and after liberalization periods is still higher 
than the pre-liberalization level.   
 Figure 22 shows the movement of the mean value of firm performance as 
measure by ROA.  The firm performance improves significantly during the 1987 
liberalization and continues to improve in the post-liberalization period.  The firm 
performance falls in the after-liberalization period but the after-liberalization value is still 
higher than the pre-liberalization value.  The movement of the firm performance as 
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measured by ROA following the 1985 liberalization is similar to the movement of firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 Since the above results simply describe the behavior of the firm performance 
as measured by Tobin’s Q without control for firm and sector differences that might drive 
up the differences in Tobin’s Q value, I first measure firm performance using the 
following equation.  
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (25a)  
                                                                               
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (25b)            
 
 TOBINQ is used to measure firm performance.  Year 1987 is used as the stock 
market liberalization year.  Whole sample and sub-sample datasets are used in the 
estimation.  The Hausman Specification test picks the fixed effect estimation over the 
panel generalized least square regardless of which dataset is used.  The results of the 
fixed effect estimation are in Table 22.  The firm specific fixed effect estimation using 
either dataset shows a significant improvement in firm performance in the LIB0, 
POSTLIB and LIBAF periods.  The sector specific fixed effect estimation shows that the 
firm performance significantly improves from the pre-liberalization level in all periods 
regardless of which dataset is used. 
 Then I add control variables to identify whether the liberalization effects of the 
1987 liberalization are different.   
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE it +τ 2 DEBTEQ it +τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ
3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                      (26a)   
 95 
                                                  
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it +τ 2 DEBTEQ it +τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0
+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                  (26b) 
 
 Firm performance is a function of firm market share, firm debt to equity ratio, 
firm size, and liberalization dummy variables.  Haksar and Kongsamut (2003) found that 
a larger market share is associated with stronger firm performance while a high debt to 
equity ratio is associated with poor performance.  Therefore, I expect a positive 
relationship between firm market share and firm Tobin’s Q and expect a negative 
relationship between firm debt to equity ratio and firm Tobin’s Q.    The fixed effect 
estimation with consistent standard error is in Table 22.  The firm and sector specific 
fixed effect estimation and using either dataset show that the firm performance positively 
relates to firm market share.  That is larger market share improves firm performance.  
However, the coefficient of the market share is not statistically significant when firm 
differences are controlled.  When the whole sample dataset is used and firm differences 
are controlled, the firm performance is negatively related to firm size. However, when 
sub-sample dataset is used, firm performance is positively related to firm size.  When 
sector differences are controlled and sub-sample dataset is used, firm performance is 
positively related to firm size.   Since the results of both firm specific and sector specific 
using sub sample dataset both shows the positive statistic relation between firm size and 
firm Tobin’s Q, I use the results of the sub-sample dataset and conclude that larger firms 
have higher Tobin’s Q.  An inclusion of the control variables does not affect the 
significance of the liberalization effects in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF periods.  That is, 
firm performance sill significantly improves in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF periods of 
the 1987 liberalization regardless of which dataset is used or whether the firm or sector 
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differences are controlled.  Therefore, the firm performance significantly improves 
following the 1987 liberalization when Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy of firm performance. 
 When I change the liberalization year to be 1985, the liberalization effects change 
slightly.  The fixed effect estimation results are in Table 20.  When liberalization years is 
1985, the firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q significantly improves only in 
POSTLIB and LIBAF period.  The LIB0 effect is still positive but no longer statistically 
significant when sector differences are controlled.  Therefore, the firm performance 
significantly improves in the POSTLIB and LIBAF periods following the 1985 stock 
market liberalization. 
 Next, I use ROA as a measure of firm performance to identify whether the 
liberalization effects are different.  
 
ROA it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (27a)    
                                                                             
ROA it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (27b)   
 
The liberalization year is 1987.  The Hausman Specification test picks the fixed 
effect estimation over the panel generalized least square estimation.  The fixed effect 
estimation with consistent standard error is in Table 23.  When firm differences are 
controlled, the firm performance, as measured by ROA, significantly improves in LIB0, 
POSTLIB, and LIBAF periods of the 1987 liberalization.  The sector specific fixed effect 
estimation also finds the same results. Then I add control variables to identify whether 
the liberalization effects are different. 
ROA it =FIRM i +τ 1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it  
+ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                           (28a) 
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ROA it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it  
+ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it      (28b)  
 
Firm performance as measured by ROA is a function of firm market share, firm 
debt to equity last period, firm size, and liberalization dummy variables.  The fixed effect 
estimation results are in Table 23.  The firm performance is positively related to firm 
market share and firm size.  That is, a larger firm has better firm performance.  A larger 
firm has higher net income because they can generate higher sales and therefore has 
better firm performance as measured by ROA.  In addition, the firm that has larger 
market share also has better firm performance.  The relationship between ROA and firm 
leverage is negative but not statistically significant.  When control variables are included, 
the liberalization effects do not change.  That is, firm performance significantly improves 
from pre-liberalization level in LIB0, POSTLIB, and LIBAF periods of the 1987 
liberalization. 
Table 21 shows the fixed effect estimation results when liberalization year is 
changed to 1985 and ROA is used as a measure of firm performance, the estimation 
results without the control variables show that the firm performance significantly 
improves from the pre-liberalization level in the POSTLIB and LIBAF period of the 1985 
liberalization.  When control variables are included, the firm specific fixed effect 
estimation and sector specific fixed effect estimation show that the firm performance 
significantly improves in the POSTLIB and LIBAF periods of 1985 liberalization.   
In conclusion, the effect of the stock market liberalization on firm performance is 
similar whether the ROA or Tobin’s Q is used to measure firm performance.  That is, 
firm performance significantly improves following the 1985 and 1987 stock market 
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liberalization.  The improvement in firm performance is much stronger when 
liberalization year is 1987 since the firm performance improves immediately during the 
1987 liberalization. The during effect is not statistically significant when liberalization 
year is 1985. .  Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 causes a large 
positive impact on firm performance.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 Stock market liberalization is a decision by country to allow foreign investors to 
participate in its stock market through buying and selling shares.  Stock market 
liberalization is one form of financial and capital account liberalization.  Many people 
have cast doubt on the benefits of stock market liberalization.  Using annual firm level 
data, this study tries to identify the effects of stock market liberalization in Thailand in 
three main areas: the effect on the firm stock return in the Main and Alien boards; the 
effect on firm investment rate and firm cost of capital; and lastly the effect on firm 
performance.  The total number of firms in this study is 469 firms in 31 sectors in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).  The period of study is from 1976 to 2003. Using 
firm level data instead of country level data allows to see how the firms in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand are affected by the country’s decision to liberalize the stock 
market.  Since stock market liberalization is a gradual process, I concentrate on three 
years that had significant changes in liberalization policies; 1985 and 1987 in evaluating 
the effect of the liberalization on firm Main board revaluation, firm investment and firm 
cost of capital and firm performance, and 1991 in evaluating the effect of liberalization 
on firm Alien board revaluation.    
The first effect of the stock market liberalization is the revaluation effect on firm 
stock return, composed of firm Main board stock return and firm Alien board stock
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return.  The Alien board was inaugurated in 1987 in addition to the Main board to 
facilitate foreign investment in the Stock Exchange of Thailand.   According to the 
International Asset Pricing Model (IAPMs), the cost of capital will fall following the 
stock market liberalization.  That is, holding the expected future cash flow constant, the 
liberalizing countries should observe an increase in equity price index following the stock 
market liberalization.  To find whether the firm Main board share stock return increases 
following the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization, I estimate models by first 
controlling for firm differences and then for sector differences since those factors might 
affect revaluation among firms.  The firm Main board stock return is negatively related to 
firm size and firm growth rate, but positively related to firm stock liquidity and world 
stock return.  The estimation results show that the firm Main board stock return falls 
during liberalization, but rise in the post-liberalization period and falls again in the after-
liberalization period following the 1985 stock market liberalization.   
 When the liberalization year is 1987, the firm Main board stock return is 
significantly higher than the pre-liberalization level during the 1987 stock market 
liberalization.  The firm Main board stock return is significantly lower than the pre-
liberalization level in the post and after-period of the 1987 stock market liberalization.  A 
change in firm size in during, post, and after periods of the 1987 stock market 
liberalization does not affect the revaluation effect of the firm Main board stock return.  
Therefore, the inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 has immediate positive impact on 
the firm Main board stock return during the 1987 stock market liberalization takes place 
and negatively impact later on. 
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Since the Alien board share price started to appear in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand in 1988, 1991 is the only liberalization year used in identifying the effect of 
stock market liberalization on firm Alien board stock return.  The immediate effect of the 
1991 liberalization on firm Alien board stock return is negative, that is, the firm Alien 
board stock return declines from the pre-liberalization level following the 1991 
liberalization.  However, the firm Alien board stock return increases from the pre-
liberalization level in the post-liberalization period. A change in firm size for the during, 
post, and after period does not affect the firm Alien board stock return.  When sector 
differences are controlled, the firm Alien board stock return significantly declines from 
the pre-liberalization level during the 1991 liberalization regardless of which estimation 
models are used.  Since local investors normally trade shares through the Main board 
while foreign investors normally trades shares through the Alien board, the differing 
ability to use the information available between local and foreign investors might be a 
reason for the different revaluation effects between the two boards following the stock 
market liberalization.   
 In addition to the revaluation effect of the stock market liberalization on firm 
stock return, I evaluate the effect of the 1985 and 1987 stock market liberalization on 
firm investment rate and firm cost of capital.  Larger firm size negatively affects firm 
investment rate when firm differences are controlled.  The firm investment rate is 
negatively related to the cost of capital but the relationship is not statistically significant.  
When a sub-sample dataset is used, the firm investment rate is positively related to the 
growth rate of firm future cash flow.  That is, the firm that has higher growth rate of 
future cash flows will have a higher investment rate.  The 1985 stock market 
 102 
liberalization negatively affects the firm investment rate since the firm investment rate 
significantly declines from the pre-liberalization level during the 1985 stock market 
liberalization.  When control variables are included in the estimation, the 1985 stock 
market liberalization positively affects the firm investment rate in the after-period. The 
1987 stock market liberalization affects the firm investment rate differently.  The firm 
investment rate significantly increases from the pre-liberalization level in the during, 
post, and after-periods of the 1987 stock market liberalization.  When control variables 
are included in the estimation, the during effect is still positive but no longer statistically 
significant.  However, the firm investment rate still significantly improves from the pre-
liberalization level in the post and after 1987 periods.  The increase in firm investment 
rate following the liberalization is consistent with the International Asset Pricing model 
that predicts a fall in firm cost of capital following the liberalization.  As the cost of 
capital falls following the liberalization, the investment is expected to rise.  Between the 
two liberalization events, the inauguration of the Alien board has the stronger immediate 
positive impact on firm investment rate following the liberalization. 
 The firm cost of capital immediately declines from the pre-liberalization level 
following the 1985 and 1987 liberalizations regardless of which pre-liberalization period 
is used.  The effect of the 1987 stock market liberalization on firm cost of capital is 
stronger than the effect of the 1985 liberalization since the firm cost of capital declines 
from the pre-liberalization level in the during-liberalization period in addition to the post 
and after-liberalization periods.  This confirms that the inauguration of the Alien board in 
1987 is the major liberalization event since the firm cost of capital immediately declines 
and investment rate rises following the liberalization.   
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 Both Tobin’s Q and ROA are used as proxies for firm performance when 
evaluating the effect of stock market liberalization on firm performance.  The firm 
performance as proxied by Tobin’s Q is positively related to firm market share.  The 
effect of firm size on firm performance depends on whether the whole sample or the sub-
sample dataset is used.  Firm performance as measured by ROA is positively related to 
firm market share and firm size.  That is a firm that has higher market share and a larger 
firm will have better performance.  Firm performance significantly improves from the 
pre-liberalization level following the 1985 and 1987 liberalizations.  The improvement in 
firm performance is larger when Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy of firm performance.  
When liberalization year is 1985, the firm performance significantly improves from the 
pre-liberalization level in the post and after-period of stock market liberalization 
regardless of which firm performance proxy is used.  The during-effect of the 1985 stock 
market liberalization on firm performance is not statistically significant. 
  When liberalization year is 1987, the improvement in firm performance 
following the liberalization is much stronger.  The firm performance immediately 
improves from the pre-liberalization level during the 1987 stock market liberalization 
period regardless of which firm performance proxy is used. The firm performance 
significantly improves from the pre-liberalization level in during, post, and after 
liberalization period regardless of firm performance proxy is used.  Therefore, the 
inauguration of the Alien board in 1987 has a positive effect on firm performance.   
 The analysis of the effect of stock market liberalization on firm stock return, firm 
investment/ firm cost of capital, and firm performance would be clearer if monthly firm 
level data were used since the announcements of certain liberalizations policies occurred 
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in certain months as shown in Table 1.  However, because monthly firm level data and 
even quarterly firm level data are not available for the early years, it is only possible to 
use annual firm level data in analyzing the effects of the stock market liberalization.  The 
effect of stock market liberalization in Thailand can also be further analyzed to see the 
effect of liberalization in each sector in addition to the overall effects to see how each 
sector is affected by the country’s decision to liberalize the stock market.
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APPENDIX A 
Table 1 
Thailand Official Stock Market Liberalization  
Dates and Policies to Promote Foreign Investment 
Date                 Details about liberalization and policies 
 
April 1975 The Securities Exchange of Thailand (old SET) was established 
April 1977  Foreign Promotion Act, guarantees that no private business will be 
nationalized.  Tax exemptions are granted for three to eight years, as are tariff 
exemptions and reduction in income taxes.  Free repatriation of profits and 
dividends. 
1980 Interest rate ceilings for financial institutions from 15 percent limit imposed by 
usury law. 
 
August 1981 The tax holding for interest payment on foreign loans. Originally scheduled to 
end on September 30, 81 and to apply only to loans with an original maturity 
exceeding 12 months, was extended until the end of the year and to cover loans 
of all maturities. 
 
September 1981 The Exchange Equalization fund introduced a forward exchange over facility 
for U.S. dollar funds borrowed abroad by the commercial banks and their 
customers; the facility provided coverage for three months, with a premium of 
Baht 0.04 per US$ 1 for forward sales. 
 
1983 Board of Investments criteria were changed to facilitate export-oriented 
investment.  While new criteria require majority local ownership for firms 
producing in the domestic market, they permit majority foreign ownership of 
export-oriented firms; plants whose output is wholly exports are permitted to be 
owned 100 percent by foreigners 
 
1983 Banking crisis; 15 % of banks asset were non-performing.  Causes; oil shock in 
1979/80, deficient bank management, short-comings in regulatory and 
accounting framework as will as inadequate supervision.  Overall change in 
macro policies: devaluation of exchange rate and tight fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
 
January 1983 The exemption from the withholding tax on interest payments on foreign loans, 
originally scheduled to end at Dec 31, 1982, was extended to June 30, 1983 for 
loans with maturities of more than 12 months. 
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July 1983 The above exemption form the withholding tax further extended to June 30, 
1984, but only for foreign loans with maturities of more than 24 months 
 
September 1983 Special government bonds bearing 5% interest rate and with a 10 year 
maturities were issued for a period up to the end of fiscal year 1983 in Baht 1 
million denominations in an amount not exceeding Baht 100 millions; they 
were offered for subscription to foreign investors intending to invest and reside 
in Thailand. 
 
1984 Thailand abandons fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar.  General credit 
restrictions abolished but restrictions on bank lending rates are re-imposed.  
Ceilings for loans to priority sectors lowered. 
 
1984 The introduction of the Insider Trading Laws 
 
June 1984 The exemption form the withholding tax granted to interest payments on 
foreign  loans with maturities of more than 24 months was terminated 
 
1985 IMF standby credit. 
 
May 1985 All private foreign borrowing at the Bank of Thailand was required to register 
within seven days of the signature date, and not after the loan funds were 
imposed and sold to authorized banks. 
 
July 1985 Bangkok Fund Ltd launched on the London Stock Exchange with net asset 
value of $163.5 million (in December 1991) 
 
1986 SET policies to promote foreign investment: 1. SET sought the co-operation 
form the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to relax remittance procedures to foreign 
investors in repatriating their invested funds to their own countries.  The BOT 
consequently allowed foreign investors to repatriate their invested funds at any 
TIME after being confirmed by member firms of the SET. 2. Printed Matters 
and videotapes on securities market and data for distribution to foreign 
investors were produced. 3. Co-ordination was sought from various government 
agencies, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tourism Authority of 
Thailand, etc., in spreading the information and understanding of securities 
investment in Thailand to foreign investors. 
 
April 1986 The government announced the income tax rate decrease for foreign investors 
in the on-shore foreign investment fund as follows: 
 Dividend tax—On juristic investor, down from 20% to 10 % 
              On individual investor, down from the range of 7-55% to 7-   
10% 
 Capital gain tax—On juristic investor, down form 25% to 12.5% 
                                                                         On individual investor, tax-free  
 
December 1986  The Thailand Fund, the first on-shore international mutual Fund approved by 
the BOT for mobilizing funds from abroad to be invested in Thai capital 
market, was officially launched with the initial value of US$ 30 million.  The 
fund was launched by Morgan Stanley. 
 
July 1987 ASEAN free trade agreement extended. 
 
September 1987 SET promote greater foreign investment by launching the “Alien Board” 
which is the special board for trading securities held by foreigners to 
ensure confidence in securities transfer. 
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September 1987 Bekaert/ Harvey Official Liberalization date (Final Version) 
 
1988 SET attempt at encouraging foreign investors to invest more fund in equities 
instead of giving loans with a view to raising the volume of securities 
transaction by foreign investors to 32000 million baht or 10 percent of total 
trading on SET 
 
January 1988 Thailand official liberalization date according to Henry (2000). Country Fund 
Introduction: The Siam Fund Limited (from Henry (2000) paper).  According to 
Henry (2000), there are restrictions on capital transaction using resident owned 
funds and restrictions on domestic residents’ ability to own foreign securities. 
 
August 1988 Kim and Singal Liberalization date 
 
December 1988  Bakeart and Harvey Official Liberalization date (NBER version) 
 
December 1988  Ceiling on foreign borrowing were raised. 
 
1989 Attempt to encourage foreign investors to invest long-term funds in equities by 
targeting foreign investors holding 30 percent of total market value. 
 
1989   Abolished deposit rate ceiling on commercial bank TIME deposits greater than   
 
March 1989 The U.K. Department of Trade and Industry had added the Securities Exchange 
of Thailand to the list of markets approved under the regulations, which 
governed the investments of unit trusts (mutual funds) authorized in the United 
Kingdom.  The principal effect of this approval was that a British registered Unit 
Trust was faced with no restrictions in investing its funds in the SET 
 
July 1989 The BOT had issued a new rule that authorized commercial banks to administer 
and permit outward remittances of dividends foreign investors received from 
Thai companies if they had already submitted relevant documents as required by 
the rule and also governed the export of shares of certificates. 
 
December 1989 The BOT had further changed its regulation on foreign exchange control to 
allow foreign investors who registered their inward fund with the BOT to remit 
the earnings, including capital gains from sale of their shares, directed through 
commercial banks without the prior approval of the BOT on the condition that 
sufficient documents should be submitted to the BOT later on. 
 
January 1990 Allowance of dual prices quotation: the SET Board of Director had agreed to 
allow quoted and pre-quoted companies offering their shares to the public to 
adopt a dual prices policy through which their share prices might be fixed at two 
levels for sales to foreign and local investors.  This regulation would make the 
company wishing to earn more premiums by selling their shares in the foreign 
market.  Normally, foreign investors would buy shares of the companies that 
satisfied conditions concerning foreign shareholder limitation ceilings on the 
alien board, which had higher prices than the main board because of the higher 
demand. The ceiling of foreign share-ownerships were 49 percent for general 
companies and 25 percent for financial institutions but the level could be varied 
by approval of the Board of Investment or other authorities concerned. 
 
January 1990 Domestic firms no longer need to get approval to pay dividend to foreigners. 
 
March 1990 Ceiling on loan rates were raised 
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May 1990 Thai citizens gain access to foreign bank account. 
 
May 1990 Announcement of Liberalization from the BOT: the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank of Thailand announced new measures to liberalize financial system as 
follows:  
1. Announcement to comply with Article 8 of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Agreement which dismantled restrictions on current international 
payments and to avoid discriminations in currency practices to other 
members of IMF and to apply only one exchange rate for international 
business 
2. The relaxation of foreign exchange controls was to facilitate foreign 
exchange settlements, which would help sustain long-term economic 
development of the country. 
3. Thailand had changed its status from a debitor to a creditor country of the 
IMF by repaying all remaining debts to the IMF.  The repayment would be 
made before the due date. 
 
June 1990 The SET had applied to be a member of FIBV or Federal International des 
Bourses de Valeurs.  FIBV will select high quality Stock Exchange all around 
the world to be member.  The privilege of the members of this organization was 
the remittance the capital funds from the members own countries to invest in 
other member Stock Exchange without approval from any institutions.  The 
FIBV approved the SET to be a permanent member in September 1990. 
 
November 1990 The second step to ease foreign exchange: the BOT approved the second step to 
relax the foreign exchange control.  This measure was to provide facility for 
remittances in and out and to reduce cost of exchange.  The details were as 
follows: 1. An individual was allowed to open his or her own account abroad but 
the total amount should not exceed US$500,000. 2. A juristic person was 
allowed to open its own account abroad but the total amount should not exceed 
US$500,000. 
 
1991 The bank of Thailand announced the deregulation of foreign exchange phrases II 
effective on April 1, 1991 as followed. 
 1. The benefit of investment on securities comprising capital gains, dividends 
and share certificates could freely be remitted and sent to overseas 
 2. Simplifying recipients Exchange Control form (EC) and reducing the number 
of evidences 
 3. Abolishing the registration of capital inflow for investment 
 4. Allowing the opening of foreign currencies bank accounts with no restrictions 
concerning currencies, accounting types and interest rates.  However, the size of 
accounts should comply with the following; 
 -individual investor not exceeding U.S$500,000 
 -juristic investor not exceeding U.S$500,000 
 
January 1991 First ADR announced 
 
April 1991 Announcement of the loosing of foreign exchange controls and the introduction 
of the value added tax system in January of 1992.  Controls and reporting 
requirements for the repatriation of dividends, capital gains, foreign currencies, 
and share certificates were partially removed. 
 
April 1991  ADR effective date. (Company = Asia Fiber Company limited, Exchange =  
   OTC) 
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1992 The cabinet approved the establishment of the BIBF on September 8, 1992 
 
1992 Ceiling on loan rates were removed. 
May 1992 Controls and reporting requirements for the repatriation of dividends, capital 
gains, foreign currencies, and share certificates continued to be partially 
removed 
 
May 1992 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established and the old 
SET was reformulated as the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is the 
secondary equity market and is largely self-regulated for day to day operations. 
  
1993 BIBF licenses:  The Ministry of Finance announced a name list of 47 
international and domestic commercial banks granted a permission to undertake 
BIBF license.  The 47 banks included all 15 domestic commercial banks and 32 
overseas banks comprising of ; 8 Japanese, 7 American, 4 French, 2 British, 2 
Dutch, 2 Singaporean, 2 German and one each from 5 other countries. 
 
1993 The first prosecution under the Insider Trading Laws. 
 
December 1993 First exchange-traded overseas listing. 
 
1994 Measures to encourage foreign investment: 
 1. The SET extended its trading hour for the afternoon session for another half 
and hour. As a consequence, the market ended its trading hour at 4:30 pm.  This 
would help the SET to have comparable trading hour with other stock exchanges 
in the region and also to have overlapped trading hour with the London Stock 
Exchange and any other exchanges in the European countries. 
 2. The SET’s Board of Governors approved in the principle for the incorporating 
of the Thai Trust Fund Company.  This company would establish the mutual 
funds for foreign investors with major purposes of: 
 -utilizing such funds as a tool for transformation of foreign investment’s 
nationality. 
 -preventing unfair usage of foreign investment information 
 -providing trading efficiency at minimum cost increase, and 
 -registering the stated mutual funds as listed securities 
 This trust fund company would have 100 Million baht registered capital with the 
SET being a major shareholder.  Further detail on the process of establishment 
of the Thai Trust Fund Company would be submitted to SET’s Board of 
Governors for later consideration. 
 
1994 A dealer’s network serving as the central channel for all bond trading was 
established under the name of the Bond dealers club (BDC) 
 
February 1994 The ceiling on the amount authorized banks are permitted to lend to 
nonresidents in foreign currency was eliminated.  The max amount of FDI or 
loans that domestic residents may provided to their affiliates without authorized 
form the Bank of Thailand was increased form $5 million to $10 million a year 
 
April 1994 Finance and securities companies were required to hold a daily long and short 
foreign exchange position not exceeding 25% and 20% respectively, or first-tier 
capital funds. 
 
November 1994 The average weekly net long and short foreign exchange position that authorized 
banks are required to hold were changed to 20% and 15% , respectively, of first-
tier capital funds. 
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1995 Regulation on Foreign investors: Restrictions: 1) maximum 49% foreign 
ownership (restricted foreign shareholding in some specific areas of business, 
e.g., 25% of commercial banks and finance companies). 2) Foreign capital 
inflows need to be registered with free repatriation.  Commercial banks are 
authorized to approve the purchase of foreign exchange for remittance abroad 
without limit.  Taxation: 105 dividend tax rate, no tax on individual capital gains 
and 12.5-15% institution capital gains.  No change on this regulation through 
2001. 
 
March 1995 The Bank of Thailand required banks to submit detailed information on risk 
control measures on trading in foreign exchange and derivatives 
 
August 1995 The Bank of Thailand imposed a reserve requirement of 7% on nonresident baht 
accounts with maturities of less than one year. 
 
September 1995 The Bank of Thailand adopted a new method of calculating non-trade net open 
foreign exchange positions for foreign and locally incorporated banks, whose 
foreign-exchange-denominated loans are not to be counted as foreign asset if the 
loans are used for purchasing unused land or for personal purposes.  For certain 
other categories, only 50% of the loan would be allowed to be counted as a 
foreign asset.  Borrowers who fully hedge the foreign exchange risk by buying 
foreign exchange forward form the bank that extended the loan are exempt form 
this requirement. 
 
October 1995 The Thai prime rate stands at 13.75%, the highest in several years 
 
November 95 The Bangkok Stock Dealing Center (BSDC) or the organized OTC market was 
established to bolster the liquidity of securities, which are offered to the public 
but are unqualified to be traded on the main SET 
 
August 1996 The Bank of Thailand said it would pump more funds into the market by 
intervening in the foreign exchange and repurchase markets. 
 
September 1996 The government unveil a tax cut package aimed at stimulating exports and 
reducing the current account deficit. 
 
December 1996 The government plan to reduce the interest rates. 
 
February 1997 The overnight rate rose to 25%.  The baht fell to it lowest level in 10 years. 
 
June 1997 (Controls on derivatives and other instruments) The BOT introduced a series of 
measures to limit capital inflows. 
 
June 1997 (Controls on capital and money market instruments) The foreign ownership limit 
of 25% for financial institutions was lifted on a case by case basis 
 
July 1997 Devaluation of Thai baht 
 
August 1997 The central bank ordered 42 finance companies to suspend operations. 
 
September 1997 S&P cut the ratings of seven financial institutions.  Thailand was meeting 
conditions for $17.2 billion rescue package from the IMF. 
 
October 1997 The foreign invertors were allowed full ownership of local financial institutions 
for up to 10 years 
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November 1997  The BOT announced that foreign investors would be allowed to hold more than  
   49% of the shares in existing financial institutions for a period of 10 years  
   without the approval of the Ministry of Finance. 
December 1997  58 finance companies were suspended, 56 of which would be closed.  Moddy’s  
   lowered government debt and he debt of 11 banks and financial companies to  
   junk status.  Fitch IBCA cut the debt rating of ten banks. 
 
January 1998  A new state owned commercial bank was launched to manage assets of 56  
   finance and securities firms closed by the government in 1997.  The 49% of  
   foreign ownership limit for securities companies was scapped.   Creation of two  
   tier baht exchange market (domestic and offshore).  Decision to dismantle  
   currency controls was made on January 30. 
 
February 1998  Definition of bad loans changed to those in which no interest rate has been paid  
   for three consecutive months, comparing to the current standard of six month. 
 
April 1998  Interest rate in Thailand was at six year highs. 
 
April 1998  The BDC was restructured and transform into the Thai Bond Dealing Center  
   (Thai BDC) to cover Thailand’s secondary market for bond-trading.  It is  
   Self- regulated but subject to SEC oversight. 
 
May 1998  The government  nationalized  seven finance companies, including two publicly  
   traded firms.  S&P downgraded the long term foreign currency rating of the  
   country’s five biggest banks.  Thailand has $90 billion in foreign debts, largely I 
   in US$. 
 
July 1998  Banks are required to classify loans for which payments have not been made for  
   three months as NPLs 
 
August 1998  Commercial banks are required to maintain at least 6% of their nonresident  
   foreign exchange deposits in the form of (1) at least 2% as nonrenumerated  
   balance at the BOT; (2) at most 2.5% vault cash; and (3) the rest in eligible 
   securities. 
 
September 1998  The government approved tax exemptions for those companies that restructure 
   Delinquent loans. 
 
September 1998 The central bank reported it would ease finance companies’ limit on ownership 
of other companies to promote debt for equity swaps with delinquent borrower 
 
December 1998 Approximately 46% of Thai bank loans were reported delinquent by at least 
three months. 
 
May 1999  Thailand delinquent loans rose to a record 47.7% of all credit 
 
September 1999  The number of nonperforming loans fell to 45.3% of total credits and continued  
   to fall to 42.3% in November. 
 
February 2000  Creditors fail to reach a debt restructuring agreement with Thai Petrochemical  
   Industry, causing Thai stock market to be the worst performing stock market  
   year to date in the Pacific Rim. 
 
May 2000  Thai baht depreciated by 3% 
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June 2000  Moody’s Investors service raised investment grade, but Thai market still became 
   Asia’s biggest decliner as foreign investors dumped shares. 
 
August 2000  Inflation was up by 2.3% 
November 2000  The Bank of Thailand tightened regulations on baht trading. 
 
June 2001  The Board of Investment approved 11 investment projects to boost the economy.  
   The government was allowed by the parliament to set up the Thai Asset 
   Management Corp (TAMC), which would buy out nonperforming loans from  
   state owned and private banks. 
 
August 2001  Thailand successfully concluded Article IV consultation with the IMF. 
 
October 2001 The Thai cabinet announced a 58 billion baht economic stimulus plan, and 
approved a US$ 250 million Thailand Equity fund to boost the country’s 
investment.   
 
October 2001 The cabinet approved Finance Ministry plans to issue up to US$4.46 billion of 
government bonds and treasury bills in order to finance the 2001-2002 state 
budget deficit.  Thailand’s budget deficit was expected to weigh in at around 
US$4.5 billion, up from initial projection of a US$2.3 billion shortfall. 
 
November 2001 The government was preparing its first oversea sovereign bond issue since the 
1997 financial crisis.  Japan’s Daiwa Securities SMBC and Nikko Solomon 
Smith Barney were approved by the Finance Ministry to act as co-lead 
underwriter for the US$281.5 million Samurai bond issue. 
 
February 2002 Thailand’s board of Investment  (BOI) is to offer investors greater tax priviledge 
as part of efforts to attract more foreign direct investments (FDI) to the country. 
The BOI embarks on a series on investment promotion campaigns in countries 
such as the US, China, Japan, and the European Union (EU) and will open 
representative office in Hong Kong, San Francisco, California and China. 
 
July 2003 The Central Bank of Thailand (BOT) eased foreign exchange controls, which 
were imposed following the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.  Restrictions on 
participation by domestic entities in foreign debt market were relaxed to allow 
institutional investors to purchase up to a combined US$500 million in 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign paper, offered by investment grade issuers. 
 
December 2003 The Bank of Thailand imposed a ceiling of Baht 300 million on deposits by non-
residents in Thai bank accounts, with no interest paid on funds held for less than 
6 months.  Commercial banks will also ensure that current accounts held by non-
residents are used solely for the settlement of transactions relating to trade and 
investment rather than for speculation.  
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Table 6 
The t-Test of Significant Changes in the Mean Value of Firm Main Board/Alien 
Board Share Price and Firm Main Board/ Alien Board Stock Return Following 
Each Stock Market Liberalization Year 
 
The Standard error is in parenthesis.  The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the mean value of Firm Main Board Share Price before and after the stock market liberalization is 
equal to zero.  ***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm Main Board Share Price       Liberalization Year Mean  T-test Significant Change 
 
I) Period: All years before and all years after liberalization 
 
P (Baht)    1985    
Before Liberalization    347.8852  -13.4096*** Yes 
      (23.07987) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    121.7264   
      (4.956747) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.53395  -25.4774*** Yes 
      (0.0327414) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    3.406134      
      (0.0272574) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.0609131 -0.5232  No 
      (0.0208937) (0.6009) 
After Liberalization    -0.0833521 
      (0.133259) 
 
P (Baht)    1987    
Before Liberalization    329.7  -14.3916*** Yes 
      (18.02115) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    116.029  
      (5.070567) 
 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.47976  -29.6995*** Yes 
      (0.0292999) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    3.335042      
      (0.0292999) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization    -0.0217838 -1.8255*  Yes 
      (0.0172039) (0.0680) 
After Liberalization    -0.089756 
      (0.0137895 
 
PAB (Baht)   1991    
Before Liberalization    436.9339  -12.6280*** Yes 
      (53.6476) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    117.8031 
      (4.4019) 
 
LNPAB 
Before Liberalization    5.3804  -16.0869*** Yes 
      (0.0668)  (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    3.9900      
      (0.0352) 
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Alien Board Stock Return (LNPAB t -LNPAB t-1) 
Before Liberalization    -0.1633  -0.1972  No 
      (0.0861)  (0.8437) 
After Liberalization    -0.1776 
      (0.0233) 
 
II) Period: 5 years before and 5 years after liberalization 
 
P (Baht)    1985    
Before Liberalization    239.9595  3.7426*** Yes 
      (10.27009) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    380.6728  
      (23.8868) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.289209  -0.9048  No 
      (0.0331491) (0.3657) 
After Liberalization    5.22618      
      (0.0428013) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.1016376 0.3135  No 
      (0.0188508) (0.7540) 
After Liberalization    -0.0833427 
      (0.0388301) 
 
P (Baht)    1987    
Before Liberalization    250.6959  1.3056  No 
      (10.73528) (0.1919) 
After Liberalization    290.8826  
      (17.14351) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.280129  -5.7589*** Yes 
      (0.0363863) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    4.905094      
      (0.0350909) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   0.0499306 -2.9118*** Yes 
      (0.0153338) (0.0037) 
After Liberalization    -0.0973676 
      (0.0297181) 
PAB (Baht)   1991    
Before Liberalization    436.9339  -7.3456*** Yes 
      (53.6476) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    179.6406 
      (7.3517) 
LNPAB 
Before Liberalization    5.380401  -8.9781*** Yes 
      (0.0668198) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    4.707513      
      (0.0385151) 
 
Alien Board Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.1633368 -0.5369  No 
      (0.086106) (0.5915) 
After Liberalization    -0.2015396 
      (0.028236) 
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III) Period: 3 years before and 3 years after liberalization 
 
P (Baht)    1985    
Before Liberalization    232.2983  4.6602*** Yes 
      (11.81798) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    382.3117 
      (22.22436) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.252624  1.6858*  Yes 
      (0.0430293) (0.0923) 
After Liberalization    5.395278      
      (0.0564013) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   0.024555  -0.3067  No 
      (0.0160615) (0.7592) 
After Liberalization    0.0044097 
      (0.0487133) 
 
P (Baht)    1987    
Before Liberalization    264.3419  2.9168*** Yes 
      (15.06025) (0.0036) 
After Liberalization    407.3386 
      (29.43041) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.292401  -0.9983  No 
      (0.0494525) (0.3184) 
After Liberalization    5.203468      
      (0.0512188) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   0.0505909 -2.4317** Yes 
      (0.020723) (0.0153) 
After Liberalization    -0.1335022 
      (0.0496898) 
 
PAB (Baht)   1991    
Before Liberalization    436.9339  -5.7244*** Yes 
      (9.312659) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    200.3849 
      (53.64757) 
LNPAB 
Before Liberalization    5.380401  -6.8856*** Yes 
      (0.0668198) (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    4.842886      
      (0.0445679) 
 
Alien Board Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.1633368 0.2813  No 
      (0.086106) (0.7786) 
After Liberalization    -0.1407585 
      (0.0369818) 
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IV) Period: 1 year before and 1 year after liberalization 
 
P (Baht)    1985    
Before Liberalization    242.602  1.0012  No 
      (23.49819) (0.3178) 
After Liberalization    274.7991 
      (19.22221) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.242999  0.6921  No 
      (0.0799934) (0.4846) 
After Liberalization    5.316164      
      (0.0623997) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.0161551 2.2276**  Yes 
      (0.0239188) (0.0269) 
After Liberalization    0.0819481 
      (0.0279935) 
 
P (Baht)    1987    
Before Liberalization    298.8639  2.4726**  Yes 
      (29.11052) (0.0139) 
After Liberalization    451.3646 
      (33.65159) 
LNP 
Before Liberalization    5.410179  0.2308  No 
      (0.0879977) (0.8176) 
After Liberalization    5.446091      
      (0.0834495) 
 
Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   0.2162113 -2.0258** Yes 
      (0.0437364) (0.0438) 
After Liberalization    -0.0594203 
      (0.0855992) 
 
PAB (Baht)   1991    
Before Liberalization    293.1551  -2.5697** Yes 
      (56.66427) (0.0106) 
After Liberalization    185.398 
      (11.32065) 
LNPAB 
Before Liberalization    5.121679  -2.7572*** Yes 
      (0.088812) (0.0061) 
After Liberalization    4.843784      
      (0.0548868) 
 
Alien Board Stock Return (LNP t -LNP t-1) 
Before Liberalization                                   -0.5693804 3.5195*** Yes 
      (0.1064426) (0.0005) 
After Liberalization    -0.2015458 
      (0.0512793) 
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Table 7 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 Stock Market Liberalization on 
Firm Main Board Stock Return (RETURN) 
 
RETURNit=θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Firmi+em it                 (8a)                                                 
RETURNit=θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Sectori+em it               (8b) 
 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                                                                                               (9a) 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it  +θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it                                                                                                             (9b)                                                                
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it +γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB 
+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                                                                                               (10a) 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it +γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB 
+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it                                                      (10b)                             
are used to evaluate the revaluation effect of stock market liberalization on firm Main board stock return. LNSL is log 
of sales to represent firm size. MB is market to book ratio to represent growth rate of the firm. LNNS is log of firm’s 
number of share traded to represent liquidity level.  WRETURN is log of world stock return. PRELIB is the pre-
liberalization dummy variable to capture two years before the liberalization. LIB0 is the during -liberalization variable. 
POSTLIB is the post-liberalization dummy variable. LIBAF is the after-liberalization variable. PRELIBSL is 
PRELIB*LNSL. LIB0SL is LIB0*LNSL. POSTLIBSL is POSTLIB*LNSL. LIBAFSL is LIBAF*LNSL. Firm is firm 
specific fixed effect dummies. Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. The consistent standard error is in 
parenthesis. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value. Fixed effect estimation with 
consistent standard error is the estimation method. The first half of the table represents the estimation results after 
controlling for firm differences. The second half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for sector 
differences. WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset. *, **, *** represents the statistically significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Sub sample contains only firms that have observation before and after 1985.  
 
 Main Board Stock Return   (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.1035***   -0.0702*** -0.1051***  -0.0715***  
      (0.0255)        (0.0178) (0.0261)      (0.0180) 
 
MB           -0.0058      -0.0289** -0.0058      -0.0286* 
      (0.0040)      (0.0172) (0.0041)       (0.0171) 
      
LNNS      0.1202***    0.0856*** 0.1207***    0.0864*** 
      (0.0152)      (0.0161) (0.0153)       (0.0162) 
      
WRETURN     0.1687**      0.1010 0.1692**      0.1118 
      (0.0660)      (0.1133) (0.0660)        (0.1130) 
  
PRELIBSL        -0.0272         -0.0166 
              (0.0207)        (0.0199) 
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Main Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
 
LIB0SL            0.0214      0.0254  
              (0.0221)       (0.0211) 
 
POSTLIBSL                   0.0107          0.0155 
             (0.0398)       (0.0383) 
      
LIBAFSL            0.0108      0.0383 
             (0.0343)       (0.0406) 
      
PRELIB   0.1511***      0.1629*** 0.3629***    0.3340*** 0.7223**      0.5550** 
   (0.0296)        (0.0284) (0.0399)      (0.0476) (0.2785)       (0.2645) 
  
LIB0   0.0457        0.0580* 0.1916***    0.1684*** -0.0947         -0.1731 
   (0.0346)        (0.0334) (0.0496)      (0.0598) (0.3038)      (0.2920)  
 
POSTLIB  0.6127***      0.6242*** 0.7851***    0.7547*** 0.6420       0.5475 
   (0.0547)        (0.0536) (0.0627)      (0.0643) (0.5456)       (0.5245) 
 
LIBAF   -0.2384***    -0.2073*** -0.0874***   -0.0471 -0.2343         -0.5740 
   (0.0590)        (0.0708) (0.0603)      (0.0734) (0.4786)       (0.5821) 
 
D97   -1.6359***    -1.3900*** -1.6601***   -1.3907*** -1.6599***   -1.3932***  
   (0.1232)        (0.1536) (0.1235)      (0.1535) (0.1235)        (0.1535) 
       
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.1053***     -0.1048*** -0.1713***   -0.1656***  
   (0.0331)        (0.0321) (0.0433)       (0.0555)   
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.4616***      0.4613*** 0.4222***     0.4207***  
   (0.0548)        (0.0536) (0.0585)       (0.0607)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.3895***     -0.3701*** -0.4503***   -0.3811***  
   (0.0621)        (0.0712) (0.0652)       (0.0883)  
 
F-Test: γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       1.42       1.30 
         (0.2239)        (0.2660) 
 
Number of OBS  4390        1951  4290      1930  4290       1930 
 
Number of Group  432        104  431       104  431       104 
 
Hausman test  25.57        33.34 32.83      15.41  32.82             15.74 
   (0.0001)       (0.0000) (0.0001)      (0.0803) (0.0018)       (0.2634)  
 
R2   0.2312        0.1931 0.2581      0.2233 0.2582           0.2242 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.0486***   -0.0469*** -0.0493***   -0.0496*** 
      (0.0066)        (0.0117) (0.0067)        (0.0119)  
 
MB          -0.0068*      -0.0277* -0.0067*       -0.0274* 
      (0.0040)      (0.0167) (0.0041)        (0.0165) 
      
LNNS      0.0665***    0.0639*** 0.0669***     0.0653***    
             (0.0085)      (0.0132) (0.0085)        (0.0133) 
      
WRETURN     0.1262**      0.0814 0.1284**       0.0976 
      (0.0640)      (0.1110) (0.0639)        (0.1107) 
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Main Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------       
  
PRELIBSL            0.0041          0.0066 
              (0.0165)      (0.0164) 
 
LIB0SL             0.0505***    0.0472**  
               (0.0185)       (0.0183) 
 
POSTLIBSL              0.0347          0.0301 
             (0.0347)       (0.0350) 
      
LIBAFSL            0.0188       0.0477 
              (0.0316)       (0.0396) 
      
PRELIB   0.0998***     0.1464*** 0.2811***     0.2921*** 0.2289          0.2072 
   (0.0238)      (0.0253) (0.0328)      (0.0450) (0.2177)       (0.2155) 
  
LIB0   -0.0088       0.0424 0.1188***     0.1336** -0.5552**    -0.5016** 
   (0.0310)      (0.0322) (0.0446)      (0.0579) (0.2542)       (0.2548) 
 
POSTLIB  0.5585***     0.6058*** 0.7072***     0.7156*** 0.2451      0.3141 
   (0.0500)       (0.0511) (0.0558)       (0.0609) (0.4752)       (0.4803) 
 
LIBAF   -0.2761***   -0.2166*** -0.1515***    -0.0796*** -0.4049        -0.7338 
   (0.0546)       (0.0677) (0.0558)       (0.0718) (0.4396)       (0.5683) 
 
D97   -1.6320***    -1.3760*** -1.6655***   -1.3841*** -1.6651***  -1.3869*** 
   (0.1241)       (0.1518) (0.1265)       (0.1536) (0.1266)       (0.1537) 
          
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.1085***    -0.1040*** -0.1623***    -0.1586***  
   (0.0326)       (0.0323) (0.0413)        (0.0543)  
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.4588***     0.4594*** 0.4261***     0.4235***  
   (0.0514)       (0.0516) (0.0535)       (0.0581)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.3758***   -0.3630***     -0.4326***   -0.3218***  
   (0.0565)         (0.0680) (0.0600)       (0.0862)  
 
F-Test: γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       2.07      1.96 
         (0.0826)       (0.0978) 
 
Number of OBS  4390     1951  4290      1930  4290      1930 
 
Number of Group  31      19  31      19  31      19 
 
Hausman test          4.60      6.16  5.31      0.45 
           (0.8677)      (0.7242) (0.9677)      (1.0000) 
 
R2   0.1813      0.1828 0.2038      0.2075 0.2041      0.2090 
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Table 8 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1987 Stock Market Liberalization on 
Firm Main Board Stock Return (RETURN) 
 
RETURNit=θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Firmi+em it                 (1a)                                                 
RETURNit=θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF+ 5D97+Sectori+em it               (1b) 
 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                                                                                               (2a) 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2 mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it  +θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it                                                                                                             (2b)                                                                
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it +γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB 
+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Firmi+em it                                                                                                               (3a) 
RETURNit=γ1 mLNSLm it +γ 2  mMBmit-1+ γ3mLNNSmit-1+γ4mWRETURNm it +γ5mLNSLm it *PRELIB 
+γ6mLNSLm it *LIB0+γ7mLNSLm it *POSTLIB+γ8mLNSLm it *LIBAF + θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+Θ5D97+Sectori+em it                                                      (3b)                             
are used to evaluate the revaluation effect of stock market liberalization on firm Main board stock return. LNSL is log 
of sales to represent firm size. MB is market to book ratio to represent growth rate of the firm. LNNS is log of firm’s 
number of share traded to represent liquidity level.  WRETURN is log of world stock return. PRELIB is the pre-
liberalization dummy variable to capture two years before the liberalization. LIB0 is the during -liberalization variable. 
POSTLIB is the post-liberalization dummy variable. LIBAF is the after-liberalization variable. PRELIBSL is 
PRELIB*LNSL. LIB0SL is LIB0*LNSL. POSTLIBSL is POSTLIB*LNSL. LIBAFSL is LIBAF*LNSL. Firm is firm 
specific fixed effect dummies. Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. The consistent standard error is in 
parenthesis. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value. The Parenthesis under F-test is 
probability of F-value. Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the estimation method. The first half of 
the table represents the estimation results after controlling for firm differences. The second half of the table represents 
the estimation results after controlling for sector differences. WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset. *, 
**, *** represents the statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Sub sample contains only firms that 
have observation before and after 1985.  
 
 Main Board Stock Return   (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------       
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.1011***  -0.0615*** -0.1141*** -0.0654***  
                     (0.0256)       (0.0163) (0.0271)      (0.0169) 
 
MB           -0.0059     -0.0294 -0.0054       -0.0285 
                     (0.0040)     (0.0188) (0.0040)      (0.0185) 
      
LNNS      0.1157***    0.0753*** 0.1202***    0.0783*** 
      (0.0146)     (0.0141) (0.0150)      (0.0145) 
      
WRETURN     0.1397**       0.0433 0.1378**     0.0401 
                     (0.0656)      (0.1017) (0.0656)      (0.1013) 
  
PRELIBSL        0.0302         0.0307 
         (0.0232)      (0.0219) 
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Main Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
LIB0SL             0.0158      0.0160  
              (0.0568)       (0.0539) 
 
POSTLIBSL                   -0.0258        -0.0018 
             (0.0423)       (0.0451) 
      
LIBAFSL             0.0770***    0.0685* 
             (0.0286)       (0.0360) 
      
PRELIB   0.1867***      0.1700*** 0.3208***    0.2768*** -0.0776      -0.1262 
   (0.0348)        (0.0337) (0.0457)     (0.0509) (0.3214)       (0.3042) 
  
LIB0   0.9017***      0.8849*** 1.0591***    0.9929***  0.8510          0.7835 
   (0.0760)        (0.0748) (0.0807)      (0.0790) (0.7783)      (0.7391)  
 
POSTLIB  0.0617        -0.0247 0.1713***     0.1019 0.5170       0.1270 
   (0.0761)        (0.0827) (0.0766)      (0.0854) (0.5906)       (0.6388) 
  
LIBAF   -0.1615***     -0.2144*** -0.0913**     -0.1337** -1.1562***   -1.0990** 
   (0.0380)        (0.0533) (0.0387)       (0.0605) (0.3958)        (0.5170) 
 
D97   -1.6381***     -1.4997*** -1.6573***   -1.4920*** -1.6542***   -1.4918***  
   (0.1233)        (0.1485) (0.1236)      (0.1485) (0.1234)        (0.1486) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.7150***       0.7148*** 0.7383***    0.7161***  
   (0.0794)          (0.0782) (0.0850)      (0.0861)  
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.1250        -0.1947** -0.1495*      -0.1749*    
   (0.0798)        (0.0851) (0.0825)      (0.0939)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.3482***     -0.3845*** -0.4121***   -0.4104***  
   (0.0492)        (0.0589)  (0.0604)       (0.0840)  
 
F-Test: γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       2.44        1.33 
         (0.0451)       (0.2555) 
 
Number of OBS  4390        2074  4290       2053  4290       2053 
 
Number of Group  432        116  431       116  431       116 
 
Hausman test  22.25        15.69 45.77      22.27    49.13            29.08              
   (0.0005)       (0.0078) (0.0000)      (0.0080) (0.0000)        (0.0064) 
 
R2   0.2316        0.2112 0.2591      0.2395 0.2613           0.2419 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.0465***    -0.0408*** -0.0495***   -0.0457*** 
      (0.0062)        (0.0101) (0.0063)        (0.0106) 
 
MB          -0.0067*     -0.0281 -0.0062      -0.0272 
      (0.0040)     (0.0181) (0.0039)       (0.0177) 
      
LNNS      0.0642***   0.0568*** 0.0671***    0.0602***    
             (0.0078)     (0.0113) (0.0079)       (0.0116) 
      
WRETURN     0.0857          0.0231 0.0890          0.0247 
      (0.0633)      (0.0998) (0.0634)       (0.0996) 
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Main Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURN)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
  
PRELIBSL            0.0476**      0.0448** 
              (0.0192)      (0.0194) 
 
LIB0SL             0.0319      0.0270  
               (0.0504)       (0.0504) 
 
POSTLIBSL              -0.0216         0.0035 
             (0.0395)       (0.0443) 
      
LIBAFSL            0.0702***    0.0684** 
              (0.0240)       (0.0339) 
      
PRELIB   0.1223***     0.1525*** 0.2561***     0.2504*** -0.3715        -0.3421 
   (0.0318)      (0.0326) (0.0416)      (0.0494) (0.2669)       (0.2715) 
  
LIB0   0.8377***     0.8662*** 0.9831***     0.9618*** 0.5642      0.6075 
   (0.0712)      (0.0722) (0.0733)      (0.0746) (0.6902)       (0.6896) 
 
POSTLIB  0.0148         -0.0327 0.1076       0.0775 0.4012      0.0328 
   (0.0717)      (0.0802) (0.0721)       (0.0838) (0.5503)       (0.6281) 
 
LIBAF   -0.2198***   -0.2229*** -0.1619***   -0.1526** -0.1272***   -1.1140** 
   (0.0335)      (0.0508) (0.0348)       (0.0588) (0.3308)       (0.4861) 
 
D97   -1.6380***   -1.4815*** -1.6649***   -1.4820*** -1.6636***   -1.4816*** 
   (0.1243)       (0.1460) (0.1265)       (0.1477) (0.1266)        (0.1480) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.7154***    0.7137*** 0.7270***    0.7114***  
   (0.0757)      (0.0764) (0.0785)      (0.0827)  
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.1075      -0.1852** -0.1485*      -0.1729*  
   (0.0764)      (0.0839) (0.0789)      (0.0926)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.3421***   -0.3754***     -0.4180***   -0.4031***  
   (0.0431)        (0.0561) (0.0547)       (0.0813)  
 
F-Test γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       3.59        2.13 
         (0.0062)       (0.0741) 
 
Number of OBS  4390       2074  4290      2053  4290      2053 
 
Number of Group  31       22  31      22  31      22 
  
 
Hausman test  2.93                 1.61       
   (0.7106)      (0.9999)       
 
R2   0.1834      0.1998 0.2064      0.2236 0.2086      0.2264 
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Table 9 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1991 Stock Market Liberalization on 
Firm Alien Board Stock Return (RETURNPAB) 
 
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF +5D97+Firmi+eab it (11a)                              
RETURNPAB it = θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+θ4LIBAF 5D97+Sectori+eab it   (11b)                           
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it +γ 2 abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it +θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0 
+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Firmi+eab it                                                                                  (12a)                         
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it +γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it +θ1 PRELIB +θ 2 LIB0 
+θ 3 POSTLIB+ θ4LIBAF+5D97+Sectori+eab it                                      (12b) 
 
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it +γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB 
+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIBAF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+5D97+Firmi+eab it                           (13a)                                
RETURNPAB it =γ1 abLNSLab it + γ 2  abMB abit-1+γ 3 abLNNSabit-1+γ4abWRETURNab it +γ5abLNSLab it *PRELIB 
+γ6abLNSLab it *LIB0+γ7abLNSLab it *POSTLIB+γ8abLNSLab it *LIBAF+θ1 PRELIB+θ 2 LIB0+θ 3 POSTLIB+ 
θ4LIBAF+5D97+Sectori+eab it                           (13b)    
are used to evaluate the revaluation effect of stock market liberalization on Firm Alien Board Stock Return. LNSL is 
log of sales to represent firm size. MB is the Alien board market to book ratio to represent growth rate of the firm. 
LNNS is log of firm’s number of Alien board share traded to represent liquidity level.  WRETURN is log of world 
stock return. PRELIB is the pre-liberalization dummy variable to capture two years before the liberalization. LIB0 is 
the during -liberalization variable. POSTLIB is the post-liberalization dummy variable. LIBAF is the after-
liberalization variable. PRELIBSL is PRELIB*LNSL. LIB0SL is LIB0*LNSL. POSTLIBSL is POSTLIB*LNSL. 
LIBAFSL is LIBAF*LNSL. Firm is firm specific fixed effect dummies. Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. 
The consistent standard error is in parenthesis. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square 
value.  Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the estimation method. The first half of the table 
represents the estimation results after controlling for firm differences.  The second half of the table represents the 
estimation results after controlling for sector differences. WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset *, **, 
*** represents the statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Sub sample contains only firms that have 
observation before and after 1991.  
 
Alien Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURNPAB)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------       
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.0922      -0.1483** -0.0772     -0.1485***  
                     (0.0707)       (0.0321) (0.0817)      (0.0333) 
 
MB           -0.0101      -0.0102 -0.0102       -0.0102 
                     (0.0065)       (0.0064) (0.0066)      (0.0065) 
      
LNNS      -0.0149      -0.0072 -0.0167     -0.0071 
      (0.0145)      (0.0154) (0.0152)      (0.0161) 
      
WRETURN     0.3112**       0.5186*** 0.3187**      0.5252*** 
                     (0.1547)       (0.1962) (0.1550)       (0.1968) 
  
PRELIBSL        -0.0529      -0.0250 
         (0.0686)      (0.0607) 
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Alien Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURNPAB)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
 
LIB0SL              0.0388       0.0687  
                             (0.0898)        (0.0866) 
 
POSTLIBSL                   -0.0643         -0.0426 
             (0.0714)        (0.0681) 
      
LIBAFSL            -0.0016       0.0172 
             (0.0491)        (0.0446) 
      
PRELIB   -0.0511***     -0.0540*** -0.0706      -0.0897  0.7036      0.2649 
   (0.1299)        (0.1287) (0.1658)      (0.1382) (1.0352)       (0.8771) 
  
LIB0   -0.2343**      -0.2372** -0.3046**     -0.3626*** -0.8326        -1.3426 
   (0.1069)        (0.1060) (0.1302)      (0.1175) (1.3149)      (1.2479)  
 
POSTLIB   0.1792**        0.1763**  0.1479       0.1301  1.1023       0.7497 
   (0.0873)        (0.0870) (0.1068)      (0.0953) (1.0420)        (0.9757) 
  
LIBAF   -0.2150***     -0.2157*** -0.2084**     -0.2129***  0.1729         -0.4726 
   (0.0763)        (0.0773) (0.0816)       (0.0812) (0.7581)        (0.6802) 
 
D97   -0.7635***     -0.7948*** -0.8352***   -0.9098*** -0.8367***   -0.9118***  
   (0.1595)        (0.1613) (0.1712)       (0.1765) (0.1721)        (0.1767) 
         
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.1832           -0.1831 -0.2340*      -0.2729**  
   (0.1295)          (0.1276) (0.1353)      (0.1313)  
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.2304*           0.2304**  0.2186*        0.2198*  
   (0.1185)         (0.1168) (0.1239)       (0.1141)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.1639           -0.1616 -0.1378      -0.1232  
   (0.1159)         (0.1143)  (0.1407)       (0.1190)  
 
F-Test: γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       0.57        0.54 
         (0.6854)       (0.7067) 
 
Number of OBS  1223        1015  1214       1007  1214       1007 
 
Number of Group  237        173  234       170  234      170 
 
Hausman test  7.33         6.86  10.04      33.37  13.02       35.01  
   (0.1972)        (0.2312) (0.3473)       (0.0001) (0.4460)        (0.0008) 
 
R2   0.2266        0.2121 0.2430      0.2384 0.2451           0.2407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
LNSL      -0.0034      -0.0063 -0.0057         -0.0090 
      (0.0074)       (0.0082) (0.0076)        (0.0085) 
 
MB           -0.0114***  -0.0112*** -0.0113***   -0.0112*** 
      (0.0041)      (0.0041) (0.0041)        (0.0042) 
      
LNNS      -0.0004       0.0016 0.0003       0.0025   
             (0.0101)      (0.0110) (0.0101)        (0.0110) 
      
WRETURN     0.2557*       0.5000*** 0.2558*       0.5020*** 
      (0.1378)      (0.1756) (0.1380)        (0.1757) 
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Alien Board Stock Return    (1)   (2)   (3)  
(RETURNPAB)     WS      SS  WS      SS  WS      SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
  
PRELIBSL            -0.0058      -0.0046 
              (0.0540)      (0.0536) 
 
LIB0SL             0.1284*       0.1307*  
               (0.0726)       (0.0729) 
 
POSTLIBSL              0.0006          -0.0033 
             (0.0508)        (0.0513) 
      
LIBAFSL            0.0242       0.0323 
              (0.0315)        (0.0319) 
      
PRELIB   -0.0937      -0.0957  0.0093      -0.0477 0.0941           0.1143 
   (0.0927)      (0.0974) (0.0937)      (0.0974) (0.7685)        (0.7633) 
  
LIB0   -0.3208***   -0.3227*** -0.2902***   -0.3075*** -2.1135**     -2.1650** 
   (0.0918)      (0.0958) (0.0946)      (0.1003) (1.0423)        (1.0471) 
 
POSTLIB   0.1418**      0.1493**  0.1834***     0.2005*** 0.1732       0.2461 
   (0.0609)      (0.0686) (0.0638)       (0.0725) (0.7136)        (0.7184) 
 
LIBAF   -0.2458*      -0.2442*** -0.1991***    -0.2021*** -0.5633      -0.6881 
   (0.0508)      (0.0587) (0.0568)       (0.0664) (0.4769)        (0.4834) 
 
D97   -0.7548***   -0.7856*** -0.7943***    -0.8902*** -0.7913***   -0.8885*** 
   (0.1479)       (0.1517) (0.1562)       (0.1648) (0.1561)        (0.1647) 
           
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.2271*       -0.2270* -0.2995**      -0.3552***  
   (0.1214)      (0.1217) (0.1223)       (0.1232)  
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.2355**       0.2450**  0.1740*         0.1527  
   (0.0999)      (0.1004) (0.0990)       (0.0981)  
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.1521         -0.1484     -0.2085**      -0.2499***  
   (0.0943)        (0.0949) (0.0937)        (0.0939)  
 
F-Test: γ5 =γ6 = γ7 = γ8 =0       0.89        1.00 
         (0.4699)       (0.4090) 
 
Number of OBS  1223       1015  1214       1007  1214      1007 
 
Number of Group  29       27  29       27  29      27 
 
Hausman test  11.52      5.85        21.52  2.30      
   (0.0420)      (0.3214)       (0.0105) (0.9995)       
 
R2   0.1131      0.1326 0.1229      0.1493 0.1265      0.1539 
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Table 10 
The t-Test of Significant Changes in the Mean Value of Firm Investment rate 
Following Each Stock Market Liberalization Year Under Four Scenarios 
 
 The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the difference between the mean value 
of firm’s main board share price before and after the stock market liberalization is equal to zero.  ***, **, * means 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm Investment                  Liberalization Year Mean  T-test   Significant Change 
 
Variable: REALG_PPE 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0811  0.6386  No   
After Liberalization    0.0975  (0.5231)    
     
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0657  1.5187  No   
After Liberalization    0.1006  (0.1289)    
     
   
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0249  5.9618*** Yes   
After Liberalization    0.2366  (0.000)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0272  8.4903*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.3340  (0.0000)  
       
    
 
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0362  2.1963*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.1159  (0.0285)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0377  5.4194*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.2886  (0.0000)  
       
    
 
IV).Period: 1 Years Before Liberalization and 1 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0846  -1.8442*  Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0148  (0.0666)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0510  1.9345*  Yes  
After Liberalization    0.1775  (0.0540)  
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 Table 11 
The t-Test of Significant Changes in the Mean Value of Firm Cost of Capital 
Following Each Stock Market Liberalization Year Under Four Scenarios 
 
 The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the difference between the mean value 
of firm’s main board share price before and after the stock market liberalization is equal to zero.  ***, **, * means 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm Investment                  Liberalization Year Mean  T-test   Significant Change 
 
A) Variable: DIV (Dividend Yield) 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0823  -4.0878*** Yes   
After Liberalization    0.0458  (0.0000)    
     
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0797  -4.3200*** Yes   
After Liberalization    0.0450  (0.0000)    
     
        
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0943  -8.1640*** Yes   
After Liberalization    0.0444  (0.0000)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0875  -6.9093*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0420  (0.0000)  
       
 
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0933  -4.2129*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0538  (0.0000)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0889  -6.0401*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0391  (0.0000)  
       
    
IV).Period: 1 Years Before Liberalization and 1 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.1251  -1.8254*  Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0703  (0.0696)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0595  -3.5565*** Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0449  (0.0004)  
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Firm Investment                  Liberalization Year Mean  T-test   Significant Change 
 
B) Variable: LNDIV (log of dividend yield value) 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    -2.6842  -11.9353*** Yes  
After Liberalization    -3.2843  (0.0000) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    -2.6991  -13.5266*** Yes   
After Liberalization    -3.3119  (0.0000) 
    
       
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    -2.5234  -18.1352*** Yes  
After Liberalization    -3.3252  (0.0000) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    -2.6191  -18.5557*** Yes   
After Liberalization    -3.4395  (0.0000) 
       
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    -2.5265  -10.5806*** Yes  
After Liberalization    -3.0840  (0.0000) 
 
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    -2.6759  -14.4103*** Yes  
After Liberalization    -3.4431  (0.0000)  
       
   
 
IV).Period: 1 Year Before Liberalization and 1 Year After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    -2.5258  -2.6324*** Yes   
After Liberalization    -2.7529  (0.0092) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    -2.8813  -5.1160**** Yes  
After Liberalization    -3.2615  (0.0000) 
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Table 12 
During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Investment Rate  
 
REALG_PPE it = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF +4D97 + e it       (20a) 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it  (20b) 
REALG_PPE it  = FIRM i + λ 1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1+ δPRELIB + θ1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB + 
θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it       (21a)  
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i  + λ 1 DIVit-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1 +δPRELIB + θ 1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB1 + 
θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it       (21B) 
are used to evaluate the pre, post, and after effect of 1985 stock market liberalization on firm investment rate.  PRELIB 
takes value of one on two years before liberalization. LIB0 takes value of one on year of liberalization.  POSTLIB takes 
value of one on one and two year after liberalization to capture post liberalization effect.  LIBAF takes value of one 
after two years of liberalization to capture long-term effect. G_PPE is growth rate of firm property plant and equipment 
to proxy for firm investment.  G_SALES is growth rate of firm sales to proxy for firm growth rate.  LNDIV is dividend 
yield to proxy for firm cost of capital. LNTA is log of firm total asset to represent firm size. The parenthesis under the 
Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the estimation 
method. The first half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for firm differences.  WS is original 
dataset.  SS is sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have observations before and after 1985.  The second 
half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for sector differences. *, **, *** represents the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Firm Investment rate       (7)    (8) 
(REALG_PPE)                WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
DIV       -0.0411  -0.0713 
       (0.0304)  (0.0542) 
      
G_SALES      0.0572  0.1305**   
       (0.0354)  (0.0659) 
      
LNTA       -0.1147*** -0.0072 
       (0.0153)  (0.0049) 
  
PRELIB    0.0272  0.0091  -0.1506*** -0.0208 
   (0.0315)  (0.0312)  (0.0395)  (0.0342) 
 
LIB0   -0.0831** -0.1015*** -0.1886*** -0.0579   
   (0.0355)  (0.0350)  (0.0585)  (0.0563)   
 
POSTLIB   0.0201  -0.0091  -0.0969*   0.0225   
   (0.0363)  (0.0362)  (0.0544)  (0.0497)   
 
LIBAF   0.2046  0.1224*** 0.0597*  0.1244***  
    (0.0309)  (0.0336)  (0.0340)  (0.0350)   
 
D97   -0.1394*** -0.1967*** -0.1062  -0.1655** 
   (0.0596)  (0.0673)  (0.0707)  (0.0764) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.1103*** -0.1107*** -0.0380  -0.0370 
   (0.0405)  (0.0397)  (0.0547)  (0.0549) 
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Firm Investment rate       (7)    (8) 
(REALG_PPE)                WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.0071  -0.0183  0.0537  0.0433 
   (0.0411)  (0.0405)  (0.0555)  (0.0542) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.1774*** 0.1132*** 0.2103*** 0.1452*** 
   (0.0389)  (0.0390)  (0.0424)  (0.0442) 
 
Hausman test  92.80  35.45  59.05  3.92 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.8645) 
 
Number of OBS  4361  1663  3451  1371 
 
Number of Group  406  94  399  93 
 
R2   0.1466  0.0824  0.1731  0.1407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
DIV       -0.0224  -0.0411 
       (0.0293)  (0.0573) 
      
G_SALES      0.0555   0.1433**  
       (0.0411)  (0.0595) 
      
LNTA        0.0046***     0.0046* 
       (0.0013)  (0.0026) 
  
PRELIB   0.0358  0.0244   0.0012   -0.0047 
   (0.0281)  (0.0301)  (0.0260)  (0.0276) 
 
LIB0   -0.0704** -0.0809** -0.0394  -0.0433   
   (0.0313)  (0.0331)  (0.0506)  (0.0520)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0383  0.0115   0.0469   0.0361   
   (0.0343)  (0.0368)  (0.0439)  (0.0451)   
 
LIBAF   0.2535*** 0.1428***  0.2005***  0.1379***  
   (0.0303)  (0.0341)  (0.0301)  (0.0354)   
 
D97   -0.1219** -0.1818*** -0.1078  -0.1652** 
   (0.0575)  (0.0658)  (0.0685)  (0.0710) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.1062*** -0.1053*** -0.0407  -0.0386 
   (0.0388)  (0.0386)  (0.0531)  (0.0529) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.0025  -0.0130  0.0457  0.0409 
   (0.0408)  (0.0408)  (0.0493)  (0.0489) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.2177*** 0.1184*** 0.1992*** 0.1426*** 
   (0.0385)  (0.0389)  (0.0363)  (0.0393) 
 
Hausman test  5.22  9.51  7.77  4.38 
   (0.3895)  (0.0902)  (0.4565)  (0.8210) 
 
Number of OBS  4361  1663  3451  1371 
 
Number of Group  31  19  31  19 
 
R2   0.0613  0.0541  0.0622  0.1070 
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Table 13 
During, Post, and After Effects of the 1987 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Investment Rate  
 
REALG_PPE it = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF +4D97 + e it  (7a) 
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB + φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it  (7b) 
REALG_PPE it  = FIRM i + λ 1 DIV1it-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1+ δPRELIB + θ1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB + 
θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it       (8a)  
REALG_PPE it = SECTOR i  + λ 1 DIV1it-1 + λ 2 G_SALES it  + λ 3 LNTAit-1 +δPRELIB + θ1 LIB0 + θ 2 POSTLIB1 + 
θ 3 LIBAF + 4D97 + e it       (8B) 
are used to evaluate the pre, post, and after effect of 1987 stock market liberalization on firm investment rate.  PRELIB 
takes value of one on two years before liberalization. LIB0 takes value of one on year of liberalization.  POSTLIB takes 
value of one on one and two year after liberalization to capture post liberalization effect.  LIBAF takes value of one 
after two years of liberalization to capture long-term effect. G_PPE is growth rate of firm property plant and equipment 
to proxy for firm investment.  G_SALES is growth rate of firm sales to proxy for firm growth rate.  LNDIV1 is 
dividend yield to proxy for firm cost of capital. LNTA is log of firm total asset to represent firm size. The parenthesis 
under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the 
estimation method. The first half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for firm differences.  WS 
is original dataset.  SS is sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have observations before and after 1987.  
The second half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for sector differences. *, **, *** 
represents the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
Firm Investment rate       (7)    (8) 
(REALG_PPE)                WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
DIV       -0.0432  -0.0801 
       (0.0314)  (0.0616) 
      
G_SALES      0.0563  0.2114***  
       (0.0351)  (0.0382) 
      
LNTA       -0.0840*** -0.0103** 
       (0.0141)  (0.0052) 
  
PRELIB   -0.0007  -0.0248  0.0537   0.0309 
   (0.0287)  (0.0287)  (0.0461)  (0.0433) 
 
LIB0   0.1014*  0.0766  0.0108   0.0617   
   (0.0538)  (0.0530)  (0.0734)  (0.0698)   
 
POSTLIB  0.2337*** 0.1855*** 0.1580*** 0.1915***   
   (0.0341)  (0.0381)  (0.0400)  (0.0418)   
 
LIBAF   0.3335*** 0.2586*** 0.2594***  0.2530***  
   (0.0279)  (0.0452)  (0.0332)  (0.0432)   
 
D97   -0.1000** -0.2748** -0.0785  -0.2167 
   (0.0592)  (0.1357)  (0.0703)  (0.1355) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.1021*  0.1013*  0.0645  0.0308 
   (0.0570)  (0.0559)  (0.0802)  (0.0781) 
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Firm Investment rate       (7)    (8) 
(REALG_PPE)                WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.2344*** 0.2102*** 0.2117*** 0.1606*** 
   (0.0404)  (0.0426)  (0.0544)  (0.0564) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.3342*** 0.2834*** 0.3131*** 0.2221*** 
   (0.0370)  (0.0481)  (0.0517)  (0.0557) 
 
Hausman test  3.36  7.06  39.36  8.02 
   (0.6444)  (0.2161)  (0.0000)  (0.4316) 
 
Number of OBS  4361  1780  3451  1457 
 
Number of Group  406  103  399  102 
 
R2   0.1777  0.1173  0.1946  0.2776 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
DIV       -0.0261  -0.0478 
       (0.0295)  (0.0614) 
      
G_SALES      0.0529  0.2146***  
       (0.0414)  (0.0363) 
      
LNTA       0.0024*   0.0007 
       (0.0013)  (0.0026) 
  
PRELIB   0.0082  -0.0106  0.0360   0.0376 
   (0.0257)  (0.0275)  (0.0391)  (0.0407) 
 
LIB0   0.1151**  0.0949*  0.1006  0.0694   
   (0.0521)  (0.0542)  (0.0624)  (0.0630)   
 
POSTLIB  0.2528*** 0.2027*** 0.2552*** 0.2014***   
   (0.0337)  (0.0390)  (0.0390)  (0.0426)   
 
LIBAF   0.3769*** 0.2775*** 0.3198***  0.2590***  
   (0.0275)  (0.0434)  (0.0304)  (0.0411)   
 
D97   -0.0861*** -0.2607** -0.0669  -0.2144* 
   (0.0572)  (0.1315)  (0.0684)  (0.1298) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.1069*  0.1055*  0.0647  0.0318 
   (0.0555)  (0.0562)  (0.0729)  (0.0728) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.2446*** 0.2133*** 0.2192*** 0.1639*** 
   (0.0399)  (0.0422)  (0.0531)  (0.0555) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.3687*** 0.2881*** 0.2838*** 0.2215*** 
   (0.0359)  (0.0474)  (0.0479)  (0.0537) 
 
Hausman test  7.54  3.37  7.29  14.01 
   (0.1835)  (0.6428)  (0.5054)  (0.0816) 
 
Number of OBS  4361  1780  3451  1457 
 
Number of Group  31  22  31  22 
 
R2   0.1065  0.0991  0.1021  0.2548 
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Table 14 
The Effect of the 1985 Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Cost of Capital (DIV) 
 
DIV it  = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it          (22a)   
DIV it  = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97+ e it       (22b)         
DIV it  = FIRM i  +1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97  
+ e it                                                                                                       (23a) 
DIV it  =SECTOR i  + 1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it +  φ 1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it           
                                                                                                                           (23b) 
are used to evaluate the effect of stock market liberalization on firm’s cost of capital. LNTA is log of firm total asset 
used to proxy for firm size. G_EPS is growth rate of firm earning per share. PRELIB is two years before liberalization 
years. LIB0 is during liberalization year. POSTLIB is two years after liberalization dummy variable to represent post 
liberalization year. LIBAF is after two years of liberalization dummy variable. The parenthesis under the Hausman test 
is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the estimation method. The 
standard error is in parenthesis. The first half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for firm 
differences.  The second half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for sector differences. *, **, 
*** represents the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub 
sample dataset that contains only firms that have observation before and after 1985. 
 
 
Firm Cost of Capital       (9)    (10) 
(DIV)                 WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
LNTA       -0.0068*** -0.0015 
       (0.0023)  (0.0010) 
 
G_EPS       -3.54e-06  -4.50e-06 
       (2.68e-06) (7.01e-06) 
       
PRELIB   0.0577*** 0.0572*  0.0302*** 0.0348*** 
   (0.0216)  (0.0209)  (0.0046)  (0.0039) 
 
LIB0   0.0330*** 0.0325*** 0.0271*** 0.0317***   
   (0.0069)  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0058)   
 
POSTLIB  -0.0067  -0.0064  -0.0113** -0.0074   
   (0.0052)  (0.0047)  (0.0050)  (0.0046)   
 
LIBAF   -0.0057  -0.0056  -0.0083** -0.0057   
   (0.0038)  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0039)   
 
D97   0.1772*** 0.1596*** 0.2317*** 0.1719*** 
   (0.0334)  (0.0538)  (0.0542)  (0.0568) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0247  -0.0247  -0.0031  -0.0031 
   (0.0227)  (0.0221)  (0.0063)  (0.0061) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.0643*** -0.0635*** -0.0415*** -0.0422*** 
   (0.0220)  (0.0214)  (0.0052)  (0.0051) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.0633*** -0.0628*** -0.0385*** -0.0405*** 
   (0.0217)  (0.0212)  (0.0047)  (0.0048) 
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Firm Cost of Capital       (9)    (10) 
(DIV)                 WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
Hausman test  193.20  249.30  2.25  23.55 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.8954)  (0.0014) 
 
Number of OBS  4495  1899  4202  1844 
 
Number of Group  467  104  429  104 
 
R2   0.2481  0.2578  0.2649  0.1844 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
LNTA       0.0030*** 0.0027** 
       (0.0005)  (0.0012) 
 
G_EPS       -3.28e-06  -2.41e-06 
       (2.76e-06) (5.84e-06) 
       
PRELIB   0.0633*** 0.0588*** 0.0448*** 0.0401*** 
   (0.0215)  (0.0208)  (0.0047)  (0.0046) 
 
LIB0   0.0420*** 0.0375*** 0.0424*** 0.0381***   
   (0.0069)  (0.0067)  (0.0067)  (0.0065)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0055   0.0009   0.0068** -0.0013   
   (0.0036)  (0.0041)  (0.0034)  (0.0040)   
 
LIBAF   0.0048*  -0.0005   0.0035  -0.0014   
   (0.0027)  (0.0038)  (0.0026)  (0.0037)   
 
D97   0.1756*** 0.1649*** 0.2312*** 0.1701*** 
   (0.0347)  (0.0570)  (0.0570)  (0.0582) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0213  -0.0213  -0.0023  -0.0020 
   (0.0219)  (0.0218)  (0.0068)  (0.0063) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.0577*** -0.0570*** -0.0380*** -0.0388*** 
   (0.0210)  (0.0207)  (0.0042)  (0.0037) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.0585*** -0.0593*** -0.0413*** -0.0415*** 
   (0.0214)  (0.0211)  (0.0044)  (0.0039) 
 
Hausman test        4.61 
         (0.7073) 
 
Number of OBS  4495  1899  4202  1844 
 
Number of Group  31  19  31  19 
 
R2   0.1310  0.2040  0.1542  0.2323 
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Table 15 
The Effect of the 1987 Stock Market Liberalization on Firm Cost of Capital (DIV1) 
 
DIV1 it  = FIRM i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it      (9a)     
 DIV1 it  = SECTOR i + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97+ e it       (9b)         
DIV1 it  = FIRM i  +1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it + φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97  
+ e it                                                                                                       (10a) 
DIV1 it  =SECTOR i  +1 LNTA it + 2G_EPS it +  φ1 PRELIB +φ 2 LIB0 +φ 3 POSTLIB +φ4LIBAF+ 4D97 + e it           
                                                                                           (10b) 
are used to evaluate the effect of stock market liberalization on firm’s cost of capital. LNTA is log of firm total asset 
used to proxy for firm size. PRELIB is two years before liberalization years. LIB0 is during liberalization year. 
POSTLIB is two years after liberalization dummy variable to represent post liberalization year. LIBAF is after two 
years of liberalization dummy variable. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  
Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the estimation method. The standard error is in parenthesis. 
The first half of the table represents the estimation results after controlling for firm differences.  The second half of the 
table represents the estimation results after controlling for sector differences. *, **, *** represents the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset that contains only 
firms that have observation before and after 1987. 
 
 
Firm Cost of Capital       (9)    (10) 
(DIV1)                 WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
LNTA       -0.0085*** -0.0026*** 
       (0.0021)  (0.0011) 
 
G_EPS       -3.86e-06  -2.11e-06** 
       (2.71e-06) (8.20e-07) 
       
PRELIB   0.0134**  0.0127**   0.0102** 0.0136*** 
   (0.0062)  (0.0060)  (0.0050)  (0.0048) 
 
LIB0   -0.0208*** -0.0235*** -0.0255*** -0.0233***   
   (0.0063)  (0.0062)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)   
 
POSTLIB  -0.0104** -0.0130*** -0.0143*** -0.0118***   
   (0.0044)  (0.0051)  (0.0043)  (0.0045)   
 
LIBAF   -0.0006  -0.0072  0.0014  -0.0041   
   (0.0056)  (0.0085)  (0.0053)  (0.0084)   
 
D97   0.1762*** 0.1491*** 0.2321*** 0.1635*** 
   (0.0334)  (0.0502)  (0.0543)  (0.0527) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0342*** -0.0362*** -0.0357*** -0.0369*** 
   (0.0064)  (0.0061)  (0.0057)  (0.0055) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.0238*** -0.0257*** -0.0245*** -0.0254*** 
   (0.0056)  (0.0057)  (0.0050)  (0.0051) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.0140** -0.0199** -0.0088  -0.0177** 
   (0.0067)  (0.0079)  (0.0063)  (0.0080) 
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Firm Cost of Capital       (9)    (10) 
(DIV1)                 WS        SS             WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
Hausman test  152.30  166.30  136.07  42.32 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
Number of OBS  4495  2021  4202  1966 
  
Number of Group  467  116  429  116 
 
R2   0.2457  0.2387  0.2643  0.2565 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
LNTA       0.0029*** 0.0026*** 
       (0.0005)  (0.0012) 
 
G_EPS       -3.25e-06  -3.55e-06*** 
       (2.74e-06) (1.23e-06)  
       
PRELIB   0.0284*** 0.0215*** 0.0305***  0.0237*** 
   (0.0048)  (0.0054)  (0.0045)  (0.0048) 
 
LIB0   -0.0058  -0.0140*** -0.0049  -0.0124***   
   (0.0039)  (0.0046)  (0.0037)  (0.0042)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0009  -0.0076  0.0007  -0.0060   
   (0.0032)  (0.0050)  (0.0030)  (0.0043)   
 
LIBAF   0.0120*** -0.0003  0.0084*  -0.0011   
   (0.0043)  (0.0083)  (0.0043)  (0.0083)   
 
D97   0.1752*** 0.1542*** 0.2311*** 0.1602*** 
   (0.0347)  (0.0532)  (0.0571)  (0.0540) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0342*** -0.0355*** -0.0354*** -0.0362*** 
   (0.0045)  (0.0042)  (0.0043)  (0.0038) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  -0.0275*** -0.0291*** -0.0298*** -0.0297*** 
   (0.0043)  (0.0044)  (0.0041)  (0.0041) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  -0.0164*** -0.0218*** -0.0221*** -0.0248*** 
   (0.0052)  (0.0071)  (0.0052)  (0.0072) 
 
Hausman test  279.21    16.81  3.92 
   (0.0000)    (0.0187)  (0.7895) 
 
Number of OBS  4495  2021  4202  1966 
 
Number of Group  31  22  31  22 
 
R2   0.1285  0.1842  0.1528  0.2101 
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 Table 16 
The t-test of Significant Changes in the Mean Value of Firm Performance  
(as measured by Tobin’s Q) following the 1985, 1987, and 1991  
Stock Market Liberalization 
 
The Standard error is in parenthesis.  The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the mean value of firm Tobin’s Q before and after the stock market liberalization is equal to zero.  
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Firm Performance            Liberalization Year Mean  T-test Significant Change 
 
I )Period: All years before and all years after liberalization 
 
Tobin’s Q   1985    
 
Before Liberalization    1.2407  2.8712*** Yes 
      (0.0278)  (0.0041) 
After Liberalization    1.5807  
      (0.0393) 
Tobin’s Q   1987    
 
Before Liberalization    1.2254  3.5505*** Yes 
      (0.0235)  (0.0004) 
After Liberalization    1.5962  
      (0.0408) 
 
 
II)Period: 5 years before and 5 years after liberalization 
 
Tobin’ Q    1985 
 
Before Liberalization    1.0593  7.9812*** Yes 
      (0.0117)  (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    2.2947 
      (0.1014) 
 
Tobin’s Q   1987 
 
Before Liberalization    1.1054  9.1517*** Yes 
      (0.0206)  (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    2.2693 
      (0.0738) 
 
 
III)Period: 3 years before and 3 years after Liberalization 
 
Tobin’s Q   1985 
 
Before Liberalization    1.0492  4.2542*** Yes 
      (0.0138)  (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    2.0229 
      (0.1650) 
 
Tobin’s Q   1987 
 
Before Liberalization    1.1487  7.1456*** Yes 
      (0.0311)  (0.0000) 
After Liberalization    2.5865 
      (0.1248) 
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Firm Performance            Liberalization Year Mean  T-test Significant Change 
 
IV)Period: 1 year before and 1 year after Liberalization 
 
Tobin’s Q   1985   
 
Before Liberalization    1.0851  1.4258  No 
      (0.0308)  (0.1553) 
After Liberalization    1.1795 
      (0.0436) 
Tobin’s Q   1987 
 
Before Liberalization    1.2472  2.8318*** Yes 
      (0.0781)  (0.0049) 
After Liberalization    2.5746 
      (0.2658) 
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Table 17 
The Mean Value of Firm Return on Asset (ROA) to Measure Firm profitability 
Level in Various Period and Firm performance 
The Standard error is in parenthesis.  The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the mean value of firm ROA before and after the stock market liberalization is equal to zero.  ***, 
**, * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm ROA                      Liberalization Year Mean   T-test  Significant Change 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0409  -0.6180   No  
After Liberalization    0.0373  (0.5366)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0397  -0.4554   No  
After Liberalization    0.0374  (0.6489)    
        
    
       
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0334  5.7704***  Yes 
After Liberalization    0.0761  (0.0000) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0347  7.0041***  Yes 
After Liberalization    0.0779  (0.0000) 
       
     
 
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0337  3.3426***  Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0706  (0.0009) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0343  5.5831***  Yes 
After Liberalization    0.0853  (0.0000) 
       
   
 
IV).Period: 1 Years Before Liberalization and 1 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.0306  0.7378   No  
After Liberalization    0.0361  (0.4612)  
     
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.0409  2.2665**   Yes  
After Liberalization    0.0877  (0.0238) 
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Table 18 
The Mean Value of Firm Rate of Return on Investment as Calculated by Firm Net 
Income Divided by Firm Property Plant and Equipment in Various Scenarios 
 
The Standard error is in parenthesis.  The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the mean value of firm rate of return on investment before and after the stock market liberalization 
is equal to zero.  ***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm ROR on Investment           Liberalization Year Mean  T-test  Significant Change 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.9234  -3.8875***  Yes 
After Liberalization    0.1826  (0.0001) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.8588  -4.0121***  Yes 
After Liberalization    0.1673  (0.0001) 
       
     
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.6617  -0.1318   No  
After Liberalization    0.6338  (0.8952)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.6188  -0.1739   No 
After Liberalization    0.5854  (0.8620)  
       
      
 
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.6212  0.2813   No 
After Liberalization    0.7226  (0.7786)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.6468  -0.0328   No 
After Liberalization    0.6374  (0.9738)  
       
 
IV).Period: 1 Years Before Liberalization and 1 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    0.7138  -0.1430   No  
After Liberalization    0.6154  (0.8864)  
     
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    0.3578  0.7320   No  
After Liberalization    0.7700  (0.4646) 
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Table 19 
The Mean Value of Firm Debt to Equity Ratio as Calculated by Firm  
Total Debt Divided by Firm Total Equity in Various Scenarios 
 
The Standard error is in parenthesis.  The parenthesis under the t-statistic is the p value.  The null hypothesis is that the 
difference between the mean value of firm debt to equity ratio on investment before and after the stock market 
liberalization is equal to zero.  ***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Firm Debt to Equity Ratio           Liberalization Year Mean  T-test  Significant Change 
 
I).Period: All Years Before and After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    6.7557  -2.1099**  Yes 
After Liberalization    3.8619  (0.0349) 
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    6.6112  -2.3629**  Yes 
After Liberalization    3.7510  (0.0182) 
     
   
       
II).Period: 5 Years Before Liberalization and 5 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    7.5227  -0.4202   No  
After Liberalization    4.7053  (0.1558)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    7.3570  -2.0574**  Yes 
After Liberalization    3.9587  (0.0398)  
       
       
 
III).Period: 3 Years Before Liberalization and 3 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    8.2357  -0.8368   No 
After Liberalization    5.5714  (0.4029)  
       
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    8.2309  -1.5301   No 
After Liberalization    4.3597  (0.1263)  
    
 
IV).Period: 1 Years Before Liberalization and 1 Years After Liberalization 
 
    1985    
Before Liberalization    12.5042  -0.8293   No  
After Liberalization    6.1923  (0.4076)  
     
    1987    
 
Before Liberalization    5.0174  0.0693   No  
After Liberalization    5.2588  (0.9448) 
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Table 20 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (25a)                                                                               
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (25b)            
 
TOBINQ it = FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                                                                            (26a) 
TOBINQ it = SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                           (26b) 
are used to evaluate the during, post, and after effect of 1985 stock market liberalization on firm performance. 
TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. MKTSHARE is firm market share. It is firm’s market 
capitalization divided by total market capitalization. LNSL is log of sales to represent firm size. DEBTEQ is firm debt 
to equity ratio to represent firm leverage. PRELIB is the pre-liberalization years to represent two years before 
liberalization.  LIB0 is during liberalization dummy variable.  POSTLIB is post liberalization dummy variable to 
represent two years after liberalization. LIBAF is after liberalization variable to represents all years after post 
liberalization years.  Firm is firm specific fixed effect dummies.  Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. α is 
constant term. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with 
consistent standard error is the estimation method. The consistent standard error is in parenthesis. WS is whole sample 
dataset.  SS is sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have observation before and after 1985 *, **, *** 
represents the statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively                                
Firm Performance  (11)       (12) 
(TOBINQ)  WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      11.3957  3.6997 
       (7.7120)  (2.4517) 
      
DEBTEQ            -0.0005  0.0002 
       (0.0005)  (0.0002) 
      
LNSL       -0.0752** 0.0621*** 
       (0.0375)  (0.0113) 
 
PRELIB   -0.1434*** -0.1549*** -0.3322*** -0.1547***   
   (0.0540)  (0.0526)  (0.0730)  (0.0577)   
 
LIB0   -0.0937  -0.1075  -0.2233*** -0.0749   
   (0.0717)  (0.0707)  (0.0851)  (0.0742)   
 
POSTLIB  1.1054*** 1.0977*** 0.9161**  1.0714***  
   (0.3294)  (0.3278)  (0.3889)  (0.3689)   
 
LIBAF   1.1088*** 0.9125*** 0.8965*** 0.9368***  
                                 (0.0889)  (0.0966)  (0.0881)  (0.0982)   
 
D97   -0.3467** -0.2798*** -0.2252  -0.2917*** 
   (0.1351)  (0.0808)  (0.1761)  (0.0674) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.0496  0.0474  0.1090  0.0798 
   (0.0784)  (0.0784)  (0.0899)  (0.0783) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  1.2488*** 1.2527*** 1.2483*** 1.2261*** 
   (0.3276)  (0.3259)  (0.3762)  (0.3653) 
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Firm Performance   (11)       (12) 
(TOBINQ)  WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  1.2521*** 1.0675*** 1.2287*** 1.0915*** 
   (0.0978)  (0.1054)  (0.1072)  (0.1091) 
 
Hausman test  19.64    76.76   
   (0.0015)    (0.0000)  
 
Number of OBS  4709  2031  4213  1905   
 
Number of Group  465  104  429  104   
 
R2   0.4655  0.5336  0.5352  0.5384   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      13.0678** 2.3777 
       (6.5719)  (1.4779) 
      
DEBTEQ            -0.0009** 0.0001 
       (0.0004)  (0.0002) 
      
LNSL        0.0785*** 0.0699*** 
       (0.0039)  (0.0128)   
  
PRELIB   -0.2365*** -0.1171*** -0.2133** -0.1179***  
   (0.0726)  (0.0399)  (0.0856)  (0.0431)  
 
LIB0   -0.1500*  -0.0386  -0.1361  -0.0684   
   (0.0865)  (0.0602)  (0.0867)  (0.0565)   
 
POSTLIB  1.0651*** 1.1780*** 1.0039*** 1.0903***  
   (0.3345)  (0.3406)  (0.3763)  (0.3775)  
 
LIBAF   1.2085*** 1.0224*** 1.0236*** 0.9641***  
  (0.1032)  (0.1046)  (0.0960)  (0.1045)   
 
D97   -0.2396** -0.2228*** -0.1974  -0.3453*** 
   (0.1121)  (0.0744)  (0.1730)  (0.0528) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.0865  0.0785  0.0772  0.0495  
   (0.0729)  (0.0599)  (0.0747)  (0.0530) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  1.3016*** 1.2951*** 1.2172*** 1.2083*** 
   (0.3278)  (0.3306)  (0.3682)  (0.3640) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  1.4450*** 1.1396*** 1.2369*** 1.0821*** 
   (0.1016)  (0.1064)  (0.1103)  (0.1109) 
 
Hausman test  959.44  42.81  11.51  17.25 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1178)  (0.0276) 
 
Number of OBS  4709  2031  4213  1905   
 
Number of Group  31  19  31  19   
 
R2   0.3014  0.4784  0.4186  0.4920   
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Table 21 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1985 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Performance (ROA) 
 
ROA it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (27a)                                                                                
ROA it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (27b)   
          
ROA it =FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                                                                            (28a) 
ROA it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                          (28b) 
are used to evaluate the during, post, and after effect of 1985 stock market liberalization on firm performance.  ROA is 
firm return on asset used to measure firm performance. MKTSHARE is firm market share. It is firm’s market 
capitalization divided by total market capitalization. LNSL is log of sales to represent firm size. DEBTEQ is firm debt 
to equity ratio to represent firm leverage. PRELIB is the pre-liberalization year to represent two years before 
liberalization.  LIB0 is during liberalization dummy variable.  POSTLIB is post liberalization dummy variable to 
represent two years after liberalization. LIBAF is after liberalization variable to represents all years after post 
liberalization years.  Firm is firm specific fixed effect dummies.  Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. α is 
constant term. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with 
consistent standard error is the estimation method.  WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset that contains 
only the firms that have observation before and after 1985. The consistent standard error is in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
represents the statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively                                
Firm Performance  (13)       (14) 
(ROA)   WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      0.2711*** 0.2450*** 
       (0.0609)  (0.0631) 
      
DEBTEQ           -2.23e-04  -0.0001 
       (5.19e-04) (0.0001) 
      
LNSL       0.0093*** 0.0032*** 
       (0.0023)  (0.0008) 
 
PRELIB   -0.0014  -0.0041   0.0103*  0.0036   
   (0.0044)  (0.0043)  (0.0054)  (0.0047)   
 
LIB0   -0.0052  -0.0084  0.0070  0.0015   
   (0.0063)  (0.0061)  (0.0085)  (0.0081)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0235*** 0.0198*** 0.0258*** 0.0193***  
   (0.0051)  (0.0057)  (0.0056)  (0.0049)   
 
LIBAF   0.0555*** 0.0387*** 0.0493*** 0.0402***  
                                 (0.0058)  (0.0040)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)   
 
D97   -0.0304*** -0.0292*** -0.0330*** -0.0312*** 
   (0.0084)  (0.0099)  (0.0080)  (0.0099) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0038  -0.0043  -0.0033  -0.0021 
   (0.0069)  (0.0067)  (0.0083)  (0.0080) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.0250*** 0.0239*** 0.0155*** 0.0157*** 
   (0.0061)  (0.0064)  (0.0055)  (0.0053) 
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Firm Performance   (13)       (14) 
(ROA)   WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.0569*** 0.0428*** 0.0390*** 0.0366*** 
   (0.0062)  (0.0049)  (0.0050)  (0.0048) 
 
Hausman test  135.59  175.37  85.56  120.48 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Number of OBS  5564  2303  4244  1921   
 
Number of Group  469  104  430  104   
 
R2   0.3389  0.4423  0.4491  0.4920   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      0.3397*** 0.1250*** 
       (0.0679)  (0.0387) 
      
DEBTEQLAG            -0.0001  -0.0001 
       (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
      
LNSL       0.0031*** 0.0027*** 
       (0.0004)  (0.0005)   
  
PRELIB   0.0086*  -0.0006  0.0066  -0.0022   
   (0.0048)  (0.0047)  (0.0045)  (0.0046)  
 
LIB0   0.0043  -0.0048  0.0056  -0.0039   
   (0.0068)  (0.0067)  (0.0085)  (0.0082)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0319*** 0.0235*** 0.0247*** 0.0158***  
   (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0046)  (0.0046)  
 
LIBAF   0.0635*** 0.0424***  0.0518*** 0.0405***  
  (0.0063)  (0.0043)  (0.0039)  (0.0044)   
 
D97   -0.0286*** -0.0243*** -0.0230** -0.0282** 
   (0.0088)  (0.0116)  (0.0090)  (0.0115) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  -0.0043  -0.0042  -0.0010  -0.0018  
   (0.0077)  (0.0076)  (0.0090)  (0.0085) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.0232*** 0.0241*** 0.0181*** 0.0180*** 
   (0.0067)  (0.0070)  (0.0057)  (0.0054) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.0549*** 0.0430***  0.0453*** 0.0427*** 
   (0.0076)  (0.0056)  (0.0053)  (0.0054) 
 
Hausman test  42.30    124.26  14.99 
   (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0593) 
 
Number of OBS  5564  2303  4244  1921   
 
Number of Group  31  19  31  19   
 
R2   0.1211  0.3291  0.1375  0.3529   
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Table 22 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1987 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 
TOBINQ it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (11a)                                                                               
TOBINQ it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (11b)  
           
TOBINQ it = FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                                                                             (12a) 
TOBINQ it = SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                    (12b) 
are used to evaluate the during, post, and after effect of 1987 stock market liberalization on firm performance. 
TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. MKTSHARE is firm market share. It is firm’s market 
capitalization divided by total market capitalization. LNSL is log of sales to represent firm size. DEBTEQ is firm debt 
to equity ratio to represent firm leverage. PRELIB is the pre-liberalization years to represent two years before 
liberalization.  LIB0 is during liberalization dummy variable.  POSTLIB is post liberalization dummy variable to 
represent two years after liberalization. LIBAF is after liberalization variable to represents all years after post 
liberalization years.  Firm is firm specific fixed effect dummies.  Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. α is 
constant term. The parenthesis under the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with 
consistent standard error is the estimation method. The consistent standard error is in parenthesis. WS is whole sample 
dataset.  SS is sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have observation before and after 1987 *, **, *** 
represents the statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively   
Firm Performance  (11)       (12) 
(TOBINQ)  WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      11.4166  3.5946 
       (7.6841)  (2.4505) 
      
DEBTEQ            -0.0005  0.0002 
       (0.0005)  (0.0003) 
      
LNSL       -0.0316  0.0547***   
       (0.0368)  (0.0112)   
 
PRELIB   0.0620  0.0360  0.0057  0.0802   
   (0.0623)  (0.0607)  (0.0739)  (0.0662)   
 
LIB0   2.0199*** 2.0092*** 2.0454*** 2.1231***  
   (0.5558)  (0.5576)  (0.7088)  (0.6844)   
 
POSTLIB  1.5389*** 1.1752*** 1.2886*** 1.1833***  
   (0.1276)  (0.1265)  (0.1317)  (0.1311)   
 
LIBAF   0.5929*** 0.5607*** 0.5753*** 0.5514**  
   (0.0445)  (0.0528)  (0.0431)  (0.0518)   
 
D97                 -0.3027**  -0.2180*** -0.1617  -0.2241***  
   (0.1353)  (0.0761)  (0.1759)  (0.0644) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  1.9579*** 1.9731*** 2.0397*** 2.0429*** 
   (0.5573)  (0.5581)  (0.6906)  (0.6728) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  1.4769*** 1.1391*** 1.2829*** 1.1031*** 
   (0.1366)  (0.1365)  (0.1434)  (0.1414) 
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Firm Performance  (11)       (12) 
(TOBINQ)  WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.5310*** 0.5247*** 0.5695*** 0.4712*** 
   (0.0730)  (0.0756)  (0.0799)  (0.0796) 
 
Hausman test  86868.88    36.89  22.07 
   (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0048) 
 
Number of OBS  4709  2162  4213  2024   
 
Number of Group  465  116  429  116 
 
R2   0.4737  0.5645  0.5459  0.5683   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      13.1025** 2.6363*  
       (6.5304)  (1.4734)   
      
DEBTEQ            -0.0008*  0.0001 
       (0.0005)  (0.0002) 
      
LNSL       0.0759*** 0.0629*** 
       (0.0037)  (0.0121) 
 
PRELIB   0.0283  0.1046*** 0.0168  0.0726   
   (0.0818)  (0.0571)  (0.0809)  (0.0552)   
 
LIB0   1.9877*** 2.0798*** 2.0707*** 2.1361***  
   (0.5604)  (0.5748)  (0.7018)  (0.7024)   
 
POSTLIB  1.6073*** 1.2712*** 1.3540*** 1.1971***  
   (0.1452)  (0.1364)  (0.1435)  (0.1393)   
 
LIBAF   0.7751*** 0.6586*** 0.6476*** 0.5782***  
   (0.0597)  (0.0580)  (0.0437)  (0.0553)   
 
D97                  -0.1574*** -0.1486** -0.1202  -0.2553*** 
   (0.1119)  (0.0673)  (0.1724)  (0.0501) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  1.9595*** 1.9752*** 2.0539*** 2.0635*** 
   (0.5580)  (0.5703)  (0.6960)  (0.6930) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  1.5790*** 1.1665*** 1.3371*** 1.1245*** 
   (0.1473)  (0.1446)  (0.1519)  (0.1486) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.7468*** 0.5540*** 0.6308*** 0.5055*** 
   (0.0765)  (0.0742)  (0.0822)  (0.0749) 
 
Hausman test      7.75   
       (0.3554)   
 
Number of OBS  4709  2162  4213  2024   
 
Number of Group  31  22  31  22   
 
R2   0.3125  0.5123  0.4313  0.5228  
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Table 23 
The During, Post, and After Effects of the 1987 Stock Market  
Liberalization on Firm Performance (ROA) 
ROA it =FIRM i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it        (13a)                                                                                
ROA it =SECTOR i +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it  (13b)   
          
ROA it =FIRM i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                                                                                            (14a) 
ROA it =SECTOR i +τ1 MKTSHARE it-1+τ 2  DEBTEQ it-1+τ 3 LNSL it +ηPRELIB+δ 2 LIB0+δ 3 POSTLIB 
+δ4LIBAF+4D97+e it                                   (14b) 
are used to evaluate the during, post, and after effect of 1987 stock market liberalization on firm performance. ROA is 
firm return on asset to measure firm performance. MKTSHARE is firm market share. It is firm’s market capitalization 
divided by total market capitalization. LNSL is log of sales to represent firm size. DEBTEQ is firm debt to equity ratio 
to represent firm leverage. PRELIB is the pre-liberalization year to represent two years before liberalization.  LIB0 is 
during liberalization dummy variable.  POSTLIB is post liberalization dummy variable to represent two years after 
liberalization. LIBAF is after liberalization variable to represents all years after post liberalization years.  Firm is firm 
specific fixed effect dummies.  Sector is sector specific fixed effect dummies. α is constant term. The parenthesis under 
the Hausman test is probability of chi-square value.  Fixed effect estimation with consistent standard error is the 
estimation method.  WS is whole sample dataset. SS is sub sample dataset that contains only the firms that have 
observation before and after 1987. The consistent standard error is in parenthesis. *, **, *** represents the statistically 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively                       
          
Firm Performance   (13)       (14) 
(ROA)   WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firm Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      0.3014*** 0.2651*** 
       (0.0636)  (0.0653) 
      
DEBTEQ           -2.4e-04  -0.0001 
       (5.11e-04) (0.0001) 
      
LNSL       0.0101*** 0.0030*** 
       (0.0022)  (0.0008) 
 
PRELIB   0.0062  0.0022  0.0142**  0.0060   
   (0.0043)  (0.0042)  (0.0057)  (0.0053)   
 
LIB0   0.0397*** 0.0407*** 0.0463*** 0.0375***  
   (0.0072)  (0.0089)  (0.0071)  (0.0066)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0680*** 0.0440*** 0.0570*** 0.0448***   
   (0.0086)  (0.0046)  (0.0052)  (0.0050)   
 
LIBAF   0.0419*** 0.0308*** 0.0437*** 0.0309***   
   (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0034)  (0.0034)   
  
D97   -0.0270*** -0.0337*** -0.0287*** -0.0357***  
   (0.0084)  (0.0111)  (0.0080)  (0.0111) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.0335*** 0.0385*** 0.0321*** 0.0315*** 
   (0.0080)  (0.0093)  (0.0075)  (0.0073) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.0618*** 0.0419*** 0.0428*** 0.0388*** 
   (0.0086)  (0.0054)  (0.0061)  (0.0061) 
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Firm Performance   (13)       (14) 
(ROA)   WS  SS  WS  SS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.0358*** 0.0287*** 0.0295*** 0.0249*** 
   (0.0048)  (0.0043)  (0.0054)  (0.0050) 
 
Hausman test  83.18                       73.22                     91.83  180.07  
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
Number of OBS  5564  2465  4244  2040   
 
Number of Group  469  116  430  116   
 
R2   0.3442  0.4476  0.4556  0.4949   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sector Fixed Effect 
 
MKTSHARE      0.3597*** 0.1449*** 
       (0.0691)  (0.0402) 
      
DEBTEQLAG            -0.0001  -0.0001 
       (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
      
LNSL       0.0029*** 0.0024*** 
       (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
 
PRELIB   0.0145*** 0.0048   0.0115** 0.0021   
   (0.0045)  (0.0045)  (0.0053)  (0.0052)   
 
LIB0   0.0465*** 0.0434*** 0.0445***  0.0351***  
   (0.0075)  (0.0091)  (0.0063)  (0.0061)   
 
POSTLIB  0.0729*** 0.0468*** 0.0566***  0.0453***  
   (0.0094)  (0.0049)  (0.0049)  (0.0051)   
 
LIBAF   0.0504*** 0.0337*** 0.0421*** 0.0316***   
   (0.0031)  (0.0038)  (0.0037)  (0.0039)   
 
D97   -0.0243*** -0.0290** -0.0189*** -0.0320*** 
   (0.0088)  (0.0126)  (0.0090)  (0.0126) 
 
LIB0-PRELIB  0.0320*** 0.0386*** 0.0329*** 0.0330*** 
   (0.0084)  (0.0096)  (0.0077)  (0.0072) 
 
POSTLIB-PRELIB  0.0585*** 0.0420*** 0.0451*** 0.0432*** 
   (0.0102)  (0.0059)  (0.0066)  (0.0065) 
 
LIBAF-PRELIB  0.0359*** 0.0289***  0.0306*** 0.0295*** 
   (0.0049)  (0.0049)  (0.0057)  (0.0055) 
 
Hausman test        42.38 
         (0.0000) 
 
Number of OBS  5564  2465  4244  2040   
 
Number of Group  31  22  31  22   
 
R2   0.1299  0.3338  0.1438  0.3521   
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      APPENDIX B 
 
 
Figure 1 
The Mean Value of Firm Main Board Share Price from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 2 
The Mean Value of the Firm Main Board Stock Return and  
the Firm Alien Board Stock Return from 1987 to 2003 
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Figure 3 
The Mean Value of Firm Main Board Share  
Price in 1985 and 1987 Liberalization Years 
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Figure 4 
The Mean Value of the Firm Main Board Stock Return  
in 1985 and 1987 liberalization Years 
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Figure 5 
The Mean Value of Firm Main Board Share Price and Alien Board Share Price 
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Figure 6 
The Mean Value of the Firm Main Board and Alien Board Share  
Price When the Liberalization Dates Change 
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Figure 7 
The Mean Value of the Firm Main Board Stock Return and the Firm  
Alien Board Stock Return When the Liberalization Year Changes 
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Figure 8 
The Mean Value of the Firm Investment from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 9 
The Mean Value of Firm Cost of Capital (DIV) from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 10 
The Mean Value of the Firm Investment (REALG_PPE) and  
the Firm Cost of Capital (DIV) from 1977 to 2003 
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Figure 11 
The Mean Value of Firm Investment Rate (REALG_PPE) in Different Periods of 
1985 and 1987 Stock Market Liberalization  
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  Figure 12 
The Mean Value of Firm Cost of Capital  (DIV) in Different Periods of 1985 and 
1987 Stock Market Liberalization  
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Figure 13 
The Mean Value of Firm Performance (TOBINQ) from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 14 
Thailand Gross Domestic Product from 1979 to 2003 
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  Source: Bank of Thailand 
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Figure 15 
Thailand Net Capital Movement from 1979 to 2003 
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  Source: Bank of Thailand 
Figure 16 
The Mean Value of Firm Rate of Return on Investment from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 17 
The Mean Value of Firm Return on Asset (ROA) from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 18 
The Mean Value of Firm Debt to Equity Ratio from 1976 to 2003 
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Figure 19 
The Average Post 1985 Liberalization Debt to Equity Ratio Compared to Average 
Pre Liberalization Value Calculated over 1982 to 1984 
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Figure 20 
The Average Post 1987 Debt to Equity Ratio Compared to Average Pre 
Liberalization Value Calculated over 1984 to 1986 
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Figure 21 
The Mean Value of Firm Performance (TOBINQ) on the Pre, During, Post, and 
After Periods of the 1985 and 1987 Stock Market Liberalization  
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Figure 22 
The Mean value of Firm Performance (ROA) on the Pre, During, Post, and After 
Periods of the 1985 and 1987 Stock Market Liberalization  
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